

Bringing research to bear on public policy in Latin America Rethinking the roles and challenges for policy research institutes

Introduction

“What happens most often is that a research project contributes to what I have called “illumination”. It perforates ancient myths, offers new perspectives and changes priority in public affairs. Research also serves to construct capacities. It is a long-term influence, in which the research capacities of researchers, or of institutions or of whole countries increase.”
(Carol Weiss)

by Vanesa Weyrauch

It is now a common place to recognise public policy processes as complex, multidimensional, and even chaotic, phenomena in which state and non-state actors interact, frequently in various spaces simultaneously. Factors of a very diverse nature intervene in these processes: i) at the contextual level, economic, political, social and cultural factors that clearly determine the times and forms of these processes; ii) at the organisational level, features such as the predominant interests, resources and ideas of the institution; iii) at the individual level, issues like the motivations, capacities, knowledge and even emotions of the persons who meet and form shared bonds in spaces of interaction.

Therefore, looking into the question of how the knowledge generated by institutions interested in influencing these processes can be brought to bear is an arduous and complex task which is difficult to undertake, unless one assumes the partiality and relativity of a great deal of learning. In this regard, the researcher in such subjects may find a first common bridge of understanding with the public official who has to make decisions recognising that the knowledge they have may offer guidance, but is not a determining factor as to the path to take.

The object of this publication is to make a contribution to reflection and debate in Latin America on the roles and challenges facing policy research institutes (PRI) or think tanks when they seek to bring the knowledge they generate to bear on those responsible for public policy. It is included within the initiative “Spaces for commitment: using knowledge to improve public policy in favour of the poor”, implemented by CIPPEC in Latin America thanks to the support of the Global Development Network (GDNNet) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), through the Evidence-Based Policy Network¹. The principal aim of the initiative is to use knowledge management to improve the link between research and policy (BRP or *Bridging Research and Policy*) in Latin America by means of the creation of a plural and active community of practice, to include both PRI representatives and public officials interested in incorporating evidence into public decision-making. The essential idea is to promote and deepen the debate on how to strengthen the link between research and

¹ For further information see <http://www.ebpdn.org/index.php>.

policy and help improve the way in which actors mutually commit to it. It is based on the conviction that better interventions in the use of research in policy can lead to more effective public policy in favour of the poor in the region.

Generating research on this subject is one of the varied strategies to progress in the objectives posed above. Evidence, lessons and unanswered questions thrown up by the case studies and the comparative analysis included in this publication should be starting points from which to rethink and improve the daily practices of those persons and organisations interested in promoting the use of evidence in public policy processes. This means that they do not merely shed light on questions which are significant for the PRI, but that they also contribute with opportune reflections for researchers in general and for officials committed to improving the incorporation of research into public decision-making.

They are four case studies (in Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay) made with the aim of identifying, describing and analysing concrete experiences of interaction between a PRI and a State agency to use research and/or evidence in the design, implementation, monitoring or evaluation of a social policy. A brief description of these cases follows:

- 1) Case 1: What impacts has the participatory budget process of Paysandú, Uruguay, had on relations between the departmental government and local society? By Viviana Martínez.

The aim of this investigation was to identify the main contributions made to the Local Development Programme of the Project of the Latin American Centre of Human Economics, (CLAEH-GDP) in the process to strengthen citizen participation in the framework of the Participatory Budget (PB) of Paysandú in 2007. The project was carried out as part of the Local Development Programme of the CLAEH, which seeks to find a space for citizen participation through the Participatory Budget (for the period 2005 to 2008). In this particular case, qualitative methodology with an exploratory design was used. Sources of secondary information were collected and analysed, interviews were held, together with participatory observation of the elective Participatory Budget process; and finally assessment and diagnostic workshops were organised. The players involved were members of local society and municipal government (project representatives, local councillors, functionaries). After analysing the results of the PB process, reflections were made on the progress achieved in preparing social projects that contribute to the development of the community, and on opinions and perceptions as to progress in the process. This has thus led to the generation of knowledge to allow the Paysandú Departmental Government to make decisions on strengthening the PB process, and specific lines of action have been identified to promote a greater involvement of local society in the process.

- 2) Case 2: Impact of the scientific production of the Inter Trade Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIEESE) in implementing specific public policy for the protection of the quality of employment by Brazil's Ministry of Labour. By María Rosa Gamarra.

The purpose of this case study was to identify, describe and analyse joint experiences between the DIEESE (Inter-Syndicate Department of Socio-Economic Statistics and

Studies) and the Brazilian Ministry of Labour as regards improving labour policies in that country. The intention was to explain and illustrate the use of research and/or evidence in the design, monitoring and assessment of the protection of the quality of employment in Brazil by qualitative methodology. On the basis of interviews with members of the DIEESE, the Ministry of Labour and the team processing the secondary information sources, the report analyses the incidence of this organisation in identifying problems to be solved in the field of employment in Brazil and in the design of policies to be implemented by the Ministry of Labour. The study of this case places particular emphasis on the identity of the DIEESE (origin, mandate, circumstances and experience), on the history of the joint initiative between both institutions and on the national context, as relevant factors in allowing research to have a bearing on labour policies in that country and to be a useful tool in implementing them.

- 3) Case 3: External assessment of the Community Centre Development Programme of the Government of Jalisco, Mexico, conducted by El Colegio de Jalisco (ColJal). By Roberto Arias de la Mora and Alberto Arellano Ríos.

This investigation, which describes the institutional linkage between a government agency of a subnational sphere (Secretariat of Human Development of the Government of Jalisco) and a local research and higher education centre (El Colegio de Jalisco), tells the story of how both organisations cooperated in the formulation and implementation of the Community Centre Development Programme in Jalisco. The study was based fundamentally on the endogenous and exogenous factors that led to collaboration between the two bodies, with the SHD designing the public policy and the ColJal taking responsibility for the monitoring and assessment phases of the impacts, thus facilitating and improving the public policy formulation process. This report highlights the reality faced by institutions dedicated to research and by government agencies when working together. It sheds light on problems in the civil service in Latin America, and on the institutional weakness that remains in the subnational spheres of government and which restricts the possibilities that could be reached by bringing both sectors together.

- 4) Case 4: Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote: Realising social, economic and cultural rights by means of combating political clientelism in social programmes in Ecuador. By Orazio Bellettini and Melanie Carrión.

This study analyses the experience undertaken in Ecuador between the Grupo Faro and public administration in combating clientelism in nine social programmes in the country. On the one hand, the investigation includes an empirical theoretical debate on the subject of clientelism, and then discusses the practical experience of this case, especially the successful linkage between the investigation conducted by civil society and intervention in social programmes. Using qualitative methodology, the study is based on interviews with the Grupo Faro team, civil society organizations and the administrators of the social programmes, and on the analysis of documented information. It identifies internal and external factors that explain the success of the initiative, such as the acknowledgement of Grupo Faro's work on public policies, work which is objective-led, innovative, and which involves a multidisciplinary staff. The context in which the project emerged is also a facilitating factor: it was a moment of political crisis with institutional disruption in that demanded a purge in the

programmes; this crisis brought with it a renewal of directors who were open to change. It indicates, however, that beyond this particular situation, the lack of political will that so often limits the possibility of advancing in these experiences, is constantly present. However, it does not fail to encourage continued work to create a bridge between the theory and practice, which will no doubt improve the quality of public policies.

In all cases, the intention was to document and analyse the history of the joint initiative bearing the following variables in mind:

- The origins of the experiences (for example, if it was born through formal or informal agreements).
- The stage/s of public policy processes in which there was impact.
- The organisational characteristics of the actors committed to the experience.
- The characteristics of the evidence or research used (if they arose as a result of demand by the State or from the supply of the research institutions).
- The objective and goals of the joint work.
- The outcomes of the interaction.

On the basis of these variables, the cases sought to: 1) measure and explain if and how the type of link generated between the PRI and the government agency affected their capacity or lack of capacity to incorporate research into public policy; 2) identify and analyse the endogenous factors (internal and under the control of the actors) that play a key role in the success or failure of the joint experience; and 3) detect and analyse the exogenous factors (external and beyond the control of the actors) which either facilitated, or rather obstructed the impact of research on policy, functioning as bottlenecks, risks, policy windows, etc.

On the basis of these four studies, Carlos Acuña prepared a comparative study in which he aimed to systematise, analyse and frame the principal factors affecting the impact processes of the PRI in public policy in Latin America, to identify strengths and weaknesses. The specific objectives of this comparative analysis were to:

- 1) Draw up a theoretical framework.
- 2) Compare, analyse and draw conclusions on the basis of the case studies into the variables described above.
- 3) Compare *-ex-ante* and *ex-post*- if and how capacity was generated to incorporate research into public policy.
- 4) Compare and analyse the key endogenous factors in the effectiveness or failure of the initiatives.
- 5) Compare and analyse the exogenous factors that obstructed or facilitated the impact of research on public policy.
- 6) Draw general conclusions on the comparisons made.

As indicated in the analysis, the heterogeneity of situations and learning included in the case studies requires prudence in drawing up general theories or universal prescriptions based on the “good practices” observed in certain experiences. Therefore, it underlines the need to construct middle-range theories rather than universality in comprehending the PRI, and suggests placing the same accent that

already exists on understanding and diffusing good practices in understanding the failed practices.

Besides, it proposes that the pattern or type of origin of State-PRI interactions should impact crucially on the sustainability of its strategies, and in the logic of its organisation and strategic behaviour. It points out the need to recognise that the conflicts and interests that pass through the PRI indicate that not all of them are genuinely engaged in the purposes they claim to espouse.

As a final recommendation, Acuña proposes to abandon PRI as the entry point for understanding and improving the impact of research on public policy. Instead he suggests looking into the social impact on public policy on the basis of the social capacity to generate knowledge which is of use to governments and states.

In short, the publication sheds light especially on the dilemmas and challenges faced by those interested parties in improving the use of research in public decision-making, which is certainly not limited to the universe of PRI. Nevertheless, given the focus of the initiative under which this research project was devised and that the evidence was incorporated into policies makes it an essential part of the DNA of numerous PRI, and we hope with this publication to make a contribution to their capacity-building in the region.

Two questions emerge from the study that I consider key for the work to be undertaken in the near future. First of all, the importance of setting the bridge between research and public policy under a profound analysis and debate of the most general links between PRI and state agencies is becoming increasingly more evident. To this end it will be of great value to address questions such as trust-building, the value assigned by others to research versus ideologies, values or political criteria, the existence of mechanisms or institutionalised spaces to regulate the interaction, and asymmetry in resources such as access to information.

Secondly, it is necessary to rethink the question of time frames for promoting and strengthening the links between research and policy. Evidently, it is not the same to build a culture of using evidence in policy, or installing a new topic on the policy agenda as ensuring that a specific piece of research translated in terms of public policy recommendation should cause a modification in a draft bill of law. To this end, the consensus on time frames for any objective linked with a better use of evidence in decision-making becomes fundamental in aiming at better articulation, and realistically managing the expectations, possibilities and constraints.

On the other hand, with this initiative we plan to continue travelling down this road, complementing the valuable finds and problems detected in this investigation with different instances of debate, reflection and generation of practical knowledge to contribute to generating concrete changes in the practices of the PRI. To do so, we also believe it is crucial to strengthen a community of practice which is genuinely committed to using knowledge in improving public policy in favour of development with growth and equity.



**SPACES FOR ENGAGEMENT: USING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOUR OF THE POOR**

**Comparative analysis of four case studies on policy
research institutes (or *think tanks*)
in Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay.**

Final report

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Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 2009.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is a comparative study on the main factors that have an influence in the impact processes of public policy think tanks in Latin America. It is based on the results of four successful experiences in policy research institutes (PRI, or think tanks) in Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay, in the context of the project “Spaces for commitment: using knowledge to improve public policy in favour of the poor” (GDN – CIPPEC, 2008-2009). Its structure provides an analytical framework in which the notion of PRI/think tank is reconsidered, and it recommends that the “narrow” conceptualisations concerning these players be flexibilised. It then defines the variables required for analysis and comprehension of the study object (institutions, stakeholders, capacities, interests, etc.); before finally identifying the thematic axes that will serve as the focus of attention of the comparative study: origins of the experiences; stage of the public policy in which there was impact; organisational characteristics of the players; characteristics of the evidence/research used; objectives/goals of the joint work; outcomes of the interaction; capacity-building to incorporate research in public policy and its causes; and the role of endogenous and exogenous factors in obstructing and/or facilitating the impact of research in public policy. After summarising the contents of each case study, the paper moves onto the comparative analysis of the information and conclusions contained in the case studies, highlighting the aspects of homogeneity and heterogeneity they present, as well as their reasons. The comparative study ends by drawing conclusions and recommendations on:

- . The need to focus on the construction of middle-range theories rather than universality in comprehending PRI/think tanks, as well as placing the same accent as already exists on comprehending and promoting good practices in understanding failed practices because, without this diversity in the explanation of why an event occurs in one case and not in another, no comparative analysis can legitimately support a recommendation to replicate experiences between societies.
- . That the pattern or type of origin of the PRI/think tanks-State interactions basically influences both the sustainability of these strategies and also the logic of organisation and strategic behaviour of the PRI/think tanks.
- . The need to recognise that not all PRI/think tanks are beautiful, and the conflicts and interests that afflict them.

As a final recommendation, the paper proposes abandoning PRI/think tanks as the entry point for comprehension and improvement of the impact of research on public policy. This recommendation seeks to enquire into the social impact on public policy on the basis of the social capacity to generate knowledge which is functional to governments and States. The stakeholders and dynamics of this impact will be varied and will include PRI/think tanks, but without excluding other stakeholders, more closely related to the various historical processes of this impact in our different societies.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper pursues the aim¹ of making a comparative study that systematises, analyses and provides a framework for the principal factors affecting the impact processes of public policy think tanks in Latin America, in order to identify strengths and weaknesses.

It is based on the results of four successful experiences undertaken by policy research institutes (PRI or think tanks) in Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay, in the context of the project “Spaces for commitment: using knowledge to improve public policy in favour of the poor” (GDN – CIPPEC, 2008-2009).

It consists of five chapters. After a brief introduction, Chapter II discusses the analytical framework which underpins the study. It reviews the notion of PRI or *think tanks* and, in a second stage, specifies the contents and variables necessary to analyse and, finally, to identify the thematic axes that will be the focus of attention in the comparative study.

On the basis of the analytical structure discussed in the previous chapter, Chapter III is a schematic summary of the information provided by the four case studies:

. *What impacts has the participatory budget process of Paysandú had on relations between the departmental government and local society?*; by Viviana Martínez (Montevideo, December 2008).

. *Impact of the scientific production of the DIEESE in implementing specific public policy for the protection of the quality of employment by Brazil’s Ministry of Labour*; by María Rosa Gamarra (La Paz, January 2009).

. *External Assessment of the Government of Jalisco’s Development Programme of Community Centres by El Colegio de Jalisco*; by Roberto Arias de la Mora and Alberto Arellano Ríos (Jalisco, November 2008).

. *Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote: realising social, economic and cultural rights by attacking political clientelism in social programmes in Ecuador*; by Orazio Bellettini and Melanie Carrión (Quito, December 2008).

Based on the same analytical structure, Chapter IV sets out the comparative analysis of the information and conclusions contained in the case studies.

Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions based on the comparative analysis of the cases, as well as general conclusions and recommendations on the principal factors that affect the impact processes of public policy think tanks in Latin America, on the basis of the strengths and weaknesses identified during the development of the paper.

¹ Both the general and specific objectives of the paper are set out in section 2, p.3, of the terms of reference for the production of this comparative study (GDN – CIPPEC, January 2009).

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This Chapter discusses the analytical framework which underpins the study. As explained in the Introduction, it is structured into three sections: the first reviews the concept of PRI or think tank; the second defines the contents and variables that make up the analytical framework for the comparative analysis; and, finally, the third identifies the thematic axes that will focus the attention of the comparative study.

2.1 POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES (PRI): RECONSIDERING THEIR NATURE (ONCE AGAIN!)

It is a repeated (and often annoying) practice in papers on PRI/think tanks to begin by making clarifications and taking a stance on the meaning of this category of sociopolitical actor. This paper is no exception and the reason is clear: there is no agreement on the limits of inclusion/exclusion that characterise this category, which inevitably implies a weakness in the causal models that seek to understand their functioning and impact, as well as recommend strategies to strengthen their contribution to the improvement of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness of public policy.

Irreverently, reality tends to be as rebellious in the face of the pigeonholes and concepts with which we aspire to bring it under control (at least, theoretically-methodologically) as an autonomy determined by the varied conditions and historical processes that forge these actors in each society (in line with the arguments of Stone, 2004 – cited by Uña 2006: 180-).

In such a context, this section offers various definitions and later identifies problems or weaknesses, before finally deciding upon the alternative that seems most conducive to addressing the PRI/think tanks as a study object.

PRI/think tanks tend to be thought of as research institutes, or civil society and private organisations which, without a profit motive, produce information and knowledge with the basic aim of influencing in some aspect the public policy process (Abelson 2006; Uña 2006; Uña, Lupica & Strazza 2009). So they are non-profit organisations “which study public policy issues in order to introduce their conclusions into the system of public decision-making” (Ducoté 2006: 222)². Therefore, “... think tanks are thought of as an informal stakeholder³ of increasing relevance in the policy-making process” (Abelson 2006, cited by Uña 2009: 8), in short policy actors (Braun, Chudnovsky, Ducoté, Weyrauch, s/f: 8-9).

² For an understanding of the historical process of the relationship between “expert knowledge” and policy, see, among others, Abelson (2002b), Brunner (1996), Camou (2006), Coser (1965), De León (1999), Haass (2002), McGann (2002), Stone (1996) and Weiss (1977).

³ The “informal” categorisation aims to differentiate these actors from those who formally (i.e., in institutionalised form due to the laws and regulations in force in the context of the political system) fulfil the function of impacting/deciding/implementing and sustaining the process of public policy-making (political parties, government powers, etc.).

What is remarkable about this first approach is that PRI/think tanks are thought of as actors both in the production of information/knowledge, and in the design and implementation of strategies to influence policy with the product/recourse of specialised knowledge. There are at least two assumptions behind this conception: firstly, the notion of actor suggests rationality inasmuch as, given a certain distribution of political, institutional, economic and ideological resources, they behave by pursuing their interests/objectives, establishing a means-ends relationship. Secondly, the condition of actor also implies attributing the PRI/think tanks with capacity for strategic action, which means a capacity to identify interests, define objectives in terms of such interests, design a course of action to reach these objectives and enjoy relative autonomy in implementing that course of action.

In short, recognising PRI/think tanks as actors inevitably implies attributing them with high degrees of strategic autonomy. Without that autonomy they should be thought of as “agents” or “organisational resources” which, although they produce knowledge and collaborate in influencing public policy, do so on behalf of another (individual or collective) subject, who effectively enjoys the condition of actor. In other words, PRI/think tanks remain in the place of “agents” or “resources” of the one who strategically decides what to try and influence (The priority), why (the interest/objective) and how (the course of action). Obviously, if the PRI/think tanks are not attributed with the condition of actors, comprehension of their functioning and impact would demand that they be identified as “carriers” of a logic not of their own and, consequently, would involve moving the analytical focus back towards their leaders and, therefore, the logic that ultimately moves and shapes their behaviour.

This recognition of the condition of autonomy as key for PRI/think tanks is clear to see in those definitions that place the accent not only on the condition of non-profit civil society organisation of these actors that produce knowledge with the aim of impacting public policy, but also their necessary independence in relation to government structures, political parties and (entrepreneurial or trade union) interest groups (Stone, 1996). In fact, in the list of what is considered to be outside the rule of inclusion in the category, other studies (such as Braun, Chudnovsky, Ducoté & Weyrauch, n/d: 15-16) highlight universities and/or the study centres that belong to them for a twofold reason: on the one hand, these centres apparently do not enjoy strategic autonomy as they are set in institutional-organisational spheres that transcend them and in which decision-making on research priorities, obtaining and distributing economic and human resources, as well as strategies of diffusion and influence, are largely outside their control (and fall to university authorities with the capacity to control or, at least, significantly curtail the actions of these centres). On the other hand, the main function of universities is teaching and research and not policy impact, so although the product of their structures, departments or research centres has an impact on the content of public policy, this would not be a sufficient condition to consider them think tanks. At best, it would make them an important seedbed of professionals or experts in which some of them,

at a personal level, do aspire to influence public policy with their research⁴. Besides, it should not be forgotten that within minimum parameters of respect for rights and values a desirable property of the condition of being a university, and its dynamic of research and training, is that of holding and fostering debate between diverse theoretical-methodological lines, a property that naturally acts against the efficiency and efficacy of the objective of influencing public policy because this type of academic pluralism frequently entails contradictory policy preferences (and recommendations).

These “narrow” visions on the constraints of PRI/think tanks face tensions with “broader” definitions on their nature, with some of the usual classifications, as well as with the inclusion of some of the case studies considered in this analysis. For instance, habitual classifications such as those by Uña (2006 and 2009) which consider academic centres, private research centres, political foundations and advocacy groups as possible types of PRI/think tanks, ignore the restriction on academic or private research centres, or political party foundations. More eclectic positions, such as that of Prat (cited in Uña, 2006: 181), explicitly consider that the basic purpose of think tanks is “...to influence in public decision-making for two reasons that are not mutually exclusive: the accumulation of resources of power that means that they are able to impose their own ideas, and *satisfying the objectives of a third, be it a party or a business sector*” (own italics), explicitly ignoring the condition of autonomy in defining the objectives of the organisation, inevitably weakening its condition as an actor). Finally, criticising what we call the “narrow” vision of PRI/think tanks, Garcé (2006), in line with Stone (2005), argues that this notion reflects the “Anglo-American” tradition of think tanks and has little to do with the dynamic that characterises them in other regions of the world. From this point of view, an organisation should be defined as a think tank if it falls within one of the five subtypes: 1) NGO; 2) university research centres, 3) government research centres, or ones funded by the State; 4) related with corporations or the business sector; and 5) generated by politicians or parties.

By now, regardless of any possible (dis)agreement we may have with the conflicting notions of PRI/think tanks, it should be clear that the botanical approach (i.e. predominantly classificatory of who is “in” and who is “out”) to different kinds of actors is of little use as an analytical starting point. In any case, the classification on who is what should be part of the arrival point.

⁴ A clear example of this is the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago which, with neoclassical theoretical-methodological consistency, led the way in the production of information and theory with particular impact after the neo-Keynesian crisis of the second half of the seventies and, particularly, in the eighties and nineties. This impact was not only theoretical-academic but was clearly influential in the understanding, diagnosis, design and implementation of public strategies of multilateral bodies and governments globally. In addition, some of its most acclaimed members acted as direct advisors to different governments in policy design and implementation. However, despite meeting the conditions of an information and theory production centre, not being a profit-making centre, as well as its production having a strong impact on policy making, regardless of the conduct of some of its members as political advisors, the fact that its main institutional objective should effectively focus on education and knowledge production prevent it being thought of as a think tank.

In this context, my proposal for a notion of PRI/think tanks more in keeping with the necessary equilibrium between theoretical parsimony and an “undisciplined” reality means stressing functions⁵ and properties instead of names and surnames of actors as an analytical starting point. **I specifically propose to consider as PRI/think tanks, 1) collective actors; who are 2) formally institutionalised; 3) not-for-profit; and 4) whose dominant, formalised or de facto organisational function should be to influence public policy; 5) through the production and transmission of knowledge; 6) transmission whose focus may include different actors liable to weigh directly or indirectly on forging and implementing policy (whether governmental, paragonovernmental or social actors, or citizens in general).** Although it seems not to be too different from some we have already seen, this format of definition is different in terms of the theoretical-methodological implications of its assumptions:

1) When speaking of “collective actors” we speak of high autonomy (although always in comparison to the historical-social context in which the actors finds themselves), regardless of whether they are in more comprehensive institutions or not. This entails the possibility of incorporating research centres (in public or private universities or, even, with predominantly government or state funding), business, trade union or political party foundations, as long as the organisation demonstrates strategic action capacity which, as we have already established, means capacity to act with significant autonomy to identify interests, define objectives in terms of them, design a course of action to reach those objectives and enjoy relative autonomy to implement that course of action. In this respect, it is contingent on the various historical, political and organisational processes if this type of centre and/or foundation attains or not the condition of actor or the capacity of autonomy to which we refer, or if it simply remains on the plane of “agents” or “resources” of a (state, governmental, university, entrepreneurial, political or trade union) third. Therefore, since these centres or foundations may or may not become PRI/think tanks, depending on whether they attain the condition of actor and not strictly in terms of the “ideal type” of organisation, names such as “academic centres”, “business foundation”, etc. are suggested.

2) By indicating in points 2) and 3) that they are formally institutionalised as not-for-profit, a two-fold condition is established: their situation as organisations with positive and clear written rules on inclusion/exclusion and functioning (which blocks the possibility of considering collective actions without a formal and relatively stable organisation to support them as PRI/think tanks), as well as removing them from the profit motive as the engine of their origin and development.

⁵ Accentuating the predominant function that occurs as a criterion in identifying the character of the organisation/actor does not entail assuming a functionalist logic and abandoning causal logic for the proposed analysis. Recognising that organisations and actors fulfil functions does not entail the need for a teleological vision of social processes, in which a “whole” or macrosocial structure determines, with biologicistic logic and without leaving a margin for the strategic actions of actors in history, compliance with functions in response to systemic needs (ultimately independent of the awareness of subjects and determining factors of their behaviours).

3) Thirdly, that points 4) and 5) on the fact that “the dominant, formalised or de facto organisational function should be impact on public policy through the production and transmission of knowledge,” although it ratifies a central condition of any PRI/think tank (such as that of influencing public policy through the production and transmission of knowledge), the incorporation of the possibility that it is “de facto” implies once again rejecting the properties of the “ideal type” (e.g. “university”) to recognise that what is important is the function that it effectively fulfils and whether it predominates over the logic that governs the organisation. In other words, although the “ideal type” of university indicates that its nature works against that of a PRI/think tank, this point reveals in the analysis of spatial and temporal historical processes that a university in fact transforms its nature, without modifying its formal condition as a university, moving towards the organisational logic of a PRI/think tank. This change alludes to the inevitable consequence that a university that has in fact become a PRI/think tank will necessarily violate the principles of pluralism and academic excellence implicit in the search for debate between diverse or even conflicting theoretical-methodological positions that are at its core. In this context, argumentation does not obstruct the possibility that a subsystem or internal collective actors from a university (e.g. a study centre or postgraduate course) might attain the capacity for autonomous strategic action and develop actions to impact public policy in any of the stages of these processes. In such cases, if no organisational modification mediates in the process of this function of political impact becoming the dominant objective of the organisation (abandoning the traditional –and surely founding- functions of teaching and research), the development of this impact activity would not allow this centre or postgraduate course to be considered a PRI/think tank. On the other hand, if an organisational modification can really be verified in the sense that the objective of impacting on policy predominates over the “traditional” academic functions, a “mutation” of this actor from an academic nature to a political one would be reproduced⁶.

4) Finally, point 6) stresses that the impact on public policy should not necessarily be understood as linear action or transmission of ideas between the PRI/think tank and government decision-makers or those who implement policies in the State, but it is a process that admits both indirect paths of political influence on the government and/or the State (through other influential stakeholders or the electorate itself), and paths “travelled” at higher and less tangible levels of aggregation of daily policy actions (e.g. acting on the models that shape the thinking or “ideological environment” of the decision-makers, of the experts who advise them, of specific social groups or classes or of citizens in general).

⁶ Here too we must state it is not being suggested, or even considered, that the academic sphere should be discrete, divorced from ideologies, commitments or political struggles. This means that, regardless of the (often desirable) superposition between political and academic processes, the logic of the latter demands spaces for debate, exchange and plurality of ideas for training and research processes, which are necessarily restricted in political collective actors (for whom it is essential to reduce the internal margins of debate and heterogeneity of thinking, particularly when deciding and implementing a common policy strategy –central/strategic event for political action which is disruptive of the character of spheres and activities of academic actors).

In short, more than a list establishing rules of inclusion/exclusion on the basis of “ideal types of organisation” (OSC, foundation of..., research centre, university, etc.), PRI/think tanks must be considered as those policy actors that satisfy the six functional conditions listed in the definition. In this respect, it is to be hoped that the composition of the group of PRI/think tanks will vary in each society in terms of the specific historical-social processes that characterise them (for instance, in one, including universities or political party foundations, and not in another because universities are what they “should be” and, quite simply, political parties do not have PRI/think tanks in their structures).

It is on the basis of this notion of PRI/*think tank* that we move on to a methodology for their analysis.

2.2 PRI AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT: HOW TO ANALYSE THEM⁷

The logic of organisation and impact of PRI/think tanks is a logic set within the general relationship between policy actors and the processes of forging public policy, so it must be understood together with the categories inherent in any policy process.

The stages of public policy usually defined as setting the agenda, formulating alternatives for action, government decisions, implementing those decisions, assessing the process and its impacts, and future courses of action (Tamayo Sáez, 1997) are critical moments that are subject to dispute and in which different players (including PRI/think tanks) participate. Each one of them has different interests and is endowed with certain resources of power and different ideological conceptions. Moreover, the interaction between these actors is subject to rules. Formal and informal institutions make up the social organisation of political power: they offer the various sectors affected by policy decisions different probabilities to resolve their problems of collective action and become an actor, while offering established actors different possibilities of realising their interests.

In brief, political-institutional variables account for the framework of distribution of power and rules of the game in which the dispute occurs between the actors that impact (or seek to impact) on policy. However, since the focus of this comparative study is on the framework of the actions of PRI/think tanks “in favour of the poor”, from now on examples and references will be linked to poverty reduction as the focus of the question. So, the political dispute on the policy to combat poverty must be explained in terms of the system of political institutions that manage this policy and the strategies of the actors involved, determined by their perceptions, their interests and their capacities.

The decisions on policy to combat poverty arise from the strategic interaction between the individual and collective actors intervening. In order to understand/explain why things occurred as they did, it is necessary to understand/explain why the players did what they did.

⁷ Section based on Acuña & Repetto (2009).

And this intentionality is only explicable on the basis of understanding the way in which institutions or incentives influence the actor. A single institutional structure can produce different behaviour in terms of other incentives (institutions or games) in which the actor may be simultaneously involved with its interests, capacities and ideology.

From the above, it is evident that the institutions, the actors and the way in which they articulate in order to forge behaviours, demand specific attention.

. **Institutions**⁸. We understand institutions to be the set of rules that structure incentives for exchanges and the actions of the stakeholders. Institutions, or rules, may be formal (defined as positive law or regulations) or informal (a shared understanding on how something functions when not covered by formal rules or when it contradicts them). Non-credible formal rules are usually accompanied by effective informal rules. When they are not, chaos or anomy reigns. Real life behaviour is rarely a result of one or other type of rule, incentive or institution: in fact, it tends to reflect varying mixes of formal and informal institutionality, so although any approach to an analysis of the effects of institutionality demands to be based on specific institutional spaces (e.g. the space that governs and contains relations within the Executive or the interjurisdictional relations between Executives, etc.), it also demands as a starting point an understanding of the integral logic that results from the counterpositions and even contradictions of incentives that are triggered from specific spaces and which, in short, is what materialises the influence of institutions on the behaviour of the actors.

Institutions aim to resolve both coordination problems and distribution conflicts. Players take the actions of other players into account when preparing their strategies. Interests and government decisions are affected by rules/institutions that operate at different levels. The way in which these different rules interact structures the set of options and differential probabilities of success the actors face when planning and attempting to implement strategies. This institutional sphere structures the problem of institutional reforms designed to improve the production of social policies.

Rules or institutions, whether formal or informal, can be classified in terms of the level of domain. First level rules, R1, have to do with specific outcomes or contents such as, for example, a reduction in unemployment through a Transitory Employment Plan. The Plan, adopted by various ministries, multilateral lending bodies and included by Congress in the Budget Law, establishes the conditions of individual and regional eligibility, as well as the conditions and resources for its implementation. On balance, the rule is taken as given: the actors will maximise their interests by implementing strategies in terms of their resources, ideology, interests and the structure of options defined by the most credible rules. Therefore, potential beneficiaries may or may not take advantage of the Plan, accept it with reservations, etc., and those excluded must accept their condition. The balance of the rule may be altered by different actors: those excluded may demand to be included by different individual means (consideration of exception) or collective means (demand to reformulate the eligibility criteria); political players, such as regional governors, may also contest the balance,

⁺⁸ Based on arguments by Acuña & Tommasi (2000).

demanding the inclusion of the jurisdictions under their control, etc. Different dominant strategies will lead to the accomplishment or frustration of the objective and to optimal or sub-optimal social results. R1 rules structure the options for the actors' strategies and determine real outcomes in relation to specific issues.

Second level rules, R2, are those that determine specific results (at R1 level). A law that identifies decision-makers and the way in which they decide on lower level rules, for instance, the role of the Legislative and the areas of the Executive responsible for the design, adoption and execution of the mentioned Transitory Employment Plan, falls within the category of formal R2. The inclusion of Governors of the ruling party or of NGOs linked to the Catholic Church in decisions on the format and nature of the Plan is an example of informal R2 (assuming, of course, that the case is not that of a society with formal Catholic predominance in government affairs).

Third level rules, R3, are those that govern lower level rules (R2) that in turn determine those of a still lower level (R1) and that induce specific outcomes. R3 rules define who and how rules are made in general terms (i.e. other than specific matters). In this regard, R3 level institutions define the processes of political participation and decision-making processes at a social level. These rules define the nature of the political system. Constitutions are obviously examples of formal R3.

Finally it should be stressed that rules, and their content in real life, are politically contingent in relation with historically anchored processes and that they do not necessarily respect "ideal types" or logical classifications such as this one. In other words, while some societies have R3 rules that include strong R2 or, even, R1⁹ components, other cases have R2 level laws that incorporate the creation/organisation of regulation or control agencies for any future lower level specific decision that may result from it. It is not that institutions follow a rigid organisational logic by interconnected levels or layers as those described above, or that specific institutions do not mix levels. Our argument is that all institutional functioning demands a hierarchical division of functions which may be thought of in terms of R1, R2 and R3 levels. In addition, and of greater relevance for our discussion, recognising this hierarchical division of functions not only helps to comprehend the form in which institutions function but also affects the behaviour and strategies of actors, a central aspect in analysing the feasibility and probability of success of policy to combat poverty and its institutionality.

. **Actors.** In managing and controlling policy to reduce poverty multiple actors intervene. Their identification varies according to the dimension of the system under analysis and the stage of the policy that needs to be understood. We have already defined actors as individual

⁹ For example, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 even seeks to regulate interest rates. Another example of "mixed" levels in terms of domestic political contingencies is seen when comparing the relationship between domestic legislation and international pacts. While in the case of Argentina the 1994 Constitution places these pacts as determining factors of local legislation and, therefore, on a level that we can consider R4, the Brazilian Constitution establishes that in the event of conflict local legislation must prevail, placing international pacts on level R2 or, depending on the matter in question, on R1.

or collective subjects with capacity for strategic action, which implies the capacity to identify interests, define objectives in terms of such interests, design a course of action to reach them and enjoy relative autonomy in implementing that course of action.

The actors that have an impact in Government or policy are not restricted to the state sphere. Political representatives, decision-makers and public managers have a fundamental position in the processes of design, decision-making and implementation of policy to combat poverty. Nevertheless, other players also intervene. In general, they are organisations that represent categories of individuals in terms of their role within the system related to poverty (the poor themselves, political parties outside the government-state sphere, *PRI/think tanks*, civil society organisations, trade unions, multilateral development agencies, etc).

Not all the groups affected by a decision on policy to combat poverty are actors. The condition of actor requires the capacity to draw up and implement collective strategies. Although they may have interests at stake in the content of a decision, some groups fail to reach that condition. The scope of the status of actor is conditioned, in turn, by the content of the rules and the capacities for organisation the various social groups develop. Explaining the nature of the actor and the logic of its behaviour requires that three elements be incorporated into the analysis: i) its interests; ii) its resources/capacities; and iii) its ideas/understanding.

. The problem of interests

The concept of interest is one of the most complex in our disciplines. The aim of these lines is not to resolve the question, but to point out some of the more complex problems and define the way in which this paper proposes to “administer” them.

A first, and traditional, definition of interest is that which suggests that interest is in fact what the actor says it is. The advantage of this “pluralist” vision of interests is that it offers us important clues on part of the causes of the behaviour of actors. A “subjective” interest is, in short, what moves an actor in one direction and not in another. As we shall see below, from this point of view, the notion of interest as a codetermining variable of conducts and strategies is closely linked with the ideology or subjective perception of the actor.

The immediate problems that this definition of interest faces are those that cast doubt on the autonomy of the actor as the best judge of his interests: a) actors as the object of social policies that due to their condition do not have sufficient capacity to define their interests autonomously (infants, mental patients, etc.); b) “interests” of such complexity that they demand the intervention of experts to establish causal relations (e.g. actors who see their health interests affected by a deteriorating ozone layer, and therefore by causes imperceptible to their senses or immediate comprehension, will only be able to develop effective behaviour of defence on the basis of advice, recommendations or exercise of the authority of those who have the capacity to establish the complex relationships between ultraviolet rays, ozone layer and skin condition, i.e. the experts).

The second definition of interest is that which deals with all aspects linked to the well-being of the actor, regardless of whether he recognises it as such (regardless of what the actor says

it is). Recognition of the “objective” aspects of the interests of the actors, i.e. those aspects outside his “subjective” recognition, opens a risky door to authoritarian intervention by those who “know” the interests of the actors better than the actors themselves. However, it is clear that although the subjective aspects of the interests are key in accounting for behaviours, the objective aspects are also key in accounting for what effectively happens to the actor.

The tension between these two conceptions of interest is at the centre of some of the dilemmas and challenges posed by policy to combat poverty: how is the knowledge of experts and PRI/think tanks articulated with that of poor social groups? Does community “participation” have as an object to incorporate the knowledge of civil society actors in the process of diagnosis, design and implementation of the social policies or, if not, is the object for these actors to learn and “appropriate” certain knowledge and technologies in order to solve their problems? In a clear problem of agency, is it the political representatives who are the agents designed to solve the problems of information in the “true” (i.e. objective) interests of a principal area of need (those that perhaps suffer the same information problems as those they represent, on the impact of the deteriorating ozone layer, for instance)? Or is it the experts, the PRI/think tanks? Or are we facing a twofold problem of agency in which the experts and PRI/think tanks act as agents of the principal (the poor...) and, simultaneously, agents of the politicians (who also play the role of agents of the poor, although with a different function to the experts)?

The answers to these questions probably vary in terms of the technological development and the political organisation of each society, as well as in the type of social good to provide, and the instance or phase within the global cycle of a social policy. Here we see an example on the difficulty of seeking universally valid recipes in content: is community participation in diagnosing and deciding on social policy positive at all times and places, or is it advisable to establish articulations between this participation and the role of different agents (among which the PRI/think tanks stand out), in terms of different issues and moments of the social policy process?

One final complication: the (objective and subjective) interests of social groups that do not attain the condition of actor, a) either because they lack the resources to solve their collective action problems (a situation in which the interests can be recognised by those affected but, nevertheless, do not produce policy impact, not even as a demand), b) or because they do not recognise their affected common interests (a situation that takes us back to previous proposals). By focusing an analysis of interests linked to social policies on players alone (i.e. on those that have resolved problems of collective action and, in some way, perceive a shared interest as one affected), those who should urgently become the focus of political action to combat poverty are left aside.

In the face of these complications, the proposal of approximation is eclectic: so as to address a complex discussion on the meaning of the category of “interest” an approach is proposed that incorporates various dimensions: a) it is necessary to contemplate in the analysis what the actors say their interests are to be able to explain conducts (subjective notion of interest); b) it is necessary to consider in the analysis what the experts define as interest of a group or social actor, because it allows possible consequences to be projected regardless of whether they are

perceived or not by the actor (objective notion of interest), and allows the conduct of experts and, at times, of political representatives to be explained; c) it is necessary to consider in the analysis the social interests that are not expressed either in conducts or in the emergence of actors, because it is a central requirement for equity in policy to combat poverty.

The relevance of resources and capacities

The question of resources/capacities that actors have may be placed on a shared analytical matrix but it shows somewhat different aspects when analysing social actors and state actors. For the former, the ability to organise and deploy strategies can be estimated by taking five parameters into account: a) the capacity for negotiation (i.e. the possibility to influence the real instances of policy formulation and management on the basis of the political and economic resources available); b) the capacity to decipher the context (i.e. the possibility to access the greatest quantity and quality of essential information throughout the public policy process); c) the capacity of representation (in the case of social actors, this refers to having a leadership able to legitimately express to those who make up its support "base"; as for state actors, it refers to the legal and political backing for their administrative actions); d) the capacity for social mobilisation (possibility of putting pressure on the others involved through sheer numbers –and their forms of expression– at certain times and places); and e) the capacity for collective action (i.e. the possibility of solving the *free-rider* problem). Of all these capacities, a) and b) obviously stand out in relation to the functions and actions of PRI/think tanks.

The dispute over the policy to combat poverty does not usually occur between isolated actors, but in alliances or coalitions which allow the resources of each actor to grow in strength by themselves. In the political dispute, the capacity of groups to become substantive stakeholders depends on their capacity to cultivate the types of resources indicated above, or to ally themselves with stakeholders which have them.

When analysing state actors, it is necessary to identify the capacities of those who intervene on the national plane in actions for poverty reduction (ministries, secretariats or whatever specific format they may adopt), as well as the form in which they affect the concrete management processes of the policies and programmes designed to tackle this problem. Three capacities stand out: a) political; b) budgetary; and c) organisational.

By “political capacity” we understand the relative force of the instance(s) with the responsibility of governing and coordinating the system to combat poverty, which means setting objectives, mobilising certain resources, carrying out actions and leading coordination processes. Given that the components of the fight against poverty are various, as a necessary responsibility this political capacity requirement can fall to a single political unit (ministry, secretariat, etc.) or a plurality of units that may share (and/or compete for) the resources destined to tackle poverty. Whatever the case, it implies paying attention both to the formal authority that emanates from the institutionality of the political system and to the informal aspects that allow coalitions, whether of support or opposition, to be formed.

“Budgetary capacity” refers to the relationship between the allocation of economic-financial resources that the Ministry or area of social action obtains in the budget distribution to carry out its tasks and the social problems it must address with those resources.

“Organisational capacity” means the way in which the definition of roles and functions, of administrative procedures and human resources allows the management problems of the social area being analysed to be tackled. Among other aspects, it implies the possibility of processing pertinent information for public decision-making in social matters. In this last dimension of state capacity, a central element is associated with the rules that govern public administration as a whole, in aspects such as the recruitment of agents, their training, the structure of incentives that frame their actions, etc.

The relation between these management capacities and the political dynamic reemerges as central when assessing the quality of social policies, by considering that the absence of efficient bureaucracies shows a close relationship with the preponderance of the logic of political exchange that invades social public management. The vicious circle of social management policy is reproduced by the advances of party politics on the social areas that debilitate the creation of a trained and efficient administrative corps, a weakness that, in turn, prevents the presence of a bureaucratic corps, whose interests and ideology could in fact restrict the advance and predominance of a short-term, changing and clientelist political logic in managing the policy of poverty reduction.

The dimensions associated with the economic and the organisational are treated by the proposed methodology as restrictions in the political-institutional process of design, decision and implementation of policies on poverty reduction (given the focus in the political-institutional dimension that characterises this paper).

The role of ideology (ideas/understanding)

Besides being characterised by certain interests and possessing determined resources/capacities, the intervening actors are guided by cognitive maps in designing and implementing their strategies. It is a question of those ideas and identities that organise their priorities, raise awareness as to desirable states of the world and promote certain courses of action to the detriment of others through the provision of an explanation on how social relations do, could and should function. In this respect, the policy to combat poverty is conditioned by the ideology of those who become political leaders, spokespersons for collective actors, PRI/*think tanks*, as well as by the ideology or “common sense” that predominates in society. In this framework of analysis, ideology bears witness to the model of thinking which, combining values, identity, culture and knowledge (or ignorance), leads the actor to suppose that a given behaviour will result in a desirable state of things. Without the actor’s comprehension of the ideology, their behaviours cannot be explained. The relationship between interests and behaviour is mediated by ideology: interests orient behaviour only if they are recognised in the plane of their ideology or understanding.

. Articulating institutions and actors to explain behaviours and their impact

Summarising the discussion so far, the analysis of the decisions and implementation of a poverty reduction policy and its relation with PRI/*think tanks* must consider:

- a) The **institutional framework** in which the interaction occurs, defining the *formal and informal rules*.
- b) The **participating actors** defined on the basis of their *interests, resources/capacities* and *ideology*.
- c) The characteristics of the **social groups in a situation of poverty** with restrictions for resolving their problems of collective action and, therefore, with difficulties to become participating actors, as well as of their relation with different agents that fulfil the function of representing their interests (from governors, politicians in general, to PRI/*think tanks*).

It is in the specific form adopted by the articulation between institutions and actors in each society which is crystallised in its history, capacities, characteristics and the nature of “its” poverty.

So far certain analytical distinctions have been established to help to understand each stage of policy to combat poverty. However, the concrete processes of government and coordination of these policies are dynamic and are characterised by each actor’s multiplicity of interests. The actors that influence these policies, including the PRI/*think tanks*, deploy simultaneous conducts in different spaces or policy arenas. In this regard, the public policy process can be represented as an articulation of multiple institutional spaces in which the actions of each actor in each space affect its position in the remaining areas in which it takes action. Although not all actors play in all institutional spaces or spheres, all actors participate in more than one and, what is relevant for this perspective, they think of more than one of these spheres of play or political struggle before deploying strategic behaviour. In other words, the incentive structures the actors face simultaneously are complex and diverse.

2.3 WHAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANALYSING THE CASE STUDIES

The comparative analysis of systematised information on the four case studies will give as a focus the questions and axes established in the terms of reference of the project¹⁰, that is, origins of the experiences; the public policy stage in which there was impact; organisational characteristics of the actors; characteristics of the evidence/research used; objective/goals of the joint work; results of the interaction; generation of the capacity to incorporate research in public policy and their causes; and, finally, the role of endogenous and exogenous factors¹¹ in obstructing and/or facilitating the impact of research in public policy.

¹⁰ In points 2, 3, 4 and 5 of section 2.2 “Specific Objectives”, p. 3, in the “Terms of Reference for Producing a Comparative Study” of the case studies carried out under the project Spaces for commitment: using knowledge to improve public policy in favour of the poor, GDN-CIPPEC, Buenos Aires, January 2009.

¹¹ “Endogenous” is understood to mean those strategic factors internal to the organisation that facilitated the public policy link, while “exogenous” factors are understood to be those elements

III. SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF THE CASE STUDIES

This chapter is a summary, in parts almost an X-ray, of the case studies since it is assumed that the disaggregated information is at the disposal of the reader, and that the most salient features in terms of the comparative analysis will stand out clearly in the next chapter (IV. Comparative analysis of the case studies).

On the other hand, it is worth stressing that, as far as possible, an attempt will be made to respect the main points of the case studies, in textual statements.

Finally, it should be noted that the form of discussing the cases will not be standard in terms of extension by section or information that may superimpose diverse criteria. The reason is twofold: first, this summary respects diversity not only in the nature of the cases, but also in the characteristics and accents reflected in the comparative analyses; and secondly, in the various narratives of the cases, the analytical variables (such as the degree of use and disaggregation of exogenous/endogenous style), are articulated differently so that these differences end up being respected and reproduced below.

3.1 CASE 1: *What impacts has the participatory budgetary process of Paysandú had in relations between the departmental government and local society?*¹²

3.1.1 Origins of the experience

This experience was funded by the World Bank (IBRD) and won formal acceptance by the Departmental Government of Paysandú (DGP), with the recommendations made in three reports that were undertaken in the framework of the Project executed during 2007 having been formally presented to the DGP in 2008.

Specifically, in 2007 the Local Development Programme of the Latin American Centre of Human Economics (Programa de Desarrollo Local del Centro Latinoamericano de Economía Humana, PDL-CLAEH) implemented a project, with funding from the World Bank's Small Grants Programme, which had as its central axis the Participatory Budget of Paysandú as a space for promotion of citizen participation, placing emphasis on aspects referring to access to public information in relation to the accountability process and mechanisms linked to its management.

For the design and implementation of the Project, the PDL-CLAEH worked jointly with the Departmental Government of Paysandú -DGP- because the Participatory Budget is one of the management tools it has been implementing since 2005.

external to the organisation, beyond its strategic control, which facilitate or obstruct the capacity for policy impact of PRI/think tanks.

¹² Carried out by Viviana Martínez (Montevideo, December 2008).

In this context, the case study refers to the joint work between PDL-CLAEH and the DGP, although it should be noted that there was a precedent for this relationship at the time it was carried out, which allowed original links to be established between CLAEH and the DGP (such as the implementation of the Diploma in Regional and Local Development in Paysandú by the CLAEH-UCUDAL in 1998).

3.1.2 Public policy stage in which impact was made

The type of impact on the public actions appeared predominantly in the evaluation and monitoring stage of work dynamics. Although part of the objectives and tasks projected originally can be considered to have included aspects of implementation, given that training activities for OSC members and the state sector were considered, they were sporadic with the former and could never be carried out with the latter, which reflects the greater relative difficulty in influencing implementation in comparison to intervention on the evaluation/monitoring plane.

3.1.3 Organisational characteristics of the intervening actors

PDL-CLAEH: With over 50 years of experience, the Latin American Centre for Human Economics (CLAEH) is a university centre with a strong recognised background in research and teaching on graduate and postgraduate degree courses. Its history links it to the economics and humanism movement, and as an institution it claims to be “independent of any state, party, church or corporation”. In this context it sees itself as a private institution, oriented to public interest, which has developed multiple interdisciplinary capacities, articulating and accumulating knowledge regarding local development, health, education, social policy, government, democracy, integration, history, culture, patrimony, communication, enterprises and human rights.

It is also a national institution present regionally with three offices, Montevideo, North-east Region (Tacuarembó) and Punta del Este (Maldonado), and internationally.

It offers a Diploma in Management in Local Development, an area in which it also offers consultancy services and technical assistance and which includes the Local Development Programme responsible for the experience in question.

Departmental Government of Paysandú: The Governorship of the Department covers the towns of Paysandú, Tambores, Quebracho and Guichón. Since 2005 it has been involved in the Participatory Budget (PB) in those locations (governed by local councils). As of the 2007 PB, it has a Follow-up Commission, an instrument created by the DGP on the basis of a citizens’ initiative which emerged in the workshops run by the PDL-CLAEH.

As regards the PB, the DGP reveals a disparity of capacities and reluctance on the part of the councillors (political representatives, who tend in general to distrust these spaces of participation/representation “parallel” to parliamentary spheres) and local state officials (in general, with greater willingness to articulate their work with practices such as those of the PB). However, there is strong dependence on local councils in relation to the central structure.

The DGP suffers from weak capacities for local action, so in the PB 2006-2010 it created the Decentralisation Directorate which is responsible for the PB Unit and the Citizens Formation Unit (which is still pending). As is to be expected, municipal policies suffer from a lack of monitoring and evaluation systems for the plans, programmes and projects they implement.

In this governmental-state context the IBRD approves financing for a PDL-CLAEH support activity with the aim of strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of the functioning of the PB in Paysandú.

3.1.4 Characteristics of the evidence/research used

The research is based on a case study carried out in the city of Paysandú and in Tambores and Quebracho, in the framework of the PB of the DGP. The research uses qualitative methodology and has an exploratory type design. Finally, the information was gathered by using different instruments: collection and analysis of sources of secondary information; semi-structured interviews with actors in local society and government; participatory observation of the elective process of PB in Tambores and Quebracho; and the holding of evaluation and diagnostic workshops with participation of those involved.

3.1.5 Objective/goals of the joint work

The first project carried out in 2007 planned “to strengthen citizens’ participation in the Participatory Budget process that the Departmental Government of Paysandú is implementing with the generation of alternative mechanisms of participation and of diverse instruments of discussion, in keeping with the needs and expectations of ordinary citizens”. The specific objectives pursued in 2008 were to:

1. Systematise the PB 2007 process in accordance with the criteria established in the previous project.
2. Identify the principal advances made in the agreements between local society and departmental government in the framework of the 2007 and 2008 editions of the PB.
3. Help generate knowledge that will allow the departmental government to strengthen the PB process under way.
4. Identify specific lines of action that can promote a greater involvement of local society in the process.

3.1.6 Results of the interaction

The project is based on different levels of intervention:

- Institutional diagnosis of the PB in its first two years of administration.
- Training of local councillors in departmental government and of social organisations and citizens interested in the PB.
- Survey of the opinions of citizens and actors intervening in the process to improve the processes of public information and accountability.

Three levels of impact identified at the end of the intervention stand out:

1. In the administration of the PB by the DGP: the following are the project's contributions to the Participatory Budget process implemented by the DGP:

- . Contribution to systematisation of existing information from two editions of the Participatory Budget (2005-2006).
- . Identification of the main strengths and challenges of the PB, in the eyes of the different actors: social organisations, municipal agents, local councillors, middle managers, Government cabinet, local media, among others.
- . Strengthening of the capacities of local secretaries and councillors on the eight local Councils concerning the role they are to play in the Participatory Budget locally.
- . As of the decision by the departmental government to carry out two pilot Elective Participatory Budget experiences in two local Councils in the department, local councillors, secretaries and officials of the Councils of Tambores and Quebracho were trained in methodologies for implementing the Participatory Budget.
- . Generation of relevant information on the opinion of the citizens involved in the process and of those that were unacquainted with it, as a fundamental decision-making tool.

2. In compliance with the objectives proposed by the Project: according to the central objective of the project, the different activities carried out helped boost citizens' participation in the PB process, which was reflected in:

- . Strengthening of the capacities of social organisations and ordinary citizens to allow them to commit themselves to the PB process, both as regards the basic tools to formulate development projects and the linking strategies with the departmental government.
- . Generation of relevant information on the needs and expectations of ordinary citizens concerning the accountability systems expected from the government and that they are willing to carry out as social organisations for their community.
- . Definition of key aspects in evaluating participation in the process, defining strategies agreed between local actors and the departmental government (e.g. PB Follow-up Committee).
- . Definition of spaces and specific issues for articulated work between residents of Quebracho and Tambores and the Local Council as the institutional government reference in the area.

3. Locally: indirectly, and by means of different activities (fundamentally those related to the gathering of information, diagnosis and survey), the Project achieved synergies between local actors who showed interest in the process and agreed to be channellers of information. This is surely one of the immeasurable results of the Project that facilitated execution and, if mediated by planned relations strategies, could strengthen the PB process. In turn, the public opinion survey taken in Paysandú helped raise awareness and, in some cases, provide information on the process, besides meeting the goals of the Project.

The case study evidence means that on the basis of the recommendations made the *level of impact* of the intervention can be viewed as *low in general terms*. However, certain aspects recognised indirectly or from the facts themselves by the government team, and fundamentally local society, should be taken into account. That is to say that many changes introduced in the PB are part of the issues debated in depth with the government authorities

and with the citizens in the various instances of exchange that emerged during the process. They include:

- Greater level of consolidation of the social organisations that present proposals.
- A greater level of impact is identified in the localities of Tambores and Quebracho.
- The departmental government recognises the *validity of CLAEH's intervention* not only because of its external view on the process but also because of the legitimacy it bestows compared to other government players and other similar experiences in the region.
- Some practical decisions on the PB as well as in administrative management can be identified in the framework of the intervention.

It should be remembered, however, that PDL-CLAEH interventions, both in the framework of the research and in the previous intervention, provided valuable inputs from different points of view on the DGP:

- In the intervention, systematisation of the process was provided through the diagnosis; knowledge of citizens' opinion through the survey; and local capacities through thematic workshops.
- The research allows the generation of knowledge on the basis of the review of the process, but in turn promotes a space of collective evaluation with specific methodology, which provides systematisation and knowledge from the main actors in the process.

3.1.7 Generating the capacity to incorporate research into public policy and its causes

The study considers that there are three significant installed capacities: trust; articulation; and flexibility. However, and given that these three capacities are necessary but not sufficient to support an institutional strengthening process such as that pursued, the work stresses the need to continue operating on the challenges addressed with conviction, decision and political will.

The principal social learning generated by the experience has been the possibility that organised residents administer projects with public funding, through a process of formulation, execution and accountability.

3.1.8 The role of endogenous and exogenous factors in obstructing and/or facilitating the impact of research on public policy

Facilitating endogenous factors:

- . High legitimacy of the organisation in the territory and *vis-à-vis* decision-makers in the departmental government.
- . Good capacity for generating projects with external funding to influence the process.
- . Consolidated work team and specific knowledge for the intervention.
- . Good summoning capacity of the organisation.
- . Proposal of flexible work with regard to the needs of the government.
- . High level of trust with the work team endorsed by compliance with all agreements throughout the intervention process.

Blocking endogenous factors:

- . Scarce financial resources to generate a long-term process.
- . Geographical distance that makes permanent presence in the territory difficult.

Facilitating exogenous factors:

- . Good image of the PB of Paysandú in the country and the region.
- . High level of consolidation on the public agenda of the PB experiences at government and citizen level and academia in general.

Blocking exogenous factors:

- . Multiple stakeholders intervening in the subject in the territory.
- . Scarce government capacity to improve systems of communication, information and accountability in the PB framework.
- . Scarce government capacity to implement cabinet changes in order to allow the PB process to become a government strategy.
- . Weak professionalisation in PB administration.

3.2 CASE 2: The impact of scientific production of the DIEESE in implementing specific public policy for the protection of the quality of employment by the Ministry of Labour of Brazil¹³

3.2.1 Origins of the experience

In the origins of the experience we found the history of a relationship that dates back to the 60s and 70s, although it has intensified after the military dictatorship since 2004, with projects of several years of duration and based on technical advice for the generation of information and development of methodologies, placing the DIEESE (Inter Trade Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies) in a position of provider of expertise for the work and functions of the Ministry of Labour. Evidence for the strengthening of the relationship emerges with the implementation of the PCDA (Training Programme for Union Leaders and Advisors). In the DIEESE/MTE relationship, it is important to mention the participation of the former in the National Labour Forum (2004-2005) along with 600 workers, government and employers representatives. An objective of the National Labour Forum was to promote the democratisation of labour relations, by adopting a model of trade union organisation based on freedom and autonomy. The participation of the DIEESE aimed to support the work of articulation of the union organisations and to offer them advice.

3.2.2 Stage of public policy in which impact was made

The functions carried out by the DIEESE are varied in its different joint projects with the MTE, although they are mainly oriented to accompanying processes by providing data and relevant information, consultancy and training of workers to prepare them to effectively

¹³ Carried out by María Rosa Gamarra (La Paz, January 2009).

participate in social dialogue on issues of interest to them. In this regard, DIEESE plays a very active support role in the initial steps of the policy cycle (defining the problem, constructing alternatives). Besides this consideration, the evaluation of policy outcomes also stands out, along with influence on implementation, although to a lesser extent, fundamentally through the formation of union cadres and state officials, who participate not only in defining, but also in the daily operations of programmes and policies.

3.2.3 Organisational characteristics of the intervening actors

DIEESE (Inter Trade Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies). The DIEESE is an agency of the Brazilian trade union movement engaged in the production and diffusion of knowledge and information on labour which, with a multidisciplinary approach, uses scientific methods at the service of the interests of the working class (regardless of the diversity of union positions and approaches). Founded in 1955 to carry out research to justify workers' demands, it has at present 262 officials (between the technical and administrative teams, with over 200 high-level technical professionals) and has 521 affiliated trade union bodies throughout Brazil. The DIEESE supports the trade union movement without having an autonomous mandate and its actions are not neutral, since the object of the institution is to produce systematic information and knowledge, although with the express finality of defending the trade union movement and the interests of its members. Moreover, it is a national non-profit body (which is particularly important in a country the size of Brazil with its great material and cultural diversity), which has 17 regional offices. Finally, over its 50 years of existence, the institution has won national and international credibility (it is recognised by multi- and bilateral bodies that have even financed some of its projects) as an institution of technical/scientific production. It is active in the areas of counselling, research and education.

DIEESE direction is exercised by three bodies:

- . National Union Directorate, responsible for political orientation, planning guidelines and the budget.
- . Executive, also Union, Directorate which accompanies and assesses planning execution.
- . Technical Directorate, comprising employees who execute the planning of the other directorates and coordinate the work of the various teams.

Among its weaknesses economic-financial and change management stand out (because the institution has undergone rapid and intense growth, which has not been internally assimilated by all areas to the same extent). The paradox here is that one of its strengths, strong organisational culture, becomes a weakness when flexibility is required in a context of change.

Brazil's Ministry of Labour and Employment: The history of the MTE begins in 1912 when the Brazilian Confederation of Labour (CBT) was set up, during the Fourth Brazilian Workers' Congress. The Confederation was responsible for promoting a long-term programme of labour demands. As a mediate response to this claim, which was "threatened" by the events of 1917 in Russia and the wave of violent post-World War One social conflicts in Western Europe, the National Labour Department was set up in 1918. The creation of the

Ministry of Employment, Industry and Trade dates back to 1930 (Getúlio Vargas) This institution changed its name and organisational structure several times until, finally, in 1999 it became known as the Ministry of Labour and Employment. The MTE has different Commissions and Councils and is the Administrator of the Public System of Employment, Labour and Income. It is responsible for the inspection of labour. It also has a National Secretariat of Economic Solidarity and a National System of Information on Economic Solidarity.

In the area of labour relations, this Government body looks after assistance and the approval of labour contracts, mediation, collective labour conventions and agreements, domestic and temporary work, the fight against discrimination at work, union contributions, Prior Conciliation Commission, and has a National Register of union bodies.

With trade union and labour reform as one of the priorities of the present PT government, a National Labour Forum (FNT) was created in 2003, referred to above and coordinated by the Secretariat of Labour Relations.

3.2.4 Characteristics of the evidence/research used

The type of products that predominate in the DIEESE/MTE relationship have to do with the production of information/labour databases for decision-making, as well as the development of analytical methodologies for the analysis of information and enhanced design of public actions. In addition to these characteristics of production that maintains the impact of DIEESE are the strategies of training and transfer of this knowledge, both to members of the trade union movement and to public officials. This dynamic of production and knowledge transfer is of a strongly multidisciplinary technical nature.

3.2.5 Objective/goals of the joint work

The DIEESE is part of the Brazilian trade union movement, and supports, develops and recommends proposals for workers and all society. As part of its constitutional mandate, the MTE carries out a series of efforts for social agreement on questions of labour and trade unions. It does so through the National Labour Forum which operates in a legitimate public space for the discussion and channelling of union and labour reforms and for affirming Social Dialogue. In this context, the joint work realised between the DIEESE and the MTE is very broad and varies in intensity according to the demands of union and government agendas. However, in this period of analysis (2004/2007), two projects stand out:

. *The employment and unemployment survey (PED)*, in which it was planned to provide permanent technical assistance for regional research, perfecting the monthly dissemination of the PED System, constructing the policy of access and availability to PED indicators and microdata, bringing the Monthly Survey of Occupation and Unemployment (PMOD) into the PED System, generating institutional articulation and Management of the PED System, and conducting pilot research in special areas with PED methodology.

. *Social and professional qualification*, through which methodologies were devised for the construction of diagnoses, for drawing up proposals of a social and economic nature, and for social qualification which have as their principal axis of action the construction of instruments to subsidise the qualified intervention of actors and/or social groups in spaces and issues considered essential in a process of sustainable development.

3.2.6 Outcomes of the interaction

As regards *professional qualification*, the joint work focuses very intensely on opening spaces for discussion; on analysis and reflection, involving a great number of social players in the workers, employers and State sectors.

Besides, the experiences analysed concerning collective bargaining of professional qualification have been articulated with the Implementation of the National Agenda of Decent Labour in Brazil.

However, the fundamental impact is indirect and, therefore, difficult to measure. The information produced by the DIEESE for the MTE is valuable for the Government in drawing up work-related policy. The DIEESE is one of the most reliable sources of information on several topics, in which the MTE has not developed its own means of production. No other institutions are as representative as the DIEESE (thanks to the broad union presence of its members) in work-related questions, pay, workers' quality, income distribution, etc.

Finally, it is also necessary to refer to the impact stemming from the training of public administrators. As explained above, the DIEESE frequently acts in qualifying participants in tripartite spaces and has thus attained respectability, credibility and recognition outside the trade union movement.

3.2.7 Generating capacity to incorporate research into public policy and its causes

The first institutionally installed capacity illustrated in the case study is the creation of an articulating axis of public, economic and social policies, with evidence-based information management (given the notable outcome achieved in the joint work experience between the DIEESE –with a significant systematised technical/scientific production which is available for broader diffusion –and the MTE, which moves in a period of particular importance for social management in Brazil).

The DIEESE has won both national and international credibility, and has become a reliable source of information and production of knowledge for the Brazilian Ministry of Labour. The experience of DIEESE, its relationship with the MTE and the joint results attained must be recognised as results of a long process and, for a fair appreciation of impact, the use of systemic approaches is relevant in incorporating both the recognition of immediate and tangible products and those which are mediate and intangible (such as the forging of trust networks, exchange and debate sustained in a clear, formal and informal institutionality).

3.2.8 The role of endogenous and exogenous factors in obstructing and/or facilitating the impact of research in public policy

Endogenous factors

Firstly, the DIEESE shows a strong sense of cohesion as regard the specific requirements expressed by trade unions in the struggle for workers' demands. So, "identity" is the first endogenous factor to highlight.

A second endogenous factor observed is the interunion nature (which has partners of different political trends, with different conceptions of the world and a variety of party identities) which has led to a specialisation of its work with high diversity and pluralism in the production of collective knowledge and, simultaneously, participatory agreements.

As regards DIEESE organisation, a third relevant factor is that the body has double direction. On one hand is the Union Directorate and on the other the Technical Directorate. The former is in fact the political directorate of the organisation and also its legal authority. This characteristic gives it strength as it has the double legitimacy of systematic knowledge and, at the same time, knowledge representative of basic social interests.

Exogenous factors

In recent years there has been evident growth in participation in social movements in Brazil, particularly in the trade union movement, which plays an active part in a broad agenda of discussion on public policy. This is a very important framework of action for this case study, since in the 80s and 90s there were several experiences of social participation, from bodies of a consultative and deliberative nature up to broader initiatives, with greater influence on the implementation of government actions. Both in the local and the national sphere, there are many cases of this type of participation that may involve from decisions on specific investments to more complete propositions of regulation.

However, the changes that are occurring today thanks to the globalisation process have shown that the Brazilian economy lacks the full capacity to absorb the growing labour force, because unemployment, precarious working conditions, fall in real income, concentration in income, etc. still exist. This means that the issue of work should be considered a high priority at different levels and that both workers and the Government and employers should participate in discussing possible solutions in spaces created for the effect and where the DIEESE fulfils several functions of articulation. The opportunities for the DIEESE are linked to this context of relevance for society of the question of labour.

On the other hand, the threats that hang over the institution are linked precisely with their direct dependence on the trade union movement, since if its participation diminishes or internal fractures emerge, this would directly affect the institution. Also, certain political instability in Brazil and its potential increase, the rise in limited-term projects (over 50% of DIEESE's current budget) and the consequent staff turnover are also seen as risks.

3.3 CASE 3: External Assessment of the Government of Jalisco's Development Programme of Community Centres by El Colegio de Jalisco¹⁴

3.3.1 Origins of the experience

At the beginning of 2004, the Secretariat of Human Development (SDH) of the State of Jalisco made contact with the Programme of Applied Studies of El Colegio de Jalisco (ColJal), to invite them to participate in designing and executing an evaluation of the Development Programme of Community Centres (PDNC). This initiative seeks to coordinate the design and implementation efforts of different social programmes (from different provincial or federal sectors and jurisdictional levels) focusing on a territory. At first, the interest of the SDH in encouraging this type of approach with the ColJal was motivated by a legal and programmatic exogenous factor: the requirements of the funding programmes of the federal Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL), which include external evaluation of every project receiving funds from SEDESOL. With the aim of responding to that requirement the SDH contacted and requested the services of El ColJal. Meanwhile, endogenous factors also played a part in the origins of the relationship, since the PNDC enjoyed unique coherence in which the systematic assessment for its improvement was evaluated: it was designed by a single agency and had a methodology of research and work, as well as a team trained in social policies and programmes.

3.3.2 Public policy stage in which impact was made

Defined by the requirements established for the reception of financing from the SEDESOL, this intervention focuses on the evaluation/monitoring stage.

3.3.3 Organisational characteristics of the actors intervening

Colegio de Jalisco (ColJal): The ColJal is an academic institution which, since its foundation 26 years ago, has dedicated its efforts to developing teaching work at a higher level of research and cultural diffusion in western Mexico. Through its Programme of Applied Studies in Local and Regional Government, it has consolidated a teaching project with the aim of contributing to the upgrading and training of professionals in various disciplines and subjects essential for the good performance of the government and public administration. As part of these efforts, diploma courses in politics and public management have been offered. Since 2003, the ColJal offers the Masters Course in Government and Public, Municipal and State Administration, with the aim of promoting greater decentralisation in education and research in Mexico, through the generation of knowledge useful for regional and municipal development, which contributes to strengthening a more balanced federalist model.

¹⁴ Carried out by Roberto Arias de la Mora and Alberto Arellano Ríos (Jalisco, November 2008).

The Secretariat of Human Development of the Government of the State of Jalisco (SDH):

The SDH was born in 2002 with the aim of responding to the need to have a control/coordination/operation body for the social programmes at the level of the State of Jalisco. On the other hand, various exogenous factors allowed the initial proposal creating the SDH to prosper. First of all, there was perceived inadequacy in a secretariat for social development in the federal sphere that had been operating diverse social programmes under a scheme which involved little effective participation by the states of the Republic. Secondly, the pioneering experience of the state of Guanajuato served as inspiration on how to shape the initiative for Jalisco, which would later become a wave affecting the other states of the Republic, where the experience of decentralising social policy began to spread. Thirdly, promotion of the vision of human development being fostered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was clear to see.

In short, the Human Development Secretariat is the office responsible for planning, designing, coordinating and executing the integral development policies of persons and the groups to which they belong. Its basic institutional characteristics were structured on three pillars: the General Directorate of Social Development; the General Directorate of Social Participation; and the third the General Directorate of Social Policy. The resulting working team was relatively compact and made up in preference of professionals with a profile of youth and solid academic formation.

3.3.4 Characteristics of the evidence/research used

The techniques used for collecting information were process auditing, direct observation, interviews and the holding of surveys (semi-structured questionnaires) of the beneficiary population. The sources for this survey of data focused on official documentation, State and society actors and informants, the dynamic of behaviour of the actors participating and a representative sample of beneficiary population from the PDNC in each community. Therefore, the analytical logic of the assessment and of the knowledge transmitted was both qualitative and quantitative as well as multidisciplinary.

3.3.5 Objective/goals of the joint work

The monitoring/evaluation objectives of the ColJal were structured into three periods. The first (2004-2005) was in turn divided into three stages: in the first the profile of each locality and the PDNC were assessed; in the second a description was made of the implementation process; and lastly, it was completed with an impact assessment. The second period, in 2005, was based on a study designed to construct a base line to determine variations in the socioeconomic conditions of the target localities, through successive measurements programmed for the future. Finally, the third period of collaboration, in 2007, focused on the objective of incorporating a component of social evaluation to complement the PDNC's execution report. This involved setting specific objectives, such as to:

1. Analyse the perception of the economic and social situation of the individuals interviewed.
2. Analyse whether the works or actions carried out in the locality impacted on the perception the beneficiaries have of the government in general.
3. Measure the level of knowledge and identification of the PDNC in the core localities.

4. Measure the impact of changes in the quality of life of the informants and/or their family, stemming directly or indirectly from the works and actions of the PDNC.
5. Estimate the level of active social participation of the informants in the PDNC, as well as their future willingness to participate in government programmes.

3.3.6 Results of the interaction

Interaction in the first stage was characterised by tensions: the authorities insisted on restricting verification only to the execution of works and actions financed with SEDESOL resources. These conditioning factors coincided with a spirit of reserve and prevailing caution among agency personnel reflected in informing only what was financed with federal resources in the programme. In other words, the only incentive to cooperate with El ColJal's evaluation the SDH had seemed strictly exogenous at the outset.

In the second stage the difficulties and reluctance experienced by the assessors in accessing information increased. However, the most remarkable thing about this exercise in cooperation and institutional approach was the recognition by the specialists of the ColJal of the innovative design of the PDNC. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic practices of the five executive instances took various forms: from full collaboration by decentralised officials from the public body of the State Water Commission to the reluctance and non-collaboration in providing the Secretariat of Rural Development (SEDER) with information.

Finally, in the third stage of this first collaboration project, the value and functionality of the contents of the assessment appeared with greater clarity, which was decisive in easing the reluctance faced so far. Thus, the change in perception of the SDH officials was finally consolidated with the results obtained in the third and last stage. However, delivering the results of the external evaluation by the PIE of SEDESOL in the times agreed did not entail additional resources for the continuation of the PDNC for 2005¹⁵.

Despite this context, the SDH decided to continue its collaboration with the ColJal during 2005. The purpose was to conduct a study of the socioeconomic profile of the 31 localities that received support from the PDNC during 2004. Besides the quantitative results of the survey, the PDNC was analysed in light of the results and observations obtained during the taking of the survey, in which both the researchers responsible for the study and the personnel in charge of the field work participated. As a result of that session of work, the strengths, opportunities, weaknesses and threats of the programme were identified.

In 2006, in the context of national elections and change of authorities in the SDH, there was a cooling in the relationship. With the electoral process over the new public officials

¹⁵ The paper and technical analysis were insufficient to give continuity or improvement to a programme that in appearance produced good outcomes. A decisive factor in explaining the design, implementation and continuity of a government programme, regardless of its technical viability, is of another type. The reason could be found in a policy conflict that arose within the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) over the presidential candidacies in the next elections.

responsible for the PDNC re-established contact with the El ColJal assessors to carry out a third study which, unlike that conducted in 2005, and as explained in the section on “objectives and goals”, was geared to integrating a component of social evaluation which would complement the PDNC’s execution report. The period of assessment took place in 2003 to 2006 and was integrated with a view to the process of handing over the government of Jalisco.

3.3.7 Generating capacity to incorporate research into public policy and its causes

This case study illustrates the tensions in the relationship between academic research centres and government agencies, relations often mediated by networks and relations that are not necessarily supported by institutional mechanisms whose rules encourage solid formal relations. These contact networks between actor, around or with institutions, are based on friendship or professional relations that go beyond or mitigate the constraints produced by the bureaucratisation of public administrations when they intend that social policy should respond to minimal criteria of rationality. In this regard, the case shows multiple constraints and opportunities that usually arise in the development of joint initiatives between institutions oriented to research and government agencies. Particularly, it can be observed in the case how the close linkage and collaboration between authorities and policy analysts, beyond the nature described above, became a key factor in ensuring that social policies respond to minimum technical criteria that lighten their usual heavy political load.

Although the case could be presented as a successful experience of linkage between a government agency and a research centre, especially in the professional and endogenous collaboration phase, it also reveals the main problems and constraints that Latin American public administrations usually face: a) the strong weight of party politics on the formulation of public policy; b) the link between a subnational agency and a research centre was initiated because of external imperatives rather than endogenously; c) government stakeholders recognise in the discourse the importance, value and usefulness of the external assessment, which reach beyond programmatic and operational questions and really contribute to measure the social impact, but there are few institutional mechanisms that make it compulsory or promote it; and d) all the above mean that social policies and government programmes are unable to resist “changes in government”. The repercussions of this are that policy is not institutionalised or reinvented, its content is changed, and the prior experience is wasted, among many other problems.

Finally, this case offers various clues to help us understand the problems in Latin American public function. It is particularly illustrative on how links with research centres are established, operate and develop in practice, especially in the subnational sphere, which probably differs substantially from the national sphere. In this regard, the sociological reality displayed in this case study offers multiple evidence on the conditions of institutional weakness that still persist in the spheres of subnational governments and which strongly limit the possibilities and potentialities that can be reached through a closer link between applied research and the formulation of public policy process.

3.3.8 The role of endogenous and exogenous factors in obstructing and/or facilitating the impact of research on public policy

The endogenous and exogenous in the Colegio de Jalisco: the institutional efforts deployed by the ColJal in recent years to professionalise public service in the State of Jalisco and its municipal districts opened an important policy window for the gradual incorporation of professionals and investigators oriented to applied studies in the sphere of the municipal and state government and public administration.

This trend, which has been consolidated in recent years, was at the time the main endogenous factor to encourage the convergence of institutional interests between the ColJal and the SDH, which occurred in the external evaluation exercise of the Community Centres Programme.

In this regard, a factor exogenous to the ColJal which was fundamental in the initial link with the SDH was the normative imperative expressed by the Operating Rules of the PIE which establish as an essential requirement the external evaluation of the social programmes that receive public funding through that federal programme. However, the impact of the results of the first external evaluation made by El ColJal academics should also be underlined as an endogenous factor that was decisive in sustaining the link with the SDH, at least during the following two years.

The endogenous and exogenous in the Secretariat of Human Development: in relation with endogenous factors, and on the basis of the above, first of all it is important to highlight both the initial motivation and the strategy that was implemented to create the SDH at the outset, and the subsequent formulation of social policy. Secondly, we find the institutional characteristics of the SDH and the later integration of a working team that contributed to give a clear orientation and solid support to the first institutional tasks undertaken by the SDH. Finally, the personal style of direction shown by the first head of the SDH should be stressed as an endogenous factor that was strategic in assuring that the institutional objectives were accomplished. This factor appears as crucial in creating a work mystique oriented by a “shared vision” between the head of the agency and his working team.

However, several factors exogenous to the SDH, which influenced its strategies and incentivated its collaboration with the ColJal also stand out: in first place, is the determining weight of federal regulations that insist that programmes be evaluated before receiving SEDESOL funds at state level. Secondly, and of a socio-demographic order, is the dispersal of the population prevailing in the rural areas of Jalisco and the challenge it presents to social programmes and policies in Jalisco. A third exogenous factor, already mentioned, are the experiences carried out in other states of the Republic, particularly in the State of Guanajuato, in turn framed in ideologies/notions of human development drawn up and transmitted by the United Nations Development Programme. Fourthly, the objective of making a party political differentiation, led to a favourable context for the creation of the SDH. Finally, as a fifth exogenous factor of influence on SDH strategies, the cycle of elections was observed. It revealed an impact of paralysis in the relationship of collaboration and of the activities of evaluation and, with the changes in government and officials in the SDH itself, acted as a

source of uncertainty and threat to preserving the collaboration relationship between the ColJal and the SDH.

3.4 CASE 4: *Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote: realising social, economic and cultural rights by attacking political clientelism in social programmes in Ecuador*¹⁶

3.4.1 Origins of the experience

In a process of political and economic instability initiated at the end of the 1990s, clientelist strategies in the government of Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez (2003 – 2005) were deployed very intensely and generated a high social perception of corruption in the government. Lucio Gutiérrez's exit from power opened a window of opportunity in a society that had just witnessed generalised practices of manipulation of social programmes in favour of a political party. Against this backdrop, the Foundation for the Advancement of Reforms and Opportunities (Fundación para el Avance de las Reformas y Oportunidades, or Grupo FARO), identified opportunities for clientelism in several social programmes and began to work jointly with two of them in their improvement: *Aliméntate Ecuador* and *Maternidad Gratuita*. This experience of work encouraged the initiative analysed in this case study which aimed to combat electoral clientelism in social programmes (both in connection with the 2006 elections, and in general post-electoral process political clientelism).

In May 2005, one month after the fall of the Gutiérrez government, Grupo FARO launched an assessment process of nine social programmes with the aim of "*placing the question of transparency and prevention of political clientelism on the agenda of these programmes,*" considering that the moment of greatest impact would be the presidential elections of 2006. The initiative to combat political clientelism in social programmes contemplated two principal moments: a) the signing of the Transparency Agreement;¹⁷ and, b) the monitoring of the Transparency Agreement.¹⁸

¹⁶ Carried out by Orazio Bellettini and Melanie Carrión (Quito, December 2008).

¹⁷ On 14 July 2006 after a lobbying process with the directors of the social programmes by Grupo FARO, the coordinators of the nine social programmes, Grupo FARO, five civil society organisations (Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP); Participación Ciudadana (PC); Centro Ecuatoriano de Derecho Ambiental (CEDA); Centro de Planificación y Estudios Sociales (CEPLAES); Coalición Acceso y Youth Employment Summit. Yes-Ecuador) and, as witnesses of honour the General State Comptroller; the Minister of Social Welfare, the Minister of Economy and Finance, the Minister of Education and Culture and the Technical Secretary of the Frente Social, signed what was called the "*Commitment agreement for transparency and protection of public funds in social programmes during election campaigns.*" The Agreement established that, in representation of the signing civil society organisations, the Fundación para el Avance de las Reformas y Oportunidades (Grupo FARO) undertook to draw up a "*document evaluating the results of this agreement, after the presidential elections of 2006*". Grupo FARO pledged its professional, technical, non-partisan, honest, impartial and transparent work. The social programmes meanwhile undertook "*not to allow any public official or organisation that works directly with*

3.4.2 Public policy stage in which impact was made

The general objective pursued by the strategy of impact focused on the setting the public agenda stage, with the intention of placing the problem of political clientelism in the social programmes of Ecuador. The target was not only the beneficiaries of these Programmes but, with a broader proposal of reform and political impact, but also the citizens and the media in general. On the other hand, the actions carried out advanced to the evaluation/monitoring stage, and the results of measuring exercises by social programme and comparative measurements were released. Finally, the strategy also showed aspects, although of lesser intensity than the previous ones, of action on implementing own programmes (for instance, designing tools of information diffusion and increased transparency, as well as incentivating their use by the programmes).

3.4.3 Organisational characteristics of the actors intervening

Grupo FARO: Grupo Faro is a civil society organisation that supports citizens, the business sector and public institutions to encourage them to participate actively in proposing, implementing and overseeing local and national public policy, in order to achieve a more efficient, equitable, inclusive and democratic Ecuadorian State. The Grupo FARO Team is made up of a multidisciplinary group of professionals, technical experts, academics and researchers, which naturally brings the incorporation of different areas of knowledge. Grupo FARO is a civil society organisation whose work consists in the research, design, analysis and evaluation of public policy.

9 Social programmes: Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH); Nuestros Niños (now FODI); Operación de Rescate Infantil (ORI); Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE); Programa Aliméntate Ecuador (AE); Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia (FISE); Sistema de Incentivos a la Vivienda Urbano-Marginal y Rural (SIV); Programa de Maternidad Gratuita (PMG); and Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición (PANN 2000).

3.4.4 Characteristics of the evidence/research used

Different tools of social research were used to monitor compliance with the objectives pursued: participatory observation, in-depth interviews and quantitative and qualitative

the social programmes in the provision of services to use public resources allocated to the programme for political ends during the 2006 election campaign, through [a series] of measures."

¹⁸ Grupo FARO took advantage of a "policy window" that opened with a new Government, which was more interested in incorporating technical administrators in the programmes than the Gutiérrez government. In this scenario, in 2006, with support from the Fondo de la Alianza por la Transparencia (PTF) a process of joint work began with Aliméntate Ecuador (AE) to monitor the transparent use of programme funds while promoting the strengthening of citizen participation. This and other previous work experiences with Operación Rescate Infantil (ORI) and Maternidad Gratuita (PMG) were used in order to bring other programmes into the initiative to combat political clientelism. In addition, Grupo FARO was able to position itself as a specialised public policy centre in issues of transparency.

analysis of the information. The greatest innovation in monitoring the Transparency Agreement was probably the creation of a ranking of commitment to the agreement by the participating programmes.¹⁹

In the case analysed, three sources of evidence were used by Grupo FARO: a) the studies and research mentioned on previous experiences of combating clientelism; b) own research and evaluations that the organisation conducted with nine of the social programmes; and, c) the prior working experience with public administration of Grupo FARO.

3.4.5 Objective/goals of the joint work

As mentioned above, the objective of the work between Grupo FARO and the nine social programmes centred on the intention to place the issue of transparency and the prevention of political clientelism on the agenda of these programmes.

In the framework of this general objective, three specific objectives were pursued: to raise awareness and inform public officials about clientelism in social programmes; to carry out a mass diffusion campaign on the signing of the agreement and the consequences of clientelism on the beneficiaries; and reforming and improving transparency and the access to information, with compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP).

3.4.6 Results of the interaction

By 2006, Grupo FARO had positioned itself as a leading and pioneering organisation in the promotion of transparency and accountability in public administration, and was publicly recognised for its impartiality. This brought it legitimacy and allowed it to open spaces in the State as a counterpart to facilitating improvement and innovation processes in institutional practices.

The theoretical contributions and empirical studies into clientelism in social programmes conducted in other countries revealed several characteristics that Grupo FARO found in the Ecuadorian case when assessing its social programmes: the growing invisibility of clientelism in social programmes, constraints in access to information and diffusion; weak participation of the citizens benefiting from the social programmes and inexistence or inefficacy of complaints mechanisms in the programmes. The results of the work carried out show indications of the opposite face of these problems:

. Uncovering clientelism in social programmes.

¹⁹ A ranking is an incentive to generate competition between institutions; however, in this case its minimal diffusion as a mechanism to present the results of compliance with the Agreement did not allow greater impact of the measure, although in some programmes certain competition has been perceived.

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- . Extending access to information and diffusion of social programmes.
 - . Strengthening of citizen participation in the administration of social programmes.
 - . Establishing mechanisms to receive and process complaints.
 - . Diffusion of social programmes as citizen rights.
 - . Inclusion on the public agenda of social programmes on the issue of political clientelism and the need to combat it through specific strategies
 - . Promotion of the culture of transparency and accountability.
 - . Encouraging compliance with the LOTAIP (Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information).

Results from the ranking show an important correlation: the best ranked programmes in compliance with the agreement are those that have had a history of great corruption, clientelist management or manipulation. On exploring the motives of the social programme administrators to participate in the initiative, the interviewees revealed, among other things, interest in showing the changes that the new administrations were introducing to make the programme management and use of public resources more transparent and, the need to recover the legitimacy lost in the corruption scandals. Lastly, the ranking shows that the lowest ranked programmes in compliance had fewer incentives to participate in the initiative (for instance, the programme of Maternidad Gratuita had already been working transparently with Grupo FARO and had “user committees” as mechanisms of participation and social oversight).

3.4.7 Generating capacity to incorporate research on public policy and its causes

Beyond the results achieved in relation with the installation of capacities, the case study shows constraints and lessons learnt on the difficulties linked with the construction and intertemporal maintenance of capacities. The experience of combating clientelism in social programmes can in principle be termed successful, although in a context of considerable constraints.

- . **Institutional impact.** When the initiative was implemented, it had impact and was placed on the agenda of social programmes. However, it has not been institutionalised in all of them.
- . **Impact on local actors.** Political and electoral clientelism fundamentally appears on a subnational scale and the principal beneficiaries are predominantly in rural and urban-marginal sectors. The initiative to combat clientelism believed that the national coordinating offices of the programmes would publicise the agreement in such a way that it would reach the beneficiaries and, in fact, the national coordinating offices decided to comply with it. In this context, and although the campaign to combat clientelism was publicised in the printed media and radio, it was unable to reach the beneficiaries to any great extent.
- . **Media impact.** Despite the media coverage given to the signing of the Transparency Agreement, the initiative was unable to place “the need to combat clientelism in social programmes” on the public agenda.

. **Socialisation of the results with actors involved.** Although the experience was monitored, systematised and assessed, the interviews with certain coordinators of the social programmes and representatives of civil society organisations that signed the Transparency Agreement revealed the need for the progress and, in particular, the results of the experience, to be disseminated among the main actors participating. Various interviewees claimed not to know the final results and the position of their programme in the ranking of compliance.

3.4.8 The role of endogenous and exogenous factors in obstructing and/or facilitating the impact of research on public policy

Grupo FARO incorporated into its experience of combating clientelism in social programmes the endogenous knowledge and learning acquired previously in issues of access to public information and transparency, and strengthening of citizen participation. By virtue of the diagnosis of the nine social programmes and systematisation of work experience in Aliméntate Ecuador and Maternidad Gratuita, it had detected the inexistence or inefficacy of the complaint and denunciation mechanisms. As regards other endogenous factors that facilitated the actions and impact of the initiative, the following stand out:

- . Objective-driven technical work.
- . Research and evidence-based innovation.
- . Grupo FARO's position as a "public policy centre".
- . Capacity for funding by the organisation.
- . A multidisciplinary staff.

Among the exogenous factors that facilitated or obstructed the strategy we can mention:

Political and institutional context as a "policy window"

"Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote" appeared at a time of political crisis, of institutional disruption and in a scenario characterised by the lack of legitimacy of social programmes among the citizens as a result of the denunciations of corruption and clientelism that shook the Lucio Gutiérrez government and led to his overthrow. There was, in consequence, a need to make the administration of the social programmes transparent and to recover the lost legitimacy. In addition, the new Government made an important renewal of the directors or coordinators of social programmes. So, for example, the new coordinators and technical experts on the Aliméntate Ecuador (AE) and Operation Restate Infante (ORI) programmes, who had been the focus of the denunciations of clientelist management and corruption, showed particular interest in purging the programmes and even redesigning certain phases of the administration to limit the bottlenecks that encouraged discretionality and manipulation for political ends.

Technical profile of the administrators of the social programmes

The analysis of the experience meant identifying whether there were common specific characteristics in the new team of social programme coordinators. It could be confirmed that the programme administrators who showed the greatest commitment to the Transparency Agreement and compliance with it responded, albeit to an appointment of a political nature,

to a prior consideration of their quality as technical experts and professionals trained to respond to the challenges of programme coordination. So, it was observed that the profile of the Technical Secretary of Frente Social was an important boost to ensuring that the Board of Ministers approved the proposal. In general, it can be concluded that the greatest level of compliance with the agreement was found in the social programmes that were directed by professionals with a technical profile and in those in which there was greatest risk or perception of opportunities for clientelist manipulation.

Prior relations and work experience with social programmes

Another exogenous factor, but one with a high endogenous content, are the conditions and links that Grupo FARO had previously established in and with programmes such as Aliméntate Ecuador and Maternidad Gratuita. These experiences had laid the bases not only of knowledge for the action of Grupo FARO itself (the endogenous face of this point), but also an experience and relations of exchange and trust as a part of the knowledge capital of actors within the state itself, which when facing the proposal or possibility of this new initiative showed willingness and drive.

Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information

Lastly, as an exogenous factor “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” used the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information as its principal tool. Although the law had been in force for several years, the social programmes revealed a considerable lack of compliance with the provisions on publicising information on the web page. Grupo FARO was able to place its proposal in a legal framework that recognised the right of citizens to be informed and the obligation of the public administration to facilitate access to information and include complaints and denunciation mechanisms.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

This analysis will be carried out schematically and not exhaustively, in an attempt to stress the most relevant aspects of the comparative evidence.

4.1 ORIGINS OF THE EXPERIENCES

Given certain initial conditions of organisation, capacities of production and transmission of knowledge that makes the actors involved potential counterparts in society to develop joint tasks with government or state actors to influence programmes and/or public policy, the case studies reveal various “triggers” for these experiences. Their origins may be classified into three types:

a) The desire of the PRI/think tank or of a state area which, within its global strategy and having resources or contacts to obtain them, activates/invests them with the aim of focusing efforts on establishing a joint activity with a social or state counterpart (depending upon the different starting points): this type would include in our sample both the DIEESE/MTE

experience and that of Grupo FARO and the nine social programmes with which it carried out its work.

b) A third actor (domestic or international foundation, multilateral agency like the IBRD, IDB, UNDP, etc.) which, from its role as a credit body, stimulates the development of this type of impact strategies, an opportunity used by the PRI/think tank and targeting a specific area of joint action with the State that meets the requirements to obtain said funding, which is where the CLAEH/DGP experience could be classified.

c) Another external actor, but this time with the authority to set rules to incentivate interactions of this type (typically, a government or state body –such as SEDESOL in Mexico– that in order to distribute resources sets as a rule requirement of compliance with the joint actions of PRI/think tank-State), a case which is illustrated by the ColJal-SDH experience²⁰.

Also in relation with the origins, in all cases the interaction was framed in formal agreements, and revealed precedents of prior exchange experiences between PRI/think tanks and the state areas involved, which at the time showed no continuity but were certainly a capital of experience and trust between the counterparts that facilitated the development of the process analysed.

4.2 PUBLIC POLICY STAGE IN WHICH IMPACT WAS MADE

The experiences covered by the case studies confirm the claims made in most of the literature to the effect that PRI/think tanks as producers and transmitters of knowledge, understandably tend to focus their impact on the stages of defining the public agenda and assessing policy alternatives. However, in the experiences great participation in the stage of evaluation/monitoring of programme and policies was observed. Although only to be expected due to the specialised/technical nature of these players, it seems to indicate a trend towards a new division of labour, and consequently displacement of the old players primarily responsible for this type of analysis, i.e. areas within the State itself and multilateral credit / finance agencies (WTO). This trend is triggered in various cases of initiatives from the State or WTO. Finally, actions or lines of work can be observed in the sample studied that can be considered part of the policy implementation stage. There are two questions which emerge from a comparative analysis of these experiences. Firstly, these lines of work tend to be marginal within a broader strategy in which either impact on the public agenda or evaluation/monitoring predominate in the impact strategy. Secondly, if working lines are present during the implementation stage, these tend to focus on actions of personnel training. This confirms how complex it is to articulate between the State and PRI/think tanks, once the “black box” of the bureaucratic structures of the former receive (and, given its functions,

²⁰ This classification aims to identify the dominant “trigger”, regardless of recognising inevitable superpositions in the motives of the actors and processes in which they are involved. For instance, the case of CLAEH-DGP reveals precedents of the relationship that could place it in a), while the El ColJal-SDH experience reveals aspects both in the objectives and activities of El ColJal and in the objectives and form of work of the original SDH team, also in a).

appropriate) the responsibility for carrying out the series of tasks that are woven into policy or programme implementation.

4.3 ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERVENING ACTORS

The case studies reveal diversity among the actors intervening. From the State, some are national (social programmes in Ecuador and the MTE in Brazil) and others subnational (SDH in Mexico, the DGP in Uruguay). They also have diverse organisational capacities: for instance, while the social programmes in Ecuador revealed great diversity (with greater or lesser technical capacities, etc.), the MTE in Brazil has a long history and technical-bureaucratic resources; and also on the subnational plane, and in a context that in general shows fewer capacities than the national entities; in Mexico the SDH had (due to the logic it impressed on their creation) from the outset greater technical-bureaucratic capacities to articulate and implement state social programmes than the government of the Department of Paysandú to sustain all the aspects at stake in Participatory Budget processes (which, in short, “joined” a bureaucratic structure neither designed nor with the capacities to carry out the function well).

From the PRI/*think tanks*, regardless of its areas of agreement, great differences are apparent. The agreement, which were to be expected, basically have to do with the fact that they are non-profit actors that have the capacity to generate and transmit knowledge (by a variety of channels) to the State and/or social players. The differences, other than the process of impact on policies analysed, contribute to the “dominant” character of these organisations: while two are academic (CLAEH and ColJal), one is an institute of production and transmission of knowledge and is part of the trade union movement (DIEESE), and Grupo FARO, the latter falling within the traditional image of an PRI/*think tank*. These differences inevitably entail political-organisational characteristics (formal and informal rules that govern them, their human resources, departments/areas, dominant sources of funding, internal structures of representation/government, type and number of veto players, functional priorities, etc.) of great diversity.

On the basis of the arguments and the definition proposed at the start of this analysis²¹, three of the experiences covered by the case studies mean that it can be discussed whether, in fact, the social actors intervening are PRI/*think tanks*. In the case of CLAEH and El ColJal their predominantly academic nature weakens the condition of theoretical-political consistency the actions of a PRI/*think tank* demand. The case of DIEESE, as part of and a

²¹ “...I specifically propose that PRI/*think tanks* be considered, 1) collective actors; who are 2) formally institutionalised; 3) not-for-profit; and 4) whose dominant, formalised or de facto organisational function, should be to influence public policy; 5) through the production and transmission of knowledge; 6) transmission whose focus may include different actors liable to weigh directly or indirectly on forging and implementing policy (whether governmental, paragonovernmental or social actors, or citizens in general)” (cf. above, 2.1 *Political Research Institutes: Reconsidering their nature (once again!)*)

resource of knowledge and impact on the policies of the Brazilian trade union movement, leads us to wonder as to its degree of autonomy to set priorities, objectives and courses of action as an organisation and, therefore, to wonder whether it meets the condition of actor, a requirement for consideration as a PRI/think tank. As we shall see in Conclusions, this question can be dealt with in a variety of ways. As the opposite side of this argument, the inclusion of the DIEESE in the sample of cases is a clear contribution to the recognition of the potentially important impact of bodies of production and transmission of knowledge linked to interests or trade union identities, an alternative usually left aside in the traditional classifications of PRI/think tanks (which despite including centres linked to business interests tend to forget their ties with the interests of the workers).

In this context of diversity, the wealth uncovered in the case studies illustrates how risky it is to try to have general theories and recommendations on organisation and actions of PRI/think tanks.

4.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EVIDENCE/RESEARCH USED

It is in this aspect that, in general, the actors analysed show greater agreements in the type of evidence they generate, as well as in the logic of research that supports it. In all cases, the evidence tends to be production of information/databases or, in some, the design and transfer of methodologies for the analysis of information functional to the inclusion of an issue on the public agenda, the consideration of policy alternatives or their evaluation. The techniques used for the information survey range from the analysis of secondary sources and the construction and analysis of primary ones, the auditing of processes, direct observation, interviews and the conducting of surveys. The analytical logic that predominates in the cases studied is qualitative and quantitative, as well as multidisciplinary.

4.5 OBJECTIVE/GOALS OF THE JOINT WORK

The objectives/goals analysed are seen, again, to be strongly shaped by the logic of origin that governs in each case both their temporal horizon and their contents. Although all the impact experiences pursue (explicitly or implicitly) a sustainable impact in policy improvement which is tangible in the medium-long term, some are part of a collaboration and division of labour sustained over time with changing, yet clear, objectives (DIEESE-MTE, Brazil); others show clear objectives contained in time and form by national regulations (ColJal-SDH, Mexico) with the prospect of reproducing the collaboration; others also aim at objectives contained in time and form, although with greater uncertainty as to sustaining the collaboration (CLAEH-DGP, Uruguay); and, finally, cases are observed in which the immediate objectives respond to taking advantage of opportunities (such as an election) and are immersed in much broader objectives seeking ideological-cultural changes (Grupo FARO-social programmes, Ecuador).

In all cases, however, it should be stressed that the shared objectives pursued by the joint work vary to some extent in meaning (content beyond specific products, extension and implications) for each counterpart. This variation occurs in relation to the rest of the “games” in which it is immersed and each actor also pursues objectives. These are “parallel games” in

which the work and joint objectives are situated, like an “intersection” of logics and priorities, which are largely diverse (e.g., the ColJal trying to transfer the value of policy assessments to the SDH and its officials –as well as of various obsolete programmes - from a position fearful of risk, giving priority to satisfying the bureaucratic requirement imposed by SEDESOL without suffering the potential costs of the review/evaluation of the of its actions as a whole). The non-recognition of this dynamic and the assumption that the shared objective means the same thing for both counterparts in terms of effort, commitment and functionality of the product, has in some cases revealed an understandable frustration.

4.6 RESULTS OF THE INTERACTION

The results of the diverse interactions show heterogeneity, although between two subsets. A clear cut-off occurs between the interaction framed in a logic of collaboration that includes capacity of certain representation of interests that clearly contributes to the legitimacy and functionality of public policy and those interactions that do not have this characteristic with the same clarity. Specifically, the results of the interaction between the DIEESE-MTE are characterised by tangibility and mutual long-term recognition by the players intervening, which is not observed in the remaining experiences. In the latter, “objective” or “neutral” actors such as academic centres (CLAEH and ColJal) or a PRI/think tank (Grupo FARO) did not produce clear successful results. Although these experiences produced results which, in general, complied with the original agreements and are considered to be positive by the PRI/think tanks participating, in all of them the constraints and uncertainties on the magnitude of what has been achieved in the short term, as well as on its significance in the medium-long term, leads them to recognise that it is particularly hard to forge relations of trust and modify in the hoped for degree the original conditions of weakness in management/implementation. The reiterated conclusion accentuates the need to recognise the importance of the accumulation and the medium-long term in considering the results obtained, given that they are either intangible or they must be considered meagre in the period of the specific experience.

4.7 GENERATING CAPACITY TO INCORPORATE RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS CAUSES

The compared evidence provided by the case studies on generating capacity to incorporate research in public policy, suggests that it is directly conditioned by the degree and type of results obtained by the interaction between the parties involved. In this regard, save for the case of DIEESE-MTE, the remaining efforts covered by the case studies show little generation of capacities of this type. The reasons for that, as outlined at several instances above, include from the type of origin of the experience, the organisational characteristics of the PRI/think tanks and the state areas involved, as well as the network and type of “parallel” strategic games in which the intersection of the shared effort (and the consequent diverse priorities of each actor when becoming involved in the collaboration) is found.

In addition, two factors which are functional to the gestation of this type of capacities stand out. On the one hand, the political-governmental interest in legitimising and sustaining either long-term policies or a long-term relationship with an actor functional to said policies.

This explains the capacities generated by the interaction between the DIEESE and the MTE in Brazil, since the DIEESE forms and, at the same time, represents the knowledge it provides and with which the trade union movement, a key actor for the tripartite elaboration of labour policies that characterises the MTE in Brazil, acts. The other factor which stands out is the formal institutionalisation of this type of interactions (like the requirement that social policies be assessed by academic centres in order to receive funding). Regardless of sectoral and jurisdictional vicissitudes and specificities, it is to be hoped that rules of this type be maintained and become even more evident in our societies. It is also to be hoped that they can induce a greater generation of capacities to be incorporated into research as an input of public policy.

4.8 THE ROLE OF ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS FACTORS IN OBSTRUCTING AND/OR FACILITATING THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY

We know that endogenous factors are central in obstructing or facilitating this type of impact. In this respect, the case studies validate a great deal of the arguments in the literature on the matter: organisational capacities, stability in funding flows, analytical capacities, symbolic resources (like an image of objectivity or reliability), communicational capacities, strategic flexibility in operations, personal and institutional networks of trust based on previous experiences, credible leaderships, etc. are key.

As regards exogenous factors, here we find the greatest novelties in the case studies concerning the generalised knowledge on the importance of “policy windows” or the role of “political-cultural conditions”. We have already spoken of significant aspects of the role played by exogenous factors when discussing the form in which they shape the origin of the political impact (in points 4.1 and 4.7, stressing both the differential value of the presence of actors who either need to establish these interactions politically, or simply to have the authority to institutionalise them). “Ideological” environments prone to accountability and improvement in the monitoring/evaluation of policies, such as those generated by diverse multilateral development bodies, also reflect clear impact and a relationship of synergy with the behaviour of government and state players with capacity to influence these interactions, or even force the public sector to adopt them. Examples of practices “attempted” in other environments as functional to the political objectives pursued by the governors, have also shown impact in the case studies (the prior experience of the State de Guanajuato had explicit and positive impact in the decision made by the leaders of Jalisco to carry out institutional reforms and create the SDH with technical criteria –however reluctant to accept external evaluation their officials might have been). The case studies also show that although some exogenous factors are clearly important, if their value is that they facilitate or obstruct the impact of the research on the public policy depends on process contingencies in each society. For instance, while the 2006 national elections were an important “window of opportunity” for Grupo FARO to place political clientelism on the public agenda and carry out its strategy of impact on national social programmes in Ecuador, in the same year the elections in Mexico led to a halt in joint ColJal-SDH of Jalisco activities, as well as bringing uncertainty as to whether the relationship would continue with the change of authorities in the SDH. In this regard, the “exogenous” nature is significant, although the property of facilitating/

obstructing varies not only according to the society but also, probably, to the type of impact, depending on the stage in the policy cycle (opening opportunities for placing issues on the public agenda and closing those of assessment/monitoring of public programmes).

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS²²

The diversity of situations and teachings contained in the case studies and which arise from the comparative analysis, calls for caution when seeking to elaborate general theories or universal recipes based on “good practices” observed in certain experiences. The analysis suggests that systemic and comparative visions are needed when acting on specific situations. It is thus feasible to learn and conclude that a successful experience may or may not be replicated in another society, considering the properties of each society and the logic of political economics that sustained the specific process. Replicating experiences and results is extremely difficult because societies are largely idiosyncratic and distinct, and even more difficult if the reason for failure in experiences is not clear. A balanced vision is able to differentiate good practice which cannot be replicated from one that can. It demands an analytical sophistication which has not yet been sufficiently well developed and still less used in analyses of PRI/think tanks. And here there is a prime challenge: to develop better comparative understanding. By appreciating the learning we could obtain from successful experiences, it seems that in this respect the path to travel involves, a) focusing on the construction of middle-range theories rather than universality; and b) placing the same accent as ever on understanding and disseminating best practices in understanding all failed practices. Without this diversity in the explanation of why an event occurs in one case and not in another, no comparative analysis can legitimately sustain a recommendation to replicate experiences between societies.

An integral vision on the observations made in the case studies suggests a central role for the logic of origins of interactions between PRI/think tanks-State by influencing both the sustainability of these strategies, and the logic of organisation and strategic behaviour of PRI/think tanks.

Firstly, the outcomes of the interactions and their impact on the capacities installed in order to incorporate research in public policy, indicate that medium-long term impact is more likely in processes whose origin shows either the will of the PRI/think tank or of a state area to carry out this collaboration within its global strategy, or an external actor with authority to set rules to encourage interactions of type (a) and (c) in our classification in point 4.1. However, it is less likely to sustain the effort indefinitely when the origin is in an external actor that encourages, from its role as financing body, taking advantage of an “opportunity” to obtain funds by the PRI/think tank (type b) in our classification. This conclusion should not lead to rejection of the importance or mediate impact (hard to measure case by case) of this type of incentives or processes. The reason is that in all the cases analysed there were valuable precedents of exchanges between the participating counterparts which, although they did not show immediate continuity at the time, they did contribute ultimately a capital

²² Some of the argumentations that follow resort to arguments originally developed in Acuña (2007).

of experience and trust that facilitated the operationalisation of the new round of collaboration, although these experiences originally fell in the uncertainty typical of the logic of “taking advantage of a funding opportunity” in the relative short term that characterises type b) of origin. This observation (restricted to the sample provided in our four cases) does not allow us to conclude that there is a significant probability that funding/incentives limited to relatively short-term collaborations make sense and have an impact in the medium-long term, since we do not know (as they fall outside the sample) the quantity or the nature of all those cases which, having reproduced the logic of type b), never experienced a “second chance” at PRI/think tanks-State collaboration and did not pass beyond limited/isolated efforts. Despite this, it seems significant to recognise that these prior experiences, originally without greater time limits or certainty of continuity in terms of contingencies -by definition, unforeseen factors and, therefore, outside the control of the stakeholders participating-, are valuable capital when forging a new round of collaborative interaction.

Secondly, and in relation to the impact of the origin of the experiences on the logic of organisation and impact strategies by the PRI/think tanks, when the dominant origin of the funding that sustains the actions of the PRI/think tank is again in external players who encourage, from their role as financing bodies, impact on public policy, the limited time frame as well as uncertainty as to the indefinite sustainability of the experience, determine actions (and an organisation functional to them) of high thematic and jurisdictional volatility by the PRI/think tank in its desire to obtain funds. The typical result is PRI/think tanks that show polychromatic “mosaics” in their logic of impact. This pattern is not necessarily negative for the objective of improvement in public policy of the PRI/think tank since its meaning will depend on other variables at stake. For instance, if this thematic/jurisdictional “multicolour mosaic” and the organisational logic that sustains it simultaneously assure coherence within a global strategy of impact and flexibility of adaptation and use of funding opportunities offered by the environment, indicates the creation of an PRI/think tank which, without a privileged thematic or jurisdictional focus and without participating in processes of specific long-term impact, ultimately influence the improvement in public policy. However, this pattern also opens the possibility that the PRI/think tank, and with the clear objective of assuring economic sustainability of the organisation, might be swept up in the short-term vision typical of this pattern of origin, running a double risk: firstly, that the thematic/jurisdictional “mosaic” inherent in the use of the various opportunities provided by the different sources of funding (and its different varying thematic/jurisdictional priorities) leads to the loss of minimal strategic consistency in the actions of the PRI/think tank, which will surely lead to a disarticulated organisation in which the thematic areas it comprises (health, education, local development, national political reform, etc.) tend more to be “resources/costs units” of great autonomy and whose value is no longer in its contribution to articulation with a global impact strategy, to focus on its capacity to contribute such necessary funds for the survival of the PRI/think tank. The second risk is suggested by sociological tradition. A nuanced vision of the virtues of the PRI/think tanks is required when analysing it, since nothing indicates that a comprehension of the dynamic and impact of PRI/think tanks must block the presence of organisations of an oligarchic nature (*à la* Michels, organisations that prioritise the interests of their leadership teams over those of the remaining members and the objectives of the organisation itself which, thanks to its own dynamic of maturation is organisational). In such cases, the predominance of a logic of origin

in which the funding that sustains the actions of the PRI/think tank is found in external actors that incentivate, in their role of financing bodies, actions to “catch all possible funding” (i.e. actions that are consequently changing and short-term in their thematic/jurisdictional priorities), not only runs the risk of losing strategic direction of the PRI/think tank, but it creates conditions functional to its increasingly oligarchic nature (with an “oligarchy” composed of an alliance of Programme Directors or areas of great autonomy and feudal traits in its strategies and management of funds, and that legitimises its domination -now *à la* Weber- with a discourse obviously related to the improvement of public policy and, if necessary and credible, in the well-being of poor children with dirty faces).

Rather than mere quips, the above not only indicates the relevance of variables like the origin of the experiences of impact of the PRI/think tanks, but also provides clues as to questions not sufficiently incorporated so far in the analyses of PRI/think tanks. In this respect, four questions need to be incorporated into the debate.

Firstly, it is important to recognise that not all PRI/think tanks are beautiful. Some may show significant processes of an increasingly oligarchic nature and others be sustained on authoritarian values. The actions of the former will show opportunism as a priority in obtaining funds more than the improvement in public policy and, the latter, will simply be negative for the improvement and democratization of policies.

Secondly, and in relation to the already mentioned organisational logics traditionally highlighted by sociological frames, it appears difficult to comprehend the “political economics” of the processes in which the increasingly oligarchic nature of PRI/think tanks is verified or avoided without systematically incorporating in the analysis the tension between individual interest and the collective/organisational actions of PRI/think tanks. In short, it is necessary to systematically contemplate this tension to avoid running the risk of falling into normative visions that assume linearity between individual interests and collective actions, today largely rejected as superficial and “pre-Olsonian” (Olson, Mancur, 1965) that quite simply assume that individuals that share interests or objectives would make collective actions to realise them.

Thirdly, with simplistic or normative visions (that obstruct objective and scientific approaches) in the manner of understanding PRI/think tanks and their capacity for political impact, tensions and obstacles are often identified as “exogenous” factors and/or actors (such as politicians, “their” parties, the State, etc.), placing them in a sphere that denies them as belonging to PRI/think tanks. These approaches are not only biased, but by predominantly placing the cut-offs in tension with the State and political parties, tend to reject probable conflicts (for political-ideological, theoretical-methodological reasons or, simply, from competition in obtaining resources) between PRI/think tanks themselves. The from in which political economics comprehends processes of political impact from actors of civil society in general, and from PRI/think tanks in particular, must recognise the complexity and conflictivity that characterises them, as well as recognising that often these processes of impact are not movements to “pareto superior” points in which someone wins and nobody loses, but processes in which the participation of PRI/think tanks in general implies the loss of influence or resources from other PRI/think tanks.

Fourthly, although the conceptual categories of “exogenous” and “endogenous” are useful for a first classification of initially “disordered” information in the dynamic of the “objective” historical process, care must be taken when using these same categories in explaining the process in question because often neither the exogenous nor the endogenous reveal a clearly distinguishable character from each other. For instance, the State presents itself as exogenous, an arrival point for PRI/think tanks constituted previously and independently of it. However, the weakness of the assumption is that the State must not be thought of as mere arena-object or “arrival” point for the actions of PRI/think tanks, both because the State may have fulfilled the role of originator of PRI/think tanks or because it is an actor that solves problems of collective action of civil society groups, allowing them to become actors. The State appears in these cases as an undeniable actor in the process of political construction of PRI/think tanks, and may be the “arrival” point of their organisation and later autonomy. In other words, the logic of the actions and impact of PRI/think tanks is in their relationship with the State as much as in the relations established between the PRI/think tanks themselves, a question that is not solved beforehand or independently of state actions. In this regard, again, a more “systemic” view is necessary, i.e. one that does not think of the State or the PRI/think tanks as divorced terms or, at least, temporally discrete in relation to each other. The “interface” between both does not articulate pieces forged independently, it is not a hinge but a set of relations of mutual determination and influence, not only on the margin and content of the actions of the PRI/think tanks and the State as “poles” of the relation, but of mutual determination and influence on the very nature of each pole.

To close it is necessary to return to the question of the notion and nature of PRI/think tanks and their implications in terms of recommendations. In section 4.3, and using the assumptions and definition at the beginning of this paper on how to consider PRI/think tanks, it was concluded that three of the four case studies (those on DIEESE, El ColJal and the CLAEH) focus on stakeholders which, for various reasons, do not strictly meet the properties of an PRI/think tank. This produces a rich tension between, on one hand, the objective of comprehending the factors that influence (obstructing or boosting) the social impact on public policy on the basis of production and transmission of knowledge (for which the case studies offer us an exceptional wealth and opportunity of comparative analysis) and, on the other, the conceptual “impertinence” of “smuggling” actors of a dubious condition of PRI/think tank. With the aim not only of assuring parsimony between the conceptual and the empirical base that interests us, but fundamentally of separating the accessory from the politically relevant, the final recommendation of this paper is that PRI/think tanks should be abandoned as the entry point for the comprehension and improvement of the impact of systematic knowledge on public policy. In a spirit of defiance in promoting debate I wonder, what does it matter if, for instance, the DIEESE does not meet the conditions to be considered an PRI/think tank if, in short, it is a key instrument of impact on public policy through the production and transmission of knowledge, by a key actor from civil society such as the Brazilian trade union movement? In brief, my recommendation is to enquire into the social impact on public policy on the basis of the social capacity to generate knowledge functional to governments and the State. The actors and dynamics of this impact will be varied and will include PRI/think tanks, although not to the exclusion of other players and more adapted to the diversity of historical processes that shape this impact in our different societies.

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SPACES FOR COMMITMENT: USING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOUR OF THE POOR

Case Study:

*What impacts has the participatory budget process of Paysandú had
on relations between the departmental government and local society?*

Final Report

Project by:

Viviana Martínez, Partner

Montevideo, Uruguay, 10 December 2008.

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I. CASE STUDY PRESENTATION

1.1 BACKGROUND

In 2007, the Local Development Programme of the Latin American Centre of Human Economics ((Programma de Desarrollo Local del Centro Latinoamericano de Economía Humana, PDL-CLAEH) implemented a project financed by the World Bank's Small Grants Programme whose central theme is Paysandu's participatory budget as a true promotional area for citizen participation, placing special emphasis on aspects related to access to public information regarding the accountability process and mechanisms associated with the administration process.

Coordinated and articulated work is being done with Paysandu's Departmental Government (GDP - Spanish abbreviation) in order to design and implement the Project, given that the Participatory Budget is one of the administration tools implemented as of 2005¹.

It is well worth emphasising a few of the elements that give origin to intervention and PDL-CLAEH relations with the selected territory and specifically with the Paysandú Departmental Government's team.

¹ In order to extend information on Paysandu's Participative Budget, consult www.paysandu.gub.uy.

EXECUTORS /FUNDERS	OBJECTIVES	YEAR OF EXECUTION
CLAEH - UCUDAL	Diploma for Regional and Local Development in Paysandú.	1998
Spanish Cooperation, SECIPI, Barcelona Local Project, Generalitat de Catalunya (Regional Government of Catalonia)	Promoting Local Development at the crossborder zone of the River Uruguay, focusing on developing productive activities, creating employment and strengthening local institutions.	1997-1999
UNDP - Paysandú and Tacuarembó Departmental Governments.	Strengthening the capacities of local governments and other social actors when formulating Local Development strategies in Guichón (Paysandú) and Laureles (Tacuarembó)	2003 - 2004
ACAC Foundation	Basic training courses for social organisations participating in projects financed by the ACAC Foundation with IAF - Redeamérica funds.	2006
World Bank	Generate information, participation and diffusion of Paysandu's Participatory Budget tool and citizen administration follow-up mechanisms.	2007
UNDP-ART	Mapping action developed in the district of Paysandú concerning issues of local development. Supporting constitution of the local work group Strengthening local capacities.	2007

In this context, the research we carry out is upheld by an existing relation between PDL-CLAEH and the GDP, specifically as of the implementation of the Project financed by the World Bank in 2007, even though previous accumulations are not unknown to them.

The objective of this project was to *“strengthen citizen participation currently being implemented by Paysandu's Departmental Government by means of generating alternative participation mechanisms and diverse lobbying tools in accordance with the needs and expectations of the common citizen”*.

1.2 PROJECT INVESTMENTS CARRIED OUT IN 2007

The project selected for analysis of the impacts of generated information arises from three different levels of intervention that can be summarised as follows:

- PB's institutional diagnosis in its first two years of administration.
- Training departmental Government local councillors, public organisations and citizens interested in the PB.
- Surveying opinions from citizens and actors intervening in the process in order to improve public information procedures and accountability.

A priori, on finalising the intervention, we can highlight at least three levels of identified impact²:

1.2.1. In administration of the Participatory Budget by the GDP

In accordance with foreseen and accomplished activities, we synthesize the following Project contributions to the Participatory Budget currently carried forth by GDP:

- ❖ Contribution to systematising existing information on the two concluded Participatory Budget editions (2005-2006).
- ❖ Identification of main PB strengths and challenges, according to the following different actors: social organisations, municipal employees, city councillors, middle management, Government cabinet, local media, amongst others.
- ❖ Strengthening Secretaries and City Councillors capacities in the 8 Local Committees concerning their role in the Participatory Budget.
- ❖ Based on the definition by the departmental Government to conduct two pilot experiments of the Elective Participatory Budget in two local governments within the department, training was given to City Councillors, Secretaries and officials in the Tambores and Quebracho councils on methodologies for implementation of the Participatory Budget.
- ❖ Generating information on the opinions of citizens involved in the process, and those unaware of it, as a fundamental tool for decision-making.

1.2.2. In compliance with the objectives proposed by the Project

According to the main objective we initially set forth, we can say that the different activities conducted have contributed to strengthening citizen participation in the Participatory Budget process currently implemented by the GDP, which was specifically reflected by means of:

- ❖ Strengthening capacities in social organisations and in common citizens in order to give committed participation in the PB process, both with respect to basic formulating of tools for project development and in linking strategies with the departmental Government.
- ❖ Generating information relevant to the needs and expectations of common citizens with respect to accountability systems they expect from the Government and that they are willing to carry out as social organisations for their community.
- ❖ Defining key aspects for the purpose of participating in the evaluation process, defining strategies arrived at by consensus between local actors and the departmental Government (e.g. PB Follow-up Committee).
- ❖ Defining areas and setting specific themes in order to work in coordination with Quebracho and Tambores residents, and with the Local Council as the Government's institutional reference in the department.

² *The identified aspects were part of the final report of the project that received support from paysandú municipal authorities and the World Bank.*

1.2.3 Within the local context

We consider that the Project has indirectly, through diverse accomplished activities (fundamentally those related to collecting information, submitting diagnosis and surveys) achieved synergy between local actors who showed interest in the process, and in some way agreed to channel information.

Without doubt, this is one of the non-measurable Project results that enabled execution, and that by means of planned strategies for establishing relations will enable strengthening of the PB process carried forth by the departmental Government.

In turn, public opinion polls conducted in the city of Paysandú, in addition to complying with objectives foreseen in the Project, allowed a raising of awareness and in some cases information on the process.

We will systematise the main recommendations made during intervention by PDL-CLAEH in the final paragraph of the report, which will allow us to evaluate the level of impact of the Project during decision-making by the Departmental Government.

II. CASE STUDY OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 CENTRAL QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES

In this context, the *central questions* we pose concerning the research are:

- *With respect to this project, what capacities have been incorporated in local society and departmental administration to give sustainability to the citizen participation process?*
- *With respect to agreements generated within the framework of the project, which has been the principal learning obtained from the experience and what role has local society undertaken in the current implementation of Paysandu's participatory budget?*

In consequence, the general objective is to identify the main contributions made by the CLAEH-GDP Project during the process of strengthening citizen participation within the framework of Paysandu's Participatory Budget, Edition 2007.

The specific objectives can be identified as:

1. Systematising the 2007 PB process in accordance with criteria established in the previous project.
2. Identifying the main progress obtained in the agreements generated between local society and the departmental Government under the framework of the 2007 and 2008 edition.
3. Helping to generate knowledge to allow the departmental Government to strengthen the PB process currently under way.
4. Identifying specific lines of action to promote greater involvement in the process by local society.

2.2 METHODOLOGY AND WORK PLAN

The investigation is based on the case study carried out in the city of Paysandú and in Tambores and Quebracho, within the framework of the GDP Participatory Budget³.

Investigation methodology is qualitative, submitting descriptive data that stress respective validity.

The design is of an exploratory nature and appeals to qualitative techniques, given that it hopes to analyse the phenomenon of the investigation in full complexity.

The gathering of information was carried out by means of diverse instruments:

- collecting and analysis of secondary sources of information;
- undertaking semi-structured interviews with local society and governmental actors;
- participatory observation of the elective PB process in Tambores and Quebracho;
- evaluation and diagnosis workshops carried out with participation of involved parties.

³ *Annex 1 submits a characterisation of the district of Paysandú and of the Participatory Budget initiative carried out by the GDP.*

The following chart is a summary of activities undertaken within the context of research:

OBJECTIVES	ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	STATUS
Project preparation	Adjust the Project and validate methodology with GDP	CLAEH-GDP	Finalised
1. Systematise the 2007 PB process according to criteria established in the previous project.	Gather secondary information and systematise respective results.	CLAEH	Finalised
	Interviews with key GDP informers.	CLAEH	Finalised
2. Identify main progress made in the agreements generated between local society and the departmental Government within the framework of the 2007 and 2008 Edition.	Interviews with representatives of presented Projects in previous and 2007 editions, who took part in the courses.	CLAEH	Finalised
	Interviewing Tambores and Quebracho town councillors.	CLAEH	Finalised
	Participatory observation of the PB process in Tambores and Quebracho.	CLAEH	Finalised
	Diagnosis workshop with the PB Follow-up Committee (main initial project contribution)	CLAEH	Finalised
3. Contribute to generating knowledge to allow the departmental Government to strengthen the current PB process under way.	Methodology workshop with the PB Follow-up Committee.	CLAEH-GDP	Not accomplished ⁴
	Workshop on “Project Management learning” with Project winners from the 3 Paysandú editions and the 2 Tambores and Quebracho editions.	CLAEH - GDP	Finalised
4. Identify specific lines of action that will promote greater local society involvement in the process.	Preparation of an intermediate report in order to validate proposals.	CLAEH	Finalised

⁴ Due to the intense PB agenda during the month of November (general elections in Guichón and Paysandú) it was thought pertinent to suspend the activity with Follow-Up Committee and incorporate the issues for discussion in the Lessons Learnt Workshop.

	Workshop validating proposals and action with the Government and Follow-up Committee.	CLAEH- GDP- OSC	Not accomplished ⁵
	Submission of final report	CLAEH	Finalised

In order to achieve the general objective, the proposal agreed with CIPPEC to conduct a workshop in Paysandú in March 2009 in order to present the departmental Government's experience with respect to managing projects favouring citizen participation is considered important, socialising the main contributions for the Government of the knowledge systematised by CLAEH.

⁵ A workshop to validate the Report will not be possible, which will be substituted by a working meeting with decision-makers, planned for the third week of December.

III. PRESENTATION ON THE MAIN PROGRESS IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS

The following indicates the main results obtained, associating generated inputs with the specific projects proposed during research.

3.1 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1: MAIN INPUTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ASSESSMENT

3.1.1 Analysis of PB process results: years 2005 to 2008

The PB Unit has provided full quantitative information on the results of the 2007 and 2008 editions recently carried out, which enables us to update a few indicators for respective analysis.

The objective of analysing the information consists of identifying if there were qualitative changes in the process to account for a different scope of the projects submitted by social organisations, and accordingly in the election process on behalf of citizens in general⁶.

That is, it is hoped to generate reflection on the progress made in preparing social projects to contribute to community development over the four years of PB.

The leading questions in the analysis are:

- *Can we identify progress with respect to citizen involvement in the PB process?*
- *Is it possible to identify over the years a greater commitment to social, cultural and environmental concerns in the community by means of the projects submitted?*

In order to answer the **first question**, it is necessary to quantify results by means of comparative indicators:

Edition	Location of elective PB	Number of projects		Ballot indicators	
		Submitted	Approved	Number	% of growth ⁷
2005	Paysandú	132	36	2,250	
2006	Paysandú	228	46	7,300	69%
2007	Paysandú	161	45	8,750	20%
	Tambores	15	7	520	
	Quebracho	22	7	838	
2008	Paysandú	141	49	11,400	30%
	Tambores	14	7	610	17%
	Quebracho	20	6	1.012	21%
	Guichón ⁸	15	4	1.766	

⁶ We will focus the analysis on the elective PB process, without including the Young PB Edition carried out this year, given its particular characteristics that must be specifically reviewed.


⁷ Rate of growth is considered in relation to the immediately prior edition within each locality.

Edition	Location of elective PB	Number of projects		Ballot indicators	
		Submitted	Approved	Number	% of growth ⁷
TOTAL		748	207	34,446	

As seen for the city of Paysandú, 69% growth was obtained between the first and second editions, 20% between the third and second editions, and finally 30% between the last and third editions.

In the case of Tambores growth in the 2008 edition was 17%, and 21% in Quebracho for the 2007 edition.

BALLOT EVOLUTION IN PP ELECTIONS PER DISTRICT



As a whole, these are registered indications of sustained growth for all cases, which for now are far from the historical plateaus given for all PB regional experiences.

A decrease in the number of projects submitted is likewise observed, which reflects capacities of social organisations and organised groups of residents to redefine their proposals and undertake activities jointly.

Many of the changes that arise as a result of the type of projects submitted, as well as ballot regulations, formalities for presentation of projects and diffusion mechanisms in addition to promotion of the PB process, have generated the observed growth⁹.

⁸ The analysis considers the locality of Guichón, where elective PB was first carried out by the citizens in 2008.

⁹ THE REPORT'S OBJECTIVE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN ANALYSIS OF ALL CHANGES THAT HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PROCESS. ONLY MODIFICATIONS GENERATED BY THE PDL-CLAEH INTERVENTION WILL BE ANALYSED FURTHER AHEAD.

FOR FUTURE INFORMATION ON THE ENTIRE PROCESS, CONSULT "MAIN CHALLENGES OF THE PARTICIPATORY BUDGET PROCESS IN THE CITY COUNCIL OF PAYSANDÚ 2005-2006" REPORT, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BM PROJECT.

Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that from the quantitative point of view important progress has been made as regards citizen involvement in the PB process carried out by GDP since 2005.

With respect to the **second question** posed, we will undertake a brief analysis concerning three variables we have prepared for this Report:

- **Destination of the Project's funds:** five categories have been defined in order to clarify usage of the assigned project funds by the social organisations.
- **Project Objectives:** refers to the purpose (social, educational, cultural, sports, environmental, etc.) the project pursues on assigning funds to the five categories described above.
- **Standard of project competence:** refers to competence of the government actor in the matter in accordance with the identified purpose.

Each one of the variables contains different categories elaborated depending on basic information provided by the GDP in accordance with the following definitions¹⁰:

Destination of Funds	
Category	Definition
Contracting of professionals	Project funds are destined to contracting professionals in different areas: training (recreational, productive, sports, etc.); technical health aid; extension of activities in educational centres (dancing, music, choirs, etc.); environmental hygiene (campaigns to neuter dogs carried out by professionals).
Equipment	Funds are destined to equipping neighbourhood, social, community, sports and recreational organisations, or State-owned community buildings (polyclinics, schools, etc.)
Infrastructure	Funds are destined to construction, extension or building improvements of neighbourhood, social, communal, sports and recreational organisations, or State-owned community buildings (polyclinics, schools, etc.)
Social services	Funds are destined to keeping social services a priority by the community, such as: maintenance of transport for sports clubs, fuel for ambulances, medicines, renting of spaces to carry out social activities, shows or cultural festivals, etc.
Urbanism	Funds are destined to improvement of city or district roads, buildings, landscapes and environmental infrastructures.
Standard of Project Competence	

¹⁰ *The categories and definitions used are of a subjective nature and responsibility of the researcher. Therefore they may be reformulated on the basis of joint revision and exchange with the GD.*

Category	Definition
Municipal Government	Projects involving public institutions with National Government competence in the matter (education, health, housing, etc.)
National Government	Projects involving competencies and roles at municipal government levels (ABC). Non-traditional roles will be considered as mixed (with intervention by the private sector or SCO).
Civil Society Organisations	Projects involving actions characteristic of non-profit social organisations, with or without legal status (e.g. neighbourhood committees, sports clubs, district associations, social clubs, etc.).
Private	Projects involving the non-profit private sector (large corporation or SMEs).

The following chart indicates distribution per *district with respect to destination and use of funds*:

		Destination of Funds					Total
		professional contracting	equipment	infrastructure	social services	urbanism	
Ballot area	Paysandú	29,5%	9,7%	34,1%	6,3%	20,5%	100,0%
	Guichón	50,0%	,0%	50,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Quebrach	23,1%	38,5%	38,5%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Tambores	35,7%	21,4%	14,3%	28,6%	,0%	100,0%
	Total	30,0%	12,1%	33,3%	7,2%	17,4%	100,0%

In general terms, regarding distribution or use of the funds, **Infrastructure** records the highest percentage with 33%, followed by Contracting of Professionals with 30%, Urbanism 17%, Equipment 12%, and lastly Social Services with 7%.

If we take distribution per district into account, we see important variations:

- the interior does not register projects that destine funds to urbanism;
- projects destined to payment of professionals, equipment and infrastructures are a priority.
- in comparison to the city, a similar distribution arises for professional contracting and infrastructure, in addition to a significant 20% in urbanism, and a minor percentage for projects that invest in equipment and social services.

The following chart indicates the same variables, incorporating changes over the different years of PB execution:


Ballot area		Destination of Funds					Total	
		professional contracting	equipment	infrastructure	social services	urbanism		
Paysandú	Year	2005	11%	0%	11%	3%	76%	100%
		2006	29%	16%	38%	4%	13%	100%
		2007	47%	9%	36%	4%	4%	100%
		2008	29%	12%	47%	12%	0%	100%
		Total	30%	10%	34%	6%	20%	100%
Guichón	Year	2008	50%		50%			100%
		Total	50%		50%			100%
Quebracho	Year	2007	14%	43%	43%			100%
		2008	33%	33%	33%			100%
		Total	23%	38%	38%			100%
Tambores	Year	2007	29%	0%	29%	43%		100%
		2008	43%	43%	0%	14%		100%
		Total	36%	21%	14%	29%		100%

- Paysandú reveals a decreasing tendency to invest funds in urbanism, with 20% strongly conditioned as a result of the impact made in the first year. There is thus a steady increase in contracting of professionals, equipment and infrastructure.
- In the interior, if we compare Quebracho and Tambores, there is greater emphasis in the latter with respect to investment in social services; distribution and evolution being very similar in the remaining categories.
- It is very significant that no funds have been invested in urbanism projects in the interior.

The following graphic indicates the *objective of the projects in all PB editions and districts*, and it is significant that 29% are projects whose objective is education, 27% health aid and 12% sports¹¹.

Namely, projects undertaken by means of the PB comply with social objectives, with a minimum percentage destined to works or other traditional municipal competencies.

¹¹ We must bear in mind that in Uruguay, as from a legal and competency point of view, areas of intervention related to health, education, housing, etc., are central matters of the State.



If we analyse distribution of each category by year, we observe a growing tendency of projects with social, sports, educational, cultural, recreational and productive and health aid objectives, to the detriment of projects with traditional objectives.

Project Objectives	Year				Total
	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Cultural	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%
Sports	8%	17%	25%	50%	100%
Educational	2%	33%	33%	33%	100%
Public spaces	71%	14%	14%	0%	100%
Environmental Administration	80%	20%	0%	0%	100%
Hygiene - health	0%	67%	33%	0%	100%
Labour - educational	40%	40%	0%	20%	100%
Productive	0%	0%	50%	50%	100%
Recreational	0%	0%	50%	50%	100%
Health	5%	15%	36%	44%	100%
Sanitation	25%	75%	0%	0%	100%
Social	12%	18%	47%	24%	100%
Transport	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Road	78%	11%	11%	0%	100%
Housing	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Total	18%	22%	29%	32%	100%


This variation in the conception of projects chosen by the citizens could be the result of three clearly identifiable factors:

- Greater understanding by citizens with respect to the scope of the PB tool;
- GDP communication strategy and changes introduced to the tool have consolidated the process in the form of a space for implementation of community projects.

- Satisfaction with the demand of traditional services provided by the municipality on behalf of the citizens.

To this end, if we analyse the *standard of competence* arising from the proposals voted by citizens, we identify a high percentage of projects destined to finance activities, services or infrastructure of social organisations; 38% are projects under the context of public government institutions of national competence and 18% of municipal competence

Standard of competence arising from voted projects



If we analyse evolution of the process, we can note a gradual increase in projects of governmental competency at national level, and of those projects that are characteristic of social organisations in the different editions, with projects of municipal competency tending to decrease.

Standard of Competence	Year				Total
	2005	2006	2007	2008	
National Government	4%	24%	33%	39%	100%
Municipal Government	68%	18%	11%	3%	100%
Social Organisations	7%	22%	29%	41%	100%
Private Sector	50%	0%	50%	0%	100%
Civil soc. - Municipality	17%	17%	67%	0%	100%
Total	18%	22%	29%	32%	100%

Concerning this distribution of competencies, the relation arising in Paysandú differs if we compare it to districts in the interior where the PB is elective.

Standard of Competence	Ballot Area				Total
	Paysandú	Guichón	Quebracho	Tambores	
National Government	39%	25%	31%	43%	38%
Municipal Government	22%	0%	0%	0%	18%
Soc. Organisations	36%	75%	62%	57%	40%
Private Sector	1%	0%	8%	0%	1%
Civil soc. -	3%	0%	0%	0%	3%

Municipality					
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Basically, districts in the interior tend to choose projects associated to governmental competencies at national level and funds for specific activities of social organisations. In Paysandú, the relation between the National Government, social organisations and municipal government categories is similar.

In conclusion, by means of the analysis we have identified greater commitment from citizens with social, cultural and environmental problems, as a result of their selected projects.

To that we should add clear emphasis on funding of projects of governmental competence at national level and of social organisations.

A priori to the above, a possible hypothesis is that this situation is due to the existing breach between the necessities and demands of the citizens and the real possibilities of the central State of providing an answer in due time and course.

For the case of funding projects of social organisations, a possible explanation can be associated to the scarce information and knowledge they have with respect to the sources of funds and mechanisms of management and sustainability of local social funds.

3.1.2 Changes in the PB's proposal based on lessons learnt

Our interest lies in identifying the new elements incorporated by the GDP into the PB in the context of reviews undertaken annually on finalising each of the Editions.

In accordance with information revealed by the interviews¹² and basic documentation of the PB Unit, we are able to identify the following changes in the proposal:

- **Young PB:** a first pilot test directed to youngsters between the ages of 14 and 29 was launched in 2008, and carried out on a special voting day with proposals submitted by those involved.
- **Digital vote:** a pilot test was carried out with several digital ballot boxes, as an experience in the city of Paysandú and in the Young PB.
- **Changes in requirements:** the projects presented must be supported by 20 residents.
- **Support from public institutions:** Projects that involve public institutions (health, education, etc.) must have the support or consensus of the local public authority.
- **Change of age:** Voting is allowed as of the age of 14.
- **Changes in ways of voting proposals:** three projects may be selected from different districts.
- **Accountability:** records are submitted to the parties responsible for the winning projects, who will render accounts to the Government and the community.
- **Integration of the Follow-Up Committee:** as of the 2007 edition, a Committee was founded and integrated by the person responsible for the PB Unit and a resident from each area of Paysandú representing the winning projects.

¹² Three interviews were carried out: City Council General Secretariat, Decentralisation Director and Person in charge of the PB Unit. Annex 1 presents the interview guidelines applied by the different actors..

- **Incorporation of Guichón as a district with elective PB:** as a result of the initiative submitted by the Town Councillors, Guichón launched their elective PB as a pilot experience in 2008, maintaining a mixed system¹³.

The objective of the following section of the Report is to analyse the level of impact of CLAEH’s intervention in the changes incorporated by the departmental Government.

3.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 2 AND 3: MAIN ADVANCES IN GENERATED AGREEMENTS AND SYSTEMATISATION OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH.

3.2.1 *Opinion and perception on the progress of the process*

Fourteen interviews were undertaken in Quebracho and Tambores in order to gather information to enable identification of the main progress made in the agreements generated between the local society and departmental Government.

The interviews were distributed as follows:

Type of Actor	Tambores	Quebracho
Interviews with Project Representatives	4	5
Interviews with Town Councillors	1	1
Interviews with Committee Executives	1	2

The following *contributions* can be identified from these interviews:

- There is consensus that the PB is *a valid instrument for administration of funds* on behalf of social organisations that cater to social problems in the community, and is a democratic *way of distributing public funds*.
- Conflicting opinions were identified with regard to the *type of projects* that should be presented in the PB. At least three opinions became known:
 - o Argumentations founded on considerations that projects of public institutional competence should not be funded (schools, polyclinics, etc.).
 - o Argumentations insinuating that social organisations capable of self-funding or generating their own resources should not participate (sports or social clubs).
 - o Argumentations manifesting the need to generate changes in the organisations presenting projects, restricting in some way the number of times an organisation can present the same proposal in more than two successive editions.
- There is consensus with respect to the main *aspect of strengthening fund administration* once the proposals have been selected, and that the municipal administration is not sufficiently agile to administer the resources.

¹³ Of the total financial resources, a part is destined to social projects assessed by the councillors in consultation with citizens, another part of the resources is assigned to the general elective system and a smaller part to the elective Young PB.

- All interviewees *consider the experience of administering resources as positive* along with the execution of projects, given that these have enabled at least three advances:
 - o Communication with the departmental Government using a different approach, leaving clientelist practices to one side.
 - o Establishing relations with other social organisations for project administration, or including issues of shared interest in their agendas.
 - o Extending visualisation of organisations at local society level, which in some cases favoured legitimacy.
- It was thought that *the Government should improve public information and communication mechanisms*. In general, the accountability mechanisms implemented are considered to be unsatisfactory.
- *Training Workshops carried out by CLAEH in 2007 are seen as positive*, and considered to be essential for the purpose of strengthening the process of participation with impact capacity on social organisations.
- There is agreement that *the PB is an instrument that is firmly installed among citizenry*, and its continuity will largely depend on citizens' capacity to influence and demand rather than the willingness of the leaders currently in office.

To the inputs provided by the interviewees, we must add the following *perceptions obtained from the experience of observing participation* carried out under the 2008 Editions of the elective PB in Tambores and Quebracho:

- *High level of citizen involvement* on the day of elections, experienced by the local society as a "festive day".
- *Defined strategies* on behalf of project promoters in order to provide support to the "electoral campaign" designed to persuade residents by using all available broadcasting channels and communication media: public entertainment, door-to-door, flyers, banners, radio and television media, etc.
- *High level of commitment and responsibility from the PB Unit* concerning organisation and logistics of the voting process. A high level of dependence on the Local Committee is still perceived towards the main structure for the purpose of carrying out the process, which is largely conditioned by disparity in existing commitment on behalf of the town councillors (representatives of the political system), not so in civil servants.
- *High impact in public visibility of the municipality in the district*, with the use of portable ballot boxes visiting urban centres and a loudspeaker promoting the possibility of casting votes from home as a strategic innovation.
- *Political involvement of the municipal Mayor* in implementing the tool. His presence in the final stages of the voting process lent validity, credibility and legitimacy to the proposal. This involvement is not perceived in the same manner within the Government cabinet, which takes on very different political commitments.

3.2.2 Elements provided by the evaluation workshops

Lastly, we should add the inputs collected during the two workshops carried out under the research framework:

- i. **Workshop with the PB Follow-Up Committee:** whose objective consisted of identifying self-perception with respect to the role they should play and the outcome to be achieved during the respective year of administration¹⁴.
- ii. **Workshop - “Lessons Learnt on Project Management of the Participatory Budget”:** which aimed to make an evaluation with the representatives of the winning projects in the city of Paysandú and districts of Quebracho and Tambores, in order to identify the principal learning resulting from project execution and to underline a few basic aspects of accountability by the social organisations.

i. Workshop with the PB Follow-Up Committee

Herewith a brief summary of the *principal issues* identified by Committee members that require that decisions and concrete action be made in order to confront the challenges that lie ahead¹⁵:

- ❖ A high level of commitment and involvement is perceived from all Committee members with regards to the PB process, although their role as residents committed to Projects cannot be clearly separated from their *role* as Committee members.
- ❖ Proposals were made to agree on a *general framework of performance* and an operative and strategic *work agenda* for the Committee. This will begin to create a form of self-perception as an instrument that will operate in an articulated and coordinated manner.
- ❖ Certain difficulty by the Committee to *exchange ideas* on a work agenda was identified, and discussion was rather disorganised and focused on the issues of concern in the PB process.
- ❖ A proposal was made to generate *spaces for discussion* with a minimal agenda of matters for discussion aimed at advancing in the creation of this space, requiring third party agents for this proposal that are able to steer the work and begin to focus discussion on matters that are important at this stage of the preparation.

In short, the main challenge the committee currently faces is basically centred on two interrelated aspects: on one hand, generating collective and periodic working occasions in order to advance in the making of this space, and on the other hand, the need to define the Committee’s role and work plan in the short term.

ii. “Lessons Learnt” Workshop

Two workshops were carried out, subdividing the group of winning project representatives from the interior of the department and the Paysandú capital city group.

¹⁴ The Follow-Up Committee is an instrument that created the GDP as of the 2007 PB Edition. It arose as a citizens initiative during the last workshop carried out by CLAEH on accountability in April 2008, and as a result of the experiences presented in the PB International Seminar held in Paysandú in October 2007.

¹⁵ Annex 2 includes the Report that was sent in October 2008 to the Government authorities with the various recommendations made.

A total of 43 project representatives participated, 26 in Paysandú and 17 in the workshop held in Tambores, of which 9 were project representatives from this district and 8 from Quebracho, who were taken to the district.

The following is the input obtained from the work dynamic carried out in both workshops, grouped by the particularities of each group and with no differentiation between workshops (only for relevant cases) and, in cases where deemed necessary, exchanging contributions between one group and another.

❖ **Lessons learnt on Project Administration by social organisations**

The PB has allowed them to have major appearance and social impact in the community, strengthening the organisations responsible for administrating funds and promoting networks.

They have had access to local media, promoting learning for everyday communication and specific actions in the framework of the PB, which has now brought them to the attention of citizens in general.

Involvement and commitment by the people has changed, in addition to contributing transparency to the process of distributing funds.

Training in the preparation of projects and accountability is a priority in strengthening the process and the participating social organisations, a relevant aspect of the learning experience.

In general, recognition is given to the relevance the projects have had regarding concrete citizen demands. Certain vulnerability can be perceived in some of the organisations to adequate project administration, given that they were exceeded in their capacities to attend to the demands generated by project execution, which are closely associated with increasing expectations.

❖ **Accountability mechanisms identified by the organisations:**

From the organisations, accountability mechanisms are identified for the projects and activities that are closely linked to the strategies on communication of project results to users, opposing parties and citizens in general.

The following have been identified¹⁶: posters in shops and district institutions; radio and television; brochures; newspapers and journals; letter-boxes, surveys and opinion polls; open demonstrations in schools and clubs; exhibitions.

❖ **Sustainability of social projects¹⁷:**

¹⁶ Advantage was taken of the workshop to work with the group on potentials and disadvantages of each one of the identified mechanisms, according to the reality of each organisation, as well as the need to plan the accountability by means of why and for which purpose.

The first action the organisations should carry out to give sustainability to the projects was considered to be related to providing permanent sources of information to users/beneficiaries of the projects and the community in general.

According to the above, emphasis was placed on evaluations identifying causes, motives or consequences as to why the project within the PB Framework failed to win.

Therefore, the need to generate more reliability and transparency within the organisations was identified, by implementing accountability mechanisms for the people, as well as broader strategies, rather than opening the organisations towards other people and attempting to articulate the projects with other community organisations.

In general, all the involved parties are aware of the strategies to be followed for funding the activities of their organisations, such as holding parties, company sponsorships and campaigns undertaken by members of social or sports clubs. However, these traditional mechanisms entail an intrinsically difficult issue that is related to the lack of commitment by all members of the organisations, with responsibilities always falling on the same people. This generates apathy and attrition, in addition to organisations overlapping in small communities.

With respect to feasibility of achieving external funds not involving mobilisation of the organisation's resources, the lack of knowledge and information as to the origins of resources or funding is observed, along with insufficient technical abilities to prepare projects in accordance with external financing requirements, and fundamentally, the uncertainty and fear this lack of information tends to generate.

With respect to the above, a few strategic actions are posed to promote the search for funding:

- The request for technical support from competent entities, or local organisations, that have the required capabilities.
- The promotion of social networks is a way of generating institutional synergies and sharing of knowledge.
- The commitment towards competent entities within areas of action of the organisation achieved through permanent communication of pertinent activities and correct preparation of projects.

In general, it is recognised that the PB modified the organisations' culture, given that this does not merely involve "requesting resources", but requires arguing, justifying and proposing a project that must convince the community.

In addition, local demands that historically had not been catered for by competent central public entities have now found a way of being channelled, although it is recognised

¹⁷ *The assignment requested that the group identify concrete actions and strategies to be carried forward on behalf of the organisations in order to achieve funds and sustainability for the projects, under the assumption they had not been selected in the PB.*

that this strategy can only be possible in the short term to generate a change of logic that will allow horizontal local public policy to be articulated.

In order to articulate actions seen at central level, enabling medium-term synergies, this change of logic requires commitment from the local Government, the organisations and citizens in general.

As a final consideration, as well as carrying the process forward, the PB Unit should channel these actions and be an articulating node between the organisations and the State.

❖ **Evaluation of the Participatory Budget Follow-up Committee¹⁸**

The following chart identifies the main contributions made by the Follow-Up Committee, set up within a matrix of strengths and weaknesses:

Strengths	Weaknesses/ aspects for improvement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Solid connection among the (permanent) members of the Committee - Neutrality when taking action and respect for all projects. - Frequent meetings held internally and with the community. - Awareness of other projects in the different districts promoted a further commitment and vision of the PB scope. - Validating the Young PB CGP proposal, follow-up of the experience and exchange of obtained learning. - Proposal and validation of changes undertaken in the PB: crossed votes; backing from district residents and public entities. - Excellent relations between the Committee and the PB working team of the GDP, as well as external intervening agents (CLAEH, Malaga). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak relation between the Committee's regular and alternate members - Lack of internal communication - Little time to act for the achievements attained - The need to implement communication mechanisms. The proposal is to prepare minutes of meetings and activities in order to inform the rest of the organisations and citizenry in general. - Although it is considered that supervision by peers is positive, technical elements are required in order to evaluate the projects (one should not overlap the other).

❖ **Challenges of the Participatory Budget: aspects to review or improve¹⁹**

¹⁸ This dynamic was only worked on in Paysandú where the Follow-Up Committee was created. The group comprised exclusively Follow-Up Committee representatives and the proposed assignment consisted of evaluation and accountability towards their peers with respect to the work they had undertaken in this period.

¹⁹ Contributions made by the groups in workshops are presented in addition to individual opinions by means of the pre-established guideline that had been prepared and was to be completed by all participants.

All participants recognise the relevance of the PB tool and the qualitative advantages generated by the project selection system, giving credibility, legitimacy and transparency to the process.

It is recognized as an important tool to initiate change in relations between both residents and social organisations with the departmental Government, although concrete changes in all directions of the city council have not yet been identified, and this new way of relating is an exclusive characteristic of the PB Unit.

There are a few identified **challenges** requiring attention for future PB editions, which are subdivided into three levels of intervention:

With respect to the PB tool:

- Increase the number of projects for funding (more available resources).
- Improve the feasibility study for the projects and communicate criteria.
- Evaluate the possibility of limiting the number of projects per organisation in order to motivate further participation.
- Extend the elective PB to the entire district.
- Strengthen the PB's social profile in order to avoid funding competing projects from government public entities at national or municipal level.
- Improve planning of the PB's timetable, submitting the respective information with more time to citizens (provide for more time between one stage and another).
- Improve administrative efficiency between stages of project selection, administrative procedures and granting of funds (a maximum of three months is considered optimum).
- Promote, on behalf of the PB Unit, open and public meetings on the projects presented for consideration in the selection, so that they can be defended and justified.
- Improve diffusion channels and ways to communicate PB progress, providing for greater continuity, presence and public visibility.
- Generate space for systematic and periodic exchange of experiences in order to benefit from accumulated learning.

At social organisation level:

- Generate skills in formulating projects (very difficult for organisations to deal with unforeseen aspects of execution).
- Plan project implementation and generate minimum agreements before starting.
- Evaluate and monitor the project during execution so as to be able to make continual changes.

At GDP level:

- Promote networking on the basis of data held by the PB Unit of all organisations.
- Motivate public inter-institutional coordination avoiding the overlapping of competencies.
- Promote a way of relating similar to the PB Unit in other directions of the City Council,

making relations between governors and citizens closer.

In short, we believe that the evaluation workshop has generated important inputs for research, but has especially generated – once again – valuable information for the GDP that enables decision-making.

We must be aware that the interventions undertaken by PDL-CLAEH, both in the context of research and in the previous intervention, have provided the GDP with valuable inputs from different perspectives:

- The intervention contributed process systematisation by means of the diagnosis; awareness of citizens' opinions by means of the survey and local capacities by means of thematic workshops.
- Research allows knowledge to be generated on the basis of process revisions, but at the same time promotes a space for collective evaluation using specific methodology, which brings systematisation and knowledge from the main actors of the process.

In the last Chapter of the Report, we shall stop to assess from our perspective the impact capacity we consider PDL-CLAEH has had in the decision-making process.

3.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 4: IDENTIFYING LINES OF ACTIONS

Possibly, the inputs presented in this Chapter could widely exceed the general proposed objective, of *identifying through research the main contributions the CLAEH-GDP Project has had in the process of strengthening citizen participation in the PB.*

However, we consider that the *leit motif* of the research has been to provide an answer to the main questions we raised at the outset:

- i. *As regards the project, what capacities have been incorporated in local society and departmental administration, in order to grant sustainability to the citizen participation process?*
- ii. *As regards the agreements generated within the context of a project, what has been the main learning obtained from this experience, and what role has local society had to play regarding implementation of Paysandu's participatory budget currently under execution?*

We have thus systematised the process, identifying the main progress achieved in agreements generated between local society and the departmental Government, which in some way has contributed towards generating knowledge so that the GDP can make decisions to strengthen the PB process.

In this section, we plan to identify specific lines of action to promote greater involvement in the process by local society, and provide answers to the previously posed questions.

3.3.1 Lines of action to motivate involvement in the process by local society

Throughout the text, we have accounted for lines of action on a wide array of subjects, therefore, we will stop at this point in order to summarise a few of these that will foster greater involvement in the process by local society, under the following assumptions:

- The process has grown steadily as regards the number of citizens supporting the proposal and mobilising human and social resources in order to provide validity to the initiative.
- The GDP has achieved support for the PB tool by means of political willingness, commitment from the officials involved and transparency during the process.
- The Paysandú PB has its own identity and is seen as being an experiment based on constant learning, opening out to intervention from external agents (both as collaborators and research centres) and flexibility with respect to decision-making.

Under such assumptions, we propose **5 specific lines of action:**

i. Provide information on the PB according to citizens' demands

The GDP has generated important changes in ways of relating with the citizens, incorporating new forms of communication with citizens that prioritise diverse means (visits to neighbourhoods, informative meetings, the web, media, electronic mail, publicity, etc).

In spite of this, PB information has not yet found appropriate mechanisms for channelling. Even though presence in the media is maintained, accountability has been strengthened with visits to projects with the media, and fundamentally the amount of information provided by the web-site has improved, such lines of action continue to be carried out without a planned and systematised communication policy²⁰.

ii. Generate PB tool changes with citizen participation.

As previously indicated, the GDP has had sufficient flexibility to apply continual changes to the PB tool, and possibly, one of the main challenges has been the creation of the Follow-Up Committee.

Concrete decisions need to be made to strengthen this space of exchange, follow-up and planning of the PB²¹.

This should be a space built between intervening actors, and fundamentally be sufficiently broad and open so as not to create ways of participating with hidden relations of power, in which *"we all participate but decisions continue to be made vertically"*.

iii. Prepare citizens' capacity to participate

Those involved in the process demand concrete spaces for training and instruction in skills in keeping with their needs, such as social networks, project preparation, local and community development, strategic planning, ways to work in social organisations, etc.

We consider that the PB has reached a sufficient level of maturity and stability within government administration to begin to promote other accumulations that by means of applying the tool will allow for the construction of spaces to strengthen citizen participation.

In fact, in the 2006-2010 Departmental Budget, the GDP created a Decentralised Administration Department which is responsible for the PB Unit and Citizens' Training Unit

²⁰ By way of example, the website includes a great deal of information on the process that is organised sequentially and without an integral vision of the tool, making it difficult to find the global results of the process, so the user of the website will have to create a data matrix. It is not a problem of the amount of information but of the quality and coherence of that information.

²¹ Annex 3 presents a specific diagnosis in this respect as well as a few recommendations.

as the main management units for PB implementation and strengthening of citizens' participation. However, to date, it has merely provided the PB Unit with contents and instructions, without generating the minimal conditions to set up a Citizens' Instruction Unit.

Even though the only training experiences carried out under the PB framework were accomplished by initiative of projects executed by PDL-CLAEH, there is clear support and willingness by the GDP, which views training as fundamental and necessary, but has not yet been channelled by means of their own resources and strategies defined for such cases.

iv. Promote accumulation of learning procedures

A concrete and specific demand to promote spaces for exchange and accumulation of collective learning procedures has been observed from the different techniques for gathering information used for this research (interviews, surveys, observations from participants, workshops, meetings, etc.)

Our previous point emphasised creating capacities for participation; this point emphasises generating spaces that will allow for socialising, articulating and carrying out shared actions. That is, learning, concrete experiences and initiatives exist within local society, which merely calls for space for adequate methodology to enable the exchange process.

Once again, a Citizens' Training unit should be set up as the main axis by which to channel synergies between PB institutions.

v. Invest in evaluating

Public policy in general and municipal policy in particular lack monitoring and evaluation systems for the plans, programmes and projects they implement.

There are multiple causes for this - not the object of this report - that can be grouped into three areas:

- Scarce or limited technical resources specialised in the subject at municipal level.
- Under-developed instruments of policy planning that do not allow the different components, inputs and resources of a policy to be foreseen.
- Political willingness to invest in human and financial resources for monitoring and evaluating systems that are visible to citizenry, or as a last resort, to the electorate.

These are common causes in most of the local public administration procedures in which we have intervened as the PDL-CLAEH.

However, by means of the PB, the GDP has managed to channel economic resources funded through international cooperation, which has afforded support, promotion and strengthening of the process.

At the initial stages, cooperation assigned funding to consolidate, raise awareness and grant greater public visibility of the process at local levels, both nationally and internationally. At this current stage it may be viable to begin to activate such funds for the construction of a monitoring and evaluation system.

3.3.2 What capacities for which process?

Lastly, we share two reflections that provide a concrete answer to the two main questions.

- ❖ If we had to define the capacities that have been installed in local society and local public administration in three words, we could say:
 - *Trust.*
 - *Articulation.*
 - *Flexibility.*

Now, although necessary, these three capacities are insufficient to sustain a process, and therefore work must be continued towards facing the challenges we have identified and above all things, *conviction, decision and political willingness* are what is required.

- ❖ The main social learning generated by the experience has been the possibility for organised citizens to *administer projects with public funding* by means of a process involving preparation, execution and accountability.

Therefore, local society has been of central importance in the PB implementation process, made possible through the political willingness of the departmental Government that has decided to subject local public administration to an *innovating experience*, which has required, and will continue to require, constant adjustments in order to articulate the different *logics of action that are inherent to a process* of this nature.

IV PDL-CLAEH INTERVENTION EVALUATION

This section offers a few reflections that enable us to identify the influence of the research/action in Paysandu's Participatory Budget process and principally in the different decisions and changes incorporated by the GDP.

4.1 SCOPE OF THE INTERVENTION

The principal recommendations made by the PDL-CLAEH to GDP may be seen below, together with the level of incidence we believe it has had one year after the end of the intervention²²:

Recommendations or challengers identified by CLAEH	Level of incidence	Concrete action from the departmental Government
Need to implement administrative processes and procedures that will provide for fast, agile and efficient management.	Medium	Changes were undertaken in administrative management of PB procedures
Definition of a strategic PB line of action that will provide a link to the strategies of each one of the Administration Departments, favouring those proposals that adapt to it.	Low	Even though it appears in the Government cabinet's agenda, it is not reflected in the strategies of the different Administration Departments; it only concerns the PB Unit.
Cross-cutting of the structure that will allow progress on the different projects at similar rates of execution.	Low	Administration Departments are not coordinated efficiently and PB cross-cutting is not considered.
Space for citizens' training and instruction for preparation and execution of projects entailing development with criteria on sustainability.	Low	On finishing CLAEH intervention, SCOs did not continue to receive training.
Multidisciplinary and stable team with real possibilities of follow-up and execution.	Medium	Comprising administrative executives of the PB unit, but administration was not made professional.
Training for municipal officials and the cabinet on team work at the level of public bureaucratic structures.	Low	Training activities were not carried out.

²² Identified recommendations were submitted to the GD in three reports that were prepared within the framework of the Project executed during 2007 and proposed at a final meeting that was held with the District Mayor and the General Secretary.

Organisation of PB Unit to incorporate work methodologies for each stage: preparation, project evaluation, execution, follow-up, evaluation and communication.	Medium	Human resources were incorporated, but the administration was not made professional.
Systematic follow-up and dialogue activities with projects executed and those under execution.	Medium	Instances of dialogue with project execution SCOs increased, but randomly with no follow-up plan.
Comparative analysis of other experiences and periodic systematisations of the experience allowing for learning processes.	Low	No systematisation of any kind was carried out.
Definition of communication strategies adapted to the various PB stages.	Low	Communication coordination is attempted, but it continues to be isolated and without planning.
Accountability for all social, financial and political actors on evolution of the process as Government strategy.	Low	Regular mechanisms are used for accountability that are not linked to each other.
Citizens' involvement through SCOs in decision-making on scope of the tool.	High	Setting up of the Follow-Up Committee
Preparation of PB manuals for municipal officials and practical guides with free access for citizens, guaranteeing equitable distribution.	Low	There is no documented experience on the use of guidelines or manuals
In accordance with survey results, the target groups for positive action to secure participation are: men, youngsters and voters from other districts.	Medium	Young PB was incorporated and age for voting in the general PB was extended
In order to reach an integral vision of the PB situation in the district of Paysandú, it would be appropriate to measure opinions arising from inhabitants in the interior of the department.	Low	No evaluations were made on any of the suggested dimensions.

It is evident that the *level of impact* of the intervention on the basis of the given recommendations *has been established in general terms*.

However, we must bear in mind a few aspects recognised indirectly, or on the basis of deeds by the Government team, and fundamentally by local society.

Many changes introduced in the PB are part of the issues discussed at length with the Government authorities and citizens in the different instances of exchange during the process.

We can emphasise:

- *Higher level of consolidation of the social organisations* submitting proposals

Even though improved preparation of projects from a formal point of view is not identified, a few articulating strategies can be visualised amongst social organisations which share an issue of concern in their communities or neighbourhoods. This achievement is partly

attributed to the experience of the training workshops carried out as a space of reciprocal awareness between organisations²³.

- *A higher level of incidence is identified in the localities of Tambores and Quebracho.*

With respect to the importance of the former, we consider that the training experience, both for town councillors and for local society, was fundamental in generating better projects and in starting up the elective PB pilot experience.

- On behalf of the departmental Government, *recognition* is given to the *importance of CLAEH's intervention*, not only due to the external perspective of the process but also due to the legitimacy it receives in comparison with other government actors and other similar experiences in the region.

That is, the need to legitimise the process on the basis of the intervention of external agents and the creation of knowledge with respect to the experience.

- *A few practical decisions on the PB*, as well as administrative management *are identified within the context of the intervention.*

However, they are neither publicly nor formally recognised by the authorities as project contributions (e.g. Young PB, extension of the voting age, separating election days in the city-interior, creating the Follow-Up Committee, critical reading of results obtained, etc.)

In short, even though it continues to be a challenge for organisations that generate knowledge - such as CLAEH - to be legitimate and recognised in their role as formulators of proposals and new logics of intervention in the territory, we believe that the building of mutual trust is a process requiring time, concrete actions with measurable results, willingness and commitment between both parties.

4.2 FACTORS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVENTION

Below is a brief summary of the endogenous²⁴ and exogenous²⁵ factors that enabled impact in public policy.

Level	Facilitators	Blockers
Endogenous factors	High legitimacy of the organisation in the territory.	Scarce financial resources to generate a long term process.
	High level of legitimacy of the organisation in face of decision-makers from the departmental Government.	
	Good ability to generate projects	

²³We consider it difficult to measure the impact caused by training for preparation of projects, given that to date the form used by the GDP for the submission of projects is very basic and does not reflect the guidelines given in the course for citizens.

²⁴ According to CIPPEC, endogenous factors are those strategic elements that are internal to the organisation which facilitated the link with public policy.

²⁵ Exogenous factors are considered to be those elements that are external to the organisation that enable or hinder the link under review.

Level	Facilitators	Blockers
	with external funding to impact on the process.	
	Consolidated work team and specific knowledge for intervention.	
	Good summoning capacity of the organisation.	Geographical distance hindering permanent presence in the territory.
	Work proposal that is flexible to Government needs.	
	High level of trust with the work team supported by compliance with all agreements throughout the intervention process.	
Endogenous factors	Good image of Paysandú PB in the country and the region.	Scarce Government capacity to implement changes in the cabinet allowing the PB process to become government strategy.
		Multiple actors intervening in the topic within the territory.
	High level of consolidation on the public agenda of the PB experiences at government and citizen levels, and by academia in general.	Scarce Government capacity for improvement of communication and information systems and accountability within the PB Framework.
		Weak professionalisation of PB administration.

In conclusion, the intervention made has left extensive learning for the PDL-CLAEH concerning *validation of an intervention model*, although there is still a long way to go with respect to developing impact strategies that will allow real actions to be integrated and intervention to be validated by governments.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PAYSANDÚ

1. Presentation of the Department of Paysandú



The department of Paysandú is located in the west of the country. It has a surface that represents 8% of the country's total area.

The latest information provided by the Institute of Statistics and Censuses accounts for a total population of 113,244 inhabitants (3% of the country's total), and similar gender distribution²⁶.

A total of 90.7% of the population is urban and 9.3% rural, with a great concentration in the capital of the department (65%).

Population with regular residence in Paysandú grew at an average annual rate of 6 per thousand, which is above the national average (3.2 per thousand). However, the capital city showed a slight population decrease with a negative growth rate (-2.2 per thousand).

2. Genesis and evolution of the Participatory Budget in Paysandú

In May 2005, after departmental elections held in Uruguay, for the first time in history Paysandú saw the ascension of a left-wing departmental Government, the "*Frente Amplio - Encuentro Progresista - Nueva Mayoría*" led by Julio Pintos.

In accordance with the manifesto and ideological lines of the sector, they swiftly began to make decisions in compliance with the guiding principles of the departmental Government, which took office on 7 July that year.

Those strategic lines featured large in the 2006-2010 Departmental Budget, which reflected the principal targets and objectives of the new departmental government.

Emphasis is placed on the need to comply with the traditional roles of departmental Governments (Lighting, Cleaning and Streets - "ABC" is the Spanish acronym), but making sustainable changes in these new roles. Therefore, "*deepening awareness and professionalisation of the traditional goals (...) as well as a tendency to generate instruments in order to improve the community's economic and social development within the context of departmental Government capacity and territorial decentralisation by means of strengthening City Government and Local Committees as instruments for such decentralisation, citizen participation as a tool to broaden*

²⁶ For further information visit www.ine.gub.uy

democracy and work on development, and local development, as an instrument to generate new opportunities for the district's inhabitants, positioning Paysandú as a regional and national reference", are established as targets for the 5-year-period.

As seen by the established targets, the intention and political will of the Government to carry out decentralisation as the instrumental basis of policy and participation as a major tool is restricted.

Therefore, five strategic alignments were established, as follows: institutional strengthening, environmental management, Productive Paysandú, Paysandú as a Human Being, Paysandú at Your Service.

Within the institutional strengthening alignment, the Decentralisation Administration Department was created as the major "umbrella" to uphold part of the transversal policies proposed by this new Government, including the Participatory Budget Unit as an administrative unit to deal horizontally with specific issues, "which the current vertical structure of the organisation chart ceases to favour".

Therefore, hierarchically speaking, the Decentralisation Administration Department depends on the General IMP Secretariat, with the PB unit and the Citizens' Educational Unit as the main administration units for PB implementation and strengthening of citizens' participation.

First experience: 2005-2006 Pilot Plan

Once the new Government took office (7 July 2005), and by means of the strong will of the Mayor to carry forth a Participatory Budget, a Decentralisation Administration Department was formed by Decree in September.

Among the first determining factors undertaken by the Government, reference is made to the fundamental nomination of the political strength of the popular vote as its banner, to be implemented on the basis of the idea of generating a PB pilot experience in the capital city.

A series of complementary activities then commenced, which would start marking the growth and main characteristics and nominations for the PB process in Paysandú:

- ❖ Work commenced on the territorial divisions of Paysandú city into six urban districts as a first measure to implement the PB: North, East, Northeast, West, South and Centre.
- ❖ In October 2005, 70 days after the Mayor's inauguration, one of the strongest electoral proposals on the programme of the departmental Government was enforced, namely integrating the eight Local Committees (Chapicuy, Quebracho, Lorenzo Geyres, Porvenir, Piedras Coloradas, Cerro Chato, Tambores and Guichón).
- ❖ A diagnosis was made of activities undertaken by Paysandú's Government Office in the capital city, by means of exchanging data from each Administration Department on ways and places that rendered municipal services (refuse collection, cleaning, lighting, endemic landfills, potable water provision, curb ditches, eating areas, nurseries and polyclinics).
- ❖ Definitions commenced on the Departmental Budget and PB, what they concern, how they are to be built and ways in which participation would work in addition to how much of the Departmental Budget would be assigned to the PB. That is, internal

Governmental decision-making began to move forward to start implementing a PB pilot plan in the city.

- ❖ The PB was included in the 2006-2010 Departmental Budget, and a decision was made to assign 3% of the total to the PB, representing 2% of IMP investment to be distributed as follows:
 - USD 60,000 per area for the capital city, and a maximum established amount of USD 10,000 per project.
 - USD 20,000 per Local Committee.
- ❖ Assemblies in the six districts commenced in September, with participation of the Mayor and entire Government cabinet, in order to explain the scope of the PB. At the same time, both Mayor and cabinet took note of the proposals submitted by the residents at the Assembly that were later processed in the IMP. The first territorial Assembly was carried out at the “Club Libertad” (South), with one of the highest attendances recorded.
- ❖ Meetings began at the same time with the town councillors of the eight Local Committees, who manifested their commitment to carry out the PB in their localities, and progress was made in designing a different strategy for the interior of each department.
- ❖ Towards the end of October, the first International Seminar on Participatory Budgeting is held, with the support of the Transnational Institute de Amsterdam (TNI), which allows authorities to have direct contact with other experiences in the region and finalise the proposal to be presented to the citizens.
- ❖ During October and November, work began on the various proposals that were submitted by the citizens during the Territorial Assemblies, and on 30 November – institutionalised date for PB elections – the first direct election of proposals in the capital city took place, with no previous survey on feasibility.
- ❖ Internally each department decided that the selection of proposals would be carried out by town councillors in assemblies held with the residents of the different localities. Two regional meetings were held – one in Guichón and the other in Quebracho – during which proposals were submitted to the Government cabinet.

Once the voting or selection process of proposals was over, the parties in charge of implementing the PB began to draw important lessons from this first pilot experience, definitions that would become part of the second PB edition in Paysandú, with emphasis on the following:

- ✓ Definitions were made concerning territorial reorganisation of the city into seven districts, subdividing the southern district into two (South and Southeast)
- ✓ Internal working patterns were established, although not regulated or written.
- ✓ Certain criteria on selection and feasibility of proposals were submitted, although not in writing, which led to the Administration Departments involved deciding to undertake a brief analysis prior to placing them for consideration of the citizens.
- ✓ Consolidation of the PB Unit as a space for administration.

- ✓ Installation of the PB House as a physical and visible area of activities.
- ✓ A toll free 0800 0728 telephone line for inquiries on the PB.
- ✓ Printed material for the media was prepared (adhesive material, invitations to neighbourhood assemblies, information leaflets, forms for reception of projects, banners, voting sheets), fundamentally addressed to citizens in the district capital, and no specific material for the interior.

Second experience: 2006-2007²⁷ Edition

On the basis of the acquired learning and execution of projects chosen in 2005, and after internal discussions and conflicting and diverging opinions, the authorities decided to continue the PB.

The sequence used was similar to that of the previous year; however a few aspects were slowly incorporated that have marked the identity of the Paysandú process.

- ❖ During August, 35 Assemblies were held in the different districts of the city, with the double objective of promoting the PB by submitting forms for proposals with explanations on the process, and a space for accountability on the levels of execution of proposals chosen in 2005.
- ❖ On perceiving a considerable decrease of citizen participation in the Assemblies, the work team decided to undertake specific actions with the aim of involving youngsters and children. Informative oral meetings were therefore held in educational centres (secondary schools, primary schools, the Uruguayan Labour University – *Universidad del Trabajo en Uruguay (UTU)* – principally within the context of a Citizen Educational assignment.
- ❖ Until 2 October, the proposal submission forms were received at PB House.
- ❖ At the same time, town councillors in the interior begin applying the form for presentation of projects received from the citizens.
- ❖ During October and November, analysis on technical feasibility of the projects presented was carried out by the directly involved Administrative Departments, in order to submit these to election by the citizens.
- ❖ In addition, spaces were spontaneously generated by the media to allow district residents to promote their projects, and to enable municipal authorities to explain the PB. The IMP published all the proposals submitted to the vote in the *El Telégrafo* newspaper, and the publicity given to them in the media also caused great impact.
- ❖ On 30 November, an institutionalised date, elections were held in the capital city, with the IMP in charge of processing ballot results, for which it received the assistance of officials from other units.

²⁷ *The 2007-2008 experience is not described because it is a part of the Report.*


On the basis of the experience of the two processes implemented, and principally the experience with respect to execution of the first PB, the Government decided to begin co-administering the selected proposals jointly with organised civil society.

The decision was made at the end of the voting process, and a great deal of time had to be devoted to dialogue and agreements with the different people and SCO's involved in each project, given that execution required the forging of agreements with the approved Projects, with the existence of a responsible SCO.

In addition, in a few of the proposals the decision was made to start generating spaces for articulation with the existing territorial inter-institutional bodies for project execution. For example, a project was coordinated with the Paysandú Departmental Prison (jurisdiction of a national entity, the Ministry of the Interior) so that all projects requiring furniture (tables and chairs) for correct functioning of dining rooms, kindergartens, polyclinics or schools would be carried out by the prisoners, and therefore promote decent work at the prison precinct, and similarly the City Council would be complying by providing the required furniture in the projects chosen by the citizens.

Stages of the process

The following flowchart indicates the main stages of the process and actors involved:



One of the distinctive features in relation to other PB experiences of the region is that in the case of Paysandú, strategic decisions were taken by the district Executive Council without participation by citizens or legislature. In addition, as observed, citizens played an important role both in preparing and deciding on projects. However, as will be seen in the report, this situation has been partially modified with the creation of the Follow-Up Committee.

In turn, the media plays an important role in broadcasting and communicating the tool, although, in all cases, it depends on the information submitted by the departmental Government.

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

Interviews held with municipal Government actors.

1. Which were the main changes incorporated into the PB process as of the 2007 edition? Why were these changes made?
2. How was the relevance of the changes evaluated? What changes were expected?
3. What results do you expect from the Follow-Up Committee? What objectives has the Government set for this Committee?
4. What expectations does Young PB have? Which do they consider are the main strengths and weaknesses? What aspects must improve for their development?
5. What assessment do they make of the elective PB experience in Tambores and Quebracho? What characteristics did the process have and what elements differentiate them from each other and in relation to the Paysandú PB?
6. Has the PB experience been useful in generating other environments for communication with civil society? What are they?
7. What contributions do you consider the training experience of civil society carried out during 2007 has made? Is the training relevant to the process?
8. On the Unit, were adjustments made in the process based on the project execution carried out by CLAEH? Which were the contributions made? What remained pending?
9. What is the current perception of the PP by the Government team?
10. Which are the main current difficulties of the PB process? Which are its main opportunities?
11. What PB administration mechanisms should be strengthened? Which aspects are still pending?
12. Which are the strategies defined for the 2008 PB?
13. What role does the communal Legislature, political body and the administration as a whole play in this strategy?
14. Which are the instances of strategic and daily coordination between the different IMP Administration Departments and the PB unit?
15. Do you consider that the PB is viable in other district administrations, whether run by this party or not?

Interviews with civil society representatives

1. How did you learn about the Participatory Budget? How did the idea of presenting a project occur to you?
2. Have you worked on your project jointly with anyone else from the community or any social organisation?
3. Did you participate in the Assemblies? What is your opinion of them?
4. With respect to your participation in the project training courses carried out last year, in what way would you evaluate your participation? Were these courses useful in the preparation of your project? What issues remained pending?
5. Once the project was chosen by the district residents, what was the process until project execution?
6. Which were the main difficulties found and how were these resolved?
7. Are you willing to continue presenting projects for the next PB?
8. Did the PB experience impact on relations and participation with other civil society organisations? And with regard to other dimensions of local government and government in general (Ministry of Social Protection, etc.)?
9. What aspects do you consider the GDP should strengthen for future PB editions?
10. Do you know of the Follow-Up Committee? What do you expect of this Committee? What role do you consider it should play?
11. Do you consider that the PB is a government mechanism? Do you consider it should be maintained in this and future administrations?

Interviews with town councillors from Tambores and Quebracho

1. What evaluation have you made of the elective PB? Which were the main challenges you had to face?
2. What was the main learning experience, as a councillor, collective political entity, and arising from administration procedures for the Committee?
3. Which aspects remain to be strengthened? Why?
4. Which are the strategies defined for the 2008 PB?
5. How do you think the citizens have responded to the PB? Did you perceive changes after the election of proposals from one year to the next with respect to citizens' interest in the subject?

6. Which were the main changes incorporated into the PB process as of the 2007 edition? Why were these carried out? How was relevance of the changes evaluated? What results do you expect to obtain?
7. Do you consider it relevant to have a Follow-Up Committee in the locality? Why and for which purpose?
8. What contributions do you think the civil society training experience carried out during 2007 made? Is training in the process important?
9. Which are the instances of the Committee's strategic and daily coordination with the departmental Executive?
10. Has the PB experience been useful in generating other spheres for communication with civil society? Which ones?
11. Do you consider that the PP is viable in other departmental administrations, whether a supporter of this party sector or not?

ANNEX 3: REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE

FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE REPORT ON PAYSANDU'S PARTICIPATORY BUDGET

I. Introduction.

Within the framework of the Research Project's performance, currently being carried out by CLAEH with respect to the Participatory Budget of Paysandu's City Council, we present a brief diagnosis on the situation of the Follow-Up Committee and a few instruments that can steer the work during the following months.

This activity is carried out within the context of one of the Project's specific objectives, which intends to *"identify the main progress made under the agreements forged between local society and the departmental Government in the Framework of the 2007 and 2008 Editions"*.

Among the different activities, it was planned to hold work meetings with the Follow-Up Committee.

In this context, a first meeting took place on 25 September, with a view to identifying the self-perception of the members of the Follow-Up Committee as to the role they must play and the outcomes they must achieve during their year of administration.

The need to hold a further meeting in October, with the aim of working on a set of instruments that can be used by the Committee in order to comply with the proposed products has been posed.

However, before holding the next meeting, we think it is important to indicate the most relevant aspects arising from the meeting and evaluate with the PB's responsible parties the following actions to be undertaken.

II. Results of the meeting.

All nominal members from each district participated in the meeting, an alternate member, the responsible party for the PB unit and a representative from Malaga.

The meeting was held with an open agenda, and leading questions with the aim of giving the debate a certain order and generating strategic contents for the Committee in the framework of the proposed objectives.

The plan had been to advance in the discussion in accordance with the following leading questions:

- Which have been the Committee's activities to date?
- What evaluation is being given to the actions?
- Which aspects should be improved?
- What role should the Follow-Up Committee have?
- Why should the Committee perform this role?
- For what reason should the Committee perform this role?
- What PP administrative dimensions should the Committee consider?

- Which products does the Follow-Up Committee wish to achieve during their year of administration?
- With whom do they propose to work?
- What actions should be undertaken in order to achieve these products?
- Which would be the instances of work?
- How often should they take place?
- What do they require in order to strengthen the Committee in this role?
- What do they expect from the City Council? What do they expect from the residents?

The following is a summary we have made of the main contents arising from the meeting, differentiated by thematic areas considered (although the order does not follow the meeting's rhythm of debate):

- ❖ The main *value* emphasised is the capacity they have had to continue to lend content to the actions as the PB process advances, "the road is made by walking" and the strong conviction held on the relevance of the PP as a participating tool.

PP growth has been considered important in the conception of the citizens. In general they all consider that the community has slowly adopted the tool.

- ❖ Emphasis is placed on the strong *commitment* that is needed, given that the majority of them lack the time to carry this task forward. They were previously responsible for knowing their projects and moving ahead according to only that; now they must know all the projects and move ahead with the aim of improving the quality of life in all neighbourhoods. They are neighbourhood delegates to the City Council, and have therefore had to become aware of concerns in the neighbourhood and relate to the residents.

They are seen as a team of residents that must think neutrally in order to carry the task forward, i.e. they must not act as spokespersons for a project or a political party.

- ❖ When identifying the Committee's role, they summarise it as follows:
 - Controller of the projects presented.
 - Indicator of shortcomings in the different zones.
 - Nexus with the population to raise awareness as to the PB's central aspects, defined as multipliers of neighbourhood projects.
 - Evaluators of the PB process, both for daily functioning and administration and for strategic aspects of the tool.
- ❖ The most important claim is related to the need to set *objectives* for the Committee and elaborate a *working plan* that will allow them to be organised in the different activities identified:
 - Cooperate between themselves in visiting different neighbourhoods with the aim of following up the winning projects, and providing support to responsible parties in face of the administration difficulties that arise.
 - Participate actively in defining and carrying out PB diffusion campaigns among residents, for which progress must be made on strategies centred on the

characteristics of each neighbourhood, but which are articulated with each other in order to enable use of the City Council's communication channels.

- Coordination between organisations and institutions.
 - Participate in evaluating PB strategy changes. Although they have participated in decision-making on a few innovating aspects that have been included this year (Young PB, 20 signatures, changes in rules, etc.), it is deemed necessary to advance with strategic discussions. That means defining the kinds of projects that are included within the viable proposals, and it is agreed that only social projects are funded in order to avoid including projects which correspond to the City Council's traditional competencies (lighting, works, cleaning, etc.).
 - Articulate between the residents and the departmental Government, both to facilitate relations between the residents and the City Council in order to submit the claims that are traditional to the different competent departments, such as the role of communicators to residents of PB contents and the scope of the tool.
 - Responsibility for accountability to residents concerning PB administration, for which they require systematic information from the City Council. The idea posed on a Project Map with information updated per district is evaluated as positive.
 - Generate capacities to enable becoming part of the evaluation process with respect to feasibility of proposals. Even though the City Council's responsibility is recognised in this aspect, it is considered important to have elements allowing the Committee to submit detailed explanations to the population on the evaluation criteria for feasibility of projects, for which instances of joint work between the Committee and the different Administrative Departments of the City Council are required.
- ❖ In order to perform the role and comply with activities, a few aspects need to be *improved*:
- Generate systematic collective working instances to get to know each other more and enable planning of collective activities.
 - Have systematic updated information from the City Council.
 - Improve instances of coordination between each other and the rest of the City Council, the media and residents.

The *main issues* that must be worked on in order to confront the challenges that lie ahead for the Committee are described below:

- ❖ A high level of commitment and involvement with the PB process can be perceived from all Committee members although their role as residents committed to the Projects cannot be clearly separated from the *role* they play as members of a Committee.

That is, they do not see themselves as a Committee but as residents that meet with the City Council to discuss PB issues. Therefore, the government is identified on one hand and the residents on the other; they do not see themselves as a *collective entity* in which everyone has a role to play. It is clear that the Government makes decisions concerning the PB process, but the role to be played by the Committee within this context remains unclear.

This situation can create excessive expectations of the Committee, or erosion over time, due to lack of contents to carry the work forward.

We propose that consensus should be reached on a *general framework of performance* and agreement made on an operative and strategic *work agenda* for the Committee, which will consequently begin to generate self-perception as an entity that must act in an articulated and coordinated fashion.

- ❖ The committee experienced certain difficulty in *exchanging ideas* as a result of the work agenda, and discussion was disorganized and focused on issues of concern to the PB process.

In this context it became difficult to advance on the work proposal we pose, although certain issues relevant to the Committee that have to do with the PB process more than the Committee's role were placed on the agenda.

This situation was within what was expected, given that the new tool and group are at an initial stage of relating to each other and consolidation. It is hoped that daily and urgent PB issues will take up time and energy so that the group can focus on issues that will allow this space to be consolidated.

We propose to generate *spaces for discussion* with a minimal agenda of topics for discussion to advance in the construction of the space, which will require external agents to steer the work and begin to focus the discussion on the topics considered important in this stage of construction.

In short, we consider that the challenge posed by the Government in opening a new space for citizens' participation within the PB framework clearly contains positive aspects that require a certain predisposition and commitment to work in order to make them sustainable over time.

We can emphasise the capacity for work and commitment to the PB process, and to the space generated within the Committee; the high degree of involvement with the community that facilitates relations; and the interest in contributing to improvement in the PB process.

In short, the main challenge the committee currently faces is minimally centred on two interrelated aspects: on one hand, generating instances of collective and periodic work in order to advance in the making of this space, and on the other, the need to define the Committee's role and working plan in the short term.



SPACES FOR COMMITMENT: USING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOUR OF THE POOR

Case Study

*“Impact of the scientific production of the Inter Trade Union Department
of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIEESE) in implementing
specific public policy for the protection of the quality of employment by
Brazil’s Ministry of Labour”*

Final report

Project led by:

Mgr. María Rosa Gamarra

La Paz, Bolivia, 05 January 2009

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THE CASE STUDY

1. BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSAL

1.1 Description of the origin of the Case Study. Who created it and what were the motives?

- **Project “Spaces for commitment: using knowledge in public policy in favour of the poor”**

The project “Spaces for commitment: using knowledge to improve public policy in favour of the poor” is a GDN initiative, implemented in Latin America by CIPPEC. The programme is based on the results of the consultation process prior to a workshop held in Buenos Aires in February 2008, and on different lessons learnt on the link between research and policy in the region.

Its main purpose is to use knowledge management to improve the link between research and policy (BRP or *Bridging Research and Policy*) in Latin America through the creation of a plural and active Community of Practice (CoP). The essential idea is to promote debate on how to strengthen BRP between civil society stakeholders that use research and evidence to influence public policy and policymakers interested in incorporating it into their policy decisions. By contributing to improve the form in which actors commit to each other, the project seeks to promote better interventions in the use of research in policy in order to ensure more effective public policy in favour of the region’s poor.

This initiative proposes that the various links between civil society actors and policy-makers be studied and promoted, bearing in mind the motivations, capacities, and constraints of each of them. In other words, it proposes to analyse the bridge between research and public policy as an integral whole (not focusing simply on supply - the research side-, or demand - the policy side). This is based on the belief that the use of research and evidence occurs by means of a dynamic process between both sectors, which assumes constant exchange, the creation and utilisation of diverse spaces of commitment, in a constant process of interaction.

Nevertheless, the relationship between civil society actors that produce information to influence public policy and policymakers is very complex. The nature of the relationship depends, to a large extent, on the specific subregions of Latin America and the Caribbean, and on the diverse topics covered by public policy. In order to circumscribe this broad and diverse relationship, the first invitation made by this project focuses on producing case studies on a particular topic: social policy (including poverty, vulnerability and exclusion) and a certain type of civil society actor: policy research institutes or *think tanks*.

1.2. Approaching the Case Study.

Since work as a fundamental right (that not only covers access to income, but is also a form of social insertion and personal realisation) and, particularly, decent work, are closely linked to the reduction of poverty and inequality. They should therefore be the epicentre of public policy in Latin America and the Caribbean, something which has been understood in

almost all the countries of the region, where the issue is generally part of the public policy agenda, but in which very different outcomes have been obtained.

It is highly recommendable that forms be found to promote the creation of an articulating axis of public, economic and social policies with evidence-based information management. Given the interesting outcome of the joint work experiences in Brazil between the Inter Trade Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIEESE), with important, systematised technical-scientific production available for more widespread diffusion, and the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MTE), which occurs in a period of particular importance for social management in Brazil, this case study has as a general objective to identify the ends and means of these experiences.

In the course of the research, sufficient evidence emerged regarding the national and international credibility of DIEESE, which has become a reliable source of information for Brazil's Ministry of Labour since it is an institution that manages knowledge by working with methodological rigour, has a highly skilled and competent technical team, a clear identity and sense of belonging, but principally because it has voluntarily decided, as a directed and conscious fact, to work to make an impact in public policy in Brazil, choosing between the opportunities and alternatives open to it, and what it believes can and should be done to benefit a position and a commitment which are fully assumed and internalised. The organisational learning process in the DIEESE reveals *"the acquisition of new competences by the members who act as a collective in an organisation. This allows the organisation to provide a creative solution to problems"* (Bolívar, 2000) **(1)**

DIEESE's experience, its relationship with the MTE and the joint results achieved must be understood as a process, and the systemic approach must be used to analyse it. This will bring comprehension of both the dynamic of change which occurred internally and externally and, principally, the various influences of its temporal and spatial contexts on those changes.

Undoubtedly, the usefulness and impact potential of this experience may be important in the area of knowledge management in order to see the different levels and elements that make for a successful insertion of technical-scientific production in promoting evidence-based public policy.

However, and since the delicate network of ends and means is part of an absolutely unique human, spatial and temporal framework, this contribution seeks to make (and is content with) the presentation of a remarkable case that, in a profoundly human form, shows that the conjunction of collective intelligence, will and passion, coupled with shared and deeply-felt purposes, can lead to concrete and positive results.

2. INTRODUCTION

Managing knowledge in a broad context (such as the “Spaces for commitment: using knowledge in public policy in favour of the poor” project) or in a specific organisational framework such as the DIEESE, which is an example of “good practice”, and to do so in the “information society”, as conceptualised by Manuel Castells in 1998 in his *The Information Age*, implies interacting within a “new technological, economic and social system; and an economy in which increased productivity does not depend on a quantitative increase in the factors of production (capital, labour, natural resources) but on the application of knowledge and information in management, production and distribution, both in the processes and in the products”, and becomes a multidimensional challenge.

Besides having had to overcome various myths as to what knowledge management is according to information gathered on the concept¹ (InWent, 2003) (2) and being profoundly involved in an issue as complex as labour, the DIEESE, the target of this study, has consolidated itself as a “**learning organisation**” (understood as one that has managed to develop in its core structures and strategies that increase and maximise organisational learning, and one that has structural conditions, such as “climate” and “culture”, which facilitate or foster it, based on team work, information flows in multiple directions, organisational transformation processes, etc.) and that is one of the most interesting motives for this investigation. The other, more fundamental, is how the DIEESE was able to use that learning to act, in the full sense of the term, and thus impact on its own reality and on that of the society of which it forms part.

¹ Thomas Davenport (10 Principles of Knowledge Management and four case studies, 1997) Yogesh Malhotra (Knowledge Management for the *New World* of Business, 1998) and Carol Hildebrand (Intellectual Capitalism, 1999) mention some of the myths associated with the topic, e.g., that managing is merely a question of systematising and automatising; it implies considerable cost; it is a problem of collecting and storing information, or that knowledge management means getting the right information to the right person at the right time (which is impossible in a dynamic reality). Knowledge management is, in fact, “an integral and holistic concept that includes psychological, organisational and technological factors to guarantee the effective mobilisation and transfer of knowledge” (Norbert Wilkens, 1998).

3. GENERAL CHARACTERISATION OF THE EXPERIENCE STUDIED: THE TOPIC OF WORK AS A SPECIFIC AREA OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE CASE STUDY.

3.1 Employment overview in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In the question of work, an important reference framework in the region is the document “Employment Overview in Latin America and the Caribbean” (ILO, 2006) (3), which claims that poverty and income inequality are pressing problems in Latin America and the Caribbean, the region of the world with the greatest income inequality. This document also says that “...the insufficient progress on the road towards the goal of reducing the percentage of poor population has been explained by stressing the weak and volatile economic growth of the region since 1990, aggravated by the profound initial inequality in income distribution...” Both factors, poverty and income inequality, are very closely linked to the quantity and quality of the employment created.

One element that leads to income differences is the level of different qualifications of human capital (skilled and unskilled labour), a fall in which is deemed to be of extreme importance. Therefore, social and professional qualifications (which we shall touch on several times below), is a means of achieving a reduction in the income gap. In terms of suitable mechanisms to foster policies and agreements promoting substantial improvements in the matter, the ILO encourages **social dialogue and collective bargaining** between the social actors, which, as we shall see, have become the field of work *par excellence* of the DIEESE.

Finally, the interest and awareness of the importance of “decent work” in achieving socially just and sustainable development, both worldwide and in Latin America and the Caribbean, is a recent development. The outcome documents of the 2005 World Summit, held during the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2005, said that the objectives of full employment and decent work had been given priority on the UN Development Agenda. The promotion of decent work is an implicit slogan in the mission of DIEESE, which even made an effective contribution to defining the concept, hence the importance of its contributions, not only in knowledge production but also in how it was able to insert it in the implementation or modification cycle of public policy on employment in Brazil.

3.2 Decent work in the Americas: a hemispheric agenda for 2006-2015.

In the Director General’s introduction document to the 96th International Labour Conference held in Geneva in 2007 (4) mention was made of four important issues that should serve as a guide to formulate the organisation’s policies and boost its institutional capacity:

- Globalisation and the transformation of the investment and employment structures.
- Work and society: combating poverty, discrimination and social exclusion.
- Modernising governance in the world of work.
- Decent work and the international development agenda.

In addition, it indicated that in order to enhance policy elaboration and reach the objectives of decent work a solid base would be required of information and knowledge that will allow the evolution of the labour market to be traced and observed. The document concluded that: “faith in market magic dissipated as soon as it was understood that in order for that market to function without distortions and in order to reestablish a balance between unequal social results efficient States are needed. Sustainable development, which rests on three fundamental values (economic and social development, and environmental protection), requires the presence of an effective welfare state and dynamic tripartism. However, globalisation poses new difficulties that require adapted responses and a strengthening of the systems of governance in the ILO and in its resource base.”

It is precisely on this kind of information and knowledge base (that allows the evolution of the labour market to be traced and observed) and on tripartism that the DIEESE has worked systematically and methodically all these years.

The “ILO Programme and Budget for 2006-2007” (ILO, 2005) (5) focused on four strategic objectives and five transversal objectives geared to generating “decent work,” a concept introduced by Juan Somavia (First Director General of the International Labour Organisation and from the Southern Hemisphere) in 1999, characterised by four strategic objectives: labour rights, employment opportunities, social protection and social dialogue, in which each one also fulfils a function in meeting broader goals such as social inclusion, the eradication of poverty, the strengthening of democracy, integral development and personal realisation (ILO, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004) (6). All are universally valid although, as in the case of the Americas, in each country certain nuances were adopted and adapted to the specificities and particularities of the area.

The first strategic objective was to comply with regulations on labour law and, very especially, on the principles and fundamental rights at work. This is a central objective of the policy on creating decent work. The second strategic objective, which was awarded maximum priority, was the creation of more work opportunities for men and women. The third strategic objective was social protection, since the social security systems, both in the field of health and in that of retirement and pension plans, frequently suffers management problems and, very especially, low coverage. The fourth strategic objective was the promotion of social dialogue and the strengthening of the social actors organisations intervening in it.

Articulating policies and achieving the objectives described involve a large number of actions and social actors under the assumption that they must act synergic ally.

3.3 Decent work in Brazil. Public policy and actions.

Social and professional qualification is one of the issues to which attention must be paid in articulating social dialogue, because it is a necessary element in defining the labour relations models mentioned above.

Brazil’s Ministry of Labour and Employment drew up a public policy on professional qualification, which faced the challenge of adopting a new perspective as an effect of the guidelines of the new Pluriannual Plan (PPA) for the period 2004-2007, which aimed at a

long-term development model, beyond 2007, designed to promote deep structural transformations in Brazilian society.

One of the biggest differences that sets this proposal apart from previous approaches was that it extended the participation of society in the construction of the PPA. It should also be mentioned that in the state context in Brazil there has been great progress in terms of constructing a social dialogue that conquers ever more space. The greatest convergence of the work undertaken by the MTE and the DIEESE is explained by the agreement on topics for the agendas and by the conditions of the political and social scenario.

On the other hand, and despite the data gathered for this Case Study, in Brazil there are other more advanced experiences in this field (the broad participation of various social actors), such as that of the Committee of Entities Against Hunger and For Life (COEP), which established a network formed by a group of Brazilian state enterprises that sought a point of convergence of the efforts to combat the situation of poverty in the country. As time passed, the network grew so much that it integrated government bodies, private enterprises and other civil society bodies; and this expansion transformed its original structure and led to a complex management model as a result.

In the document that systematises the experience (Fleury, Migueletto & Bloch) (7) we find the following comment, which can help to better shape the social context that surrounds these experiences: *"...The COEP is the expression of several of the paradoxes that characterise Brazilian society, such as the mobilisation of the most advanced sector of State capitalism, promotor of industrial development in this country which is responsible for a considerable part of the gross domestic product (GDP), in combating hunger and extending citizenship, to those who are excluded by that same process of growth without distribution. But, even in Brazil, where the State has always remained separate from the Nation, the COEP was born out of a civil society mobilisation campaign against hunger and for citizenship, unprecedented in the history of the country. Another paradox may be found in the search for a public identity by state companies, which in previous years had largely adopted the organisational forms, culture and competitive strategies of the market".* National Agenda for Decent Work (ANTD) in Brazil.

According to the ILO, decent work is a fundamental condition for overcoming poverty, reducing social inequalities, and guaranteeing democratic governance and sustainable development. The concept of decent work used by the National Agenda for Decent Work in Brazil is the same as that proposed by the international organisation, i.e., : "adequately paid work carried out in conditions of freedom, equity and security to guarantee a decent life."

On the MTE web page it can be seen that the promotion of decent work in Brazil became a commitment assumed between the Brazilian Government and the ILO in June 2003, with the commitment of the President of the Republic, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and of the Director General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, through a Memorandum of Understanding that provides for the establishment of a Special Programme of Technical Cooperation for the promotion of a National Agenda for Decent Work, in consultation with employers and workers organisations.

According to the information gathered, the MTE and the ILO are undertaking a project which in one of its phases recently involved the DIEESE in advising and carrying out work

on domestic employment in which close to 10 million female workers are negaged in Brazil. This surpasses professional qualification, and has produced legislation and fruitful discussion on the subject, using data gathered, systematized and included in the Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED), which is one of the most consolidated of DIEESE's products.

On the same topic, Sirlei Marcia de Oliveira, Technical Projects Supervisor of DIEESE, says that although the DIEESE has no direct or central participation in this process, it produced a very complete set of information on the labour force in an attempt to identify its principal problems related to the need of formalisation and the right to a Guarantee Fund for Length of Service which, considering the number of female workers involved, has enormous economic implications.

The Guarantee Fund for Length of Service was set up by Law No. 5107 of 13/09/66. The law was enforced by Decree No. 59,820 of 20/12/66 which established the payment of monthly deposits, made by companies on behalf of their employees, to a value equivalent to 8% of wages paid. In the case of a temporary contract of fixed-term work, the percentage is 2%, according to the provisions of paragraph II, Article 2 of Law No. 9601 dated 21/01/98. At present the Law that governs the Guarantee Fund for length of service is No. 8036 of 11/05/90 republished with several alterations on 14/05/90. This Fund is made up of a sum of Money which is available for retirement ora t the death of a worker and is a compensation guarantee for length of service, in cases of unfair dismissal.

As a result, the importance of DIEESE's contribution can also be inferred in terms of the value of the figures and data in processes of this nature.

3.4 Importance of professional qualification in the creation of decent work.

"There is no decent work without health, security, higiene and continuous professional training, because education is a factor that helps all society become aware of the need to formulate active prevention policies that are planned with the participation of the social actors". (Babace, 2001) (8)

The fight for the professional qualification of workers has always been one of the historical banners of the trade union movement. Its origin was marked by demands for a certain kind of (professional) education which was essential for the industrial worker, who needed a qualification in a determined profession as a substitute for the arts and crafts of the former artisans. Since then, the preparation for work has been a focus of trade union action in different countries with varying types and levels of intervention (DIEESE, 1998).

At the end of the 18th century and throughout the 19th, workers' demands reflected their desire to learn about new techniques and knowledge, as a result of the transformations imposed on the crafts and professions by the introduction of machinery and the emergence of heavy industry under the auspices of capitalism.

According to Manfredi (2002: 51), as an institution whose function in the current social imagery is to prepare the young person for entry into the labour market, school does not emerge historically linked to training for work but to "prepare select groups of persons for the exercise of leadership, power and social management." (DIEESE, 2007) (9)

Even though this concept of decent work is still being constructed, it is recognised as having a profound ethical content characterised as highlighting the importance of workers' rights and the quality of working conditions. Professional qualification, meanwhile, is upheld as a fundamental right of workers and training is recognised as a factor of employability, in the advent of a knowledge society. Therefore, it is an essential part of decent work. It is an economic instrument that forms part of employment policies and of companies' productivity and competitiveness strategies.

The relationship between professional training and social protection has been highlighted by European trade unions and included in ILO documents as the need to promote continuous education for those who run the risk of being excluded by the growth of the information society.

At present, there is a tendency to prioritise the interlinkage between these concepts since a connection is apparent between decent work, occupational health and professional training. This is not only because there is no decent work without health, security, hygiene and continuous professional training, but also because education is a factor that helps raise awareness within society as a whole as to the need to formulate active prevention policies that are planned with the participation of social actors (Babace, 2001).

On various opportunities the joint work between the DIEESE and the MTE has targeted social and professional qualification. Four projects were carried out and they began with the diagnoses made and identified a demand for professional qualification in the Sectoral Development Plans (PlanSeQs).

The four case studies are on the plastics production chain in São Paulo (which has reached a high degree of development and could be positively assessed thanks to its integral approach and the quality of training given); the trade sector in Porto Alegre; the fruit-growing sector in Valle de San Francisco, and the private surveillance sector in the Federal District. Each party addressed within these projects considered participatory construction among the workers, entrepreneurs and public administrators representative bodies.

Identification of institutional synergy in Brazil for professional qualification and the promotion of decent work.

With the advent of democracy in Brazil in the 1990s, there was increased workers participation in institutional, usually tripartite, spaces (according to the model of the International Labour Organisation) which were open to negotiation inside the state system.

From the perspective of the information collected inside the DIEESE, the Government began to attach growing importance to the issue of employment and workers, and the experience of producing reliable information and participatory diagnoses based on social dialogue, which permitted an alignment of the actions of both institutions.

However, it should not be forgotten that at the heart of the Lula government's programme is the so-called "social question", designed to generate a new development model based on growth in employment, the generation and distribution of income and social inclusion (Workers' Party, 2002) **(10)**

Resting on a very broad political coalition, with a strategy that at times adopts populist traits, Brazil's current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has deepened the liberal hegemonic cycle initiated by his predecessor, giving it its own particular tone. The specific characteristics of the Lula government can only be understood in the framework of the construction process of a new form of State initiated in 1995, with the accession of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as president.

After a long political transition between 1983 and 1994, that new form of State substituted the old State of the Vargas years (1930-1982), which excluded autonomous popular participation from political life, even during its democratic periods, and which was predominantly autarchic and development-oriented in its relationship with the economy. Unlike the Brazil of Vargas, the new State is democratic in its relations with society and moderately liberal from the point of view of its relations with the economy.

The new model has two central pillars. On one hand, the Democratic Constitution of 1988, which guaranteed political and social rights; and on the other, the Real Stabilisation Plan launched in 1994 and the set of liberal reforms implemented during the Cardoso administrations, principally the first. Although distant in time, these pillars are articulated: the 1988 Constitution had set the rules and guarantees of Brazilian democracy before the start of the Real Plan and the Cardoso reforms, but without achieving economic stability. Later, the stabilisation of the currency brought peace to the population and contributed to reconciling it with the Rule of Law, while the liberalising reforms succeeded in leaving behind the bitter controversies and conflicts on statism. (Sallum, 2008) (11)

It is in this context that the joint work between the DIEESE and the MTE on issues such as the Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED) and Social and Professional Qualification, stands out along with the internal and external recognition of DIEESE as a significant social actor and an institution of public utility for Brazil.

3.5 The Inter Trade Union Department of Studies and Socioeconomic Statistics (DIEESE)².

"The DIEESE is a unitary organ of the Brazilian trade union movement engaged in the production and diffusion of knowledge and information on labour, in a multidisciplinary context. It has as an instrument of analysis the scientific method, and is at the service of the interests of the working class, despite the diversity of union positions and approaches" (DIEESE, 1955) (12)

The Department was founded on 22 December 1955 to conduct research to justify workers' demands. At present it has 262 officials (between the technical and administrative teams, and over 200 high-level technical professionals) and 521 affiliated union bodies throughout Brazil.

Its members are legal, not natural persons. The DIEESE supports the trade union movement without having direct representation in it. It thus has no autonomous mandate and its actions are not neutral, because the institution exists to produce information and

² For further information, see: www.dieese.org.br.

knowledge on the basis of the scientific method and on the basis of state-of-the-art science, but with the specific finality of subsidising the trade union movement.

Throughout its 50 years of history the institution has won credibility both nationally and internationally (it is recognised by multi- and bilateral bodies that have even funded some of its projects) and it is recognised as an institution of technical-scientific production. It acts in the areas of consultancy, research and education.

The key areas that orient all the body's production and that structure its knowledge production are: employment, income, negotiation of collective labour agreements, public policy and development. The last two issues have been incorporated in the last four years. This enlargement of spheres of action and issues occurs because that is where the sphere of action of the trade union movement has expanded.

To further the studies related to its thematic axes, besides the work usually done for the trade union movement, the DIEESE carries out projects in association with government bodies and civil society bodies, whether national or international.

The DIEESE was born as a body to produce information and to advise the trade union movement. However, over time, when those responsible began to perceive that not only must they produce information, but they must also allow individuals access to it, then training processes were also included.

Training and consultancy spaces, on the other hand, are also spaces of knowledge construction, because each project is an important source of information that is systematised and integrated into the bases that already exist. The DIEESE is characterised by collective knowledge construction.

3.6 The Ministry of Labour and Employment of Brazil.

The history of the MTE began in 1912 when the Brazilian Labour Confederation (CBT) was formed at the Fourth Brazilian Workers Congress, held between 7 and 15 November. The function of this Confederation was to promote a long-term programme of workers' claims, such as an eight-hour working day, a six-day week, construction of housing for workers, compensation for work accidents, restrictions on the length of the working day for girls under the age of 14, collective contracts to substitute individual contracts, compulsory sickness insurance, old-age pension, a minimum salary, reform of public taxes and compulsory primary instruction. The regulation of the labour organisation in Brazil was entrusted to the National Labour Department, created in 1918.

The Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce was created on 26 November 1930, by Decree No. 19,433 issued by the then president, Getúlio Vargas. This institution changed its name and organisational structure several times (Ministry of Labour and Social Provision, simply Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Labour and Federal Administration, etc.) until finally, in 1999, it received the name Ministry of Labour and Employment, as it is now known.

The MTE has different commissions and councils (Commission of Sectoral Ethics, Executor Council of the Guarantee Fund for Length of Service, Deliberative Council of the Workers' Protection Fund, National Council for Economic Solidarity, National Immigration Council) and administers the Public System of Employment, Labour and Income. It is

responsible for inspecting work practices, with the mission of combating slave labour, child labour, inspect and guarantee safety and health at work. It also has a National Secretariat of Economic Solidarity that is implementing a Programme of Economic Solidarity and has a National Information System on Economic Solidarity.

As regards labour relations, this government body looks after assistance and ratification of cancellation of work contracts, mediation, register of collective labour conventions and agreements, domestic and temporary work, combating discrimination at work, and union contributions. It also has a Prior Conciliation Commission and a National Register of trade union bodies.

Since one of the priorities of the present Government is trade union and labour reform, a National Labour Forum (FNT) coordinated by the Secretariat of Labour Relations was set up in 2003. It is worth discussing this in a little more depth.

The National Labour Forum and the intervention of DIEESE.

Around 600 workers, government and employers representatives participated in the National Labour Forum. Its objective was to promote the democratisation of labour relations by adopting a model of trade union organisation based on freedom and autonomy.

Clemente G. Lucio, technical director of the DIEESE since 2003, claims that the participation of this organisation was designed to support the work of articulation of union organisations and offer them advice. It was supposed to organise and prepare the participation of groups of workers to meet, discuss and draw up proposals. The DIEESE carried out this support work during and after the Forum, which was held in 2004 and 2005, understanding that what the Government was seeking was to organise an agenda of discussions and, hence, develop a proposal to implement a new model or system of labour relations in Brazil.

In the Forum a proposal was drawn up to determine how to structure the trade union representation of workers and employers, the funding mechanisms of the union structure, how to project the relationship between employers and workers, how to handle and settle conflicts principally concerning collective negotiations and strikes, the bases for regulating the right to strike, how to establish the right of organisation in the workplace -another important debate within the trade union movement resisted by employers-, and how the system of labour relations in Brazil would be permanently updated by a National Labour Relations Council.

The proposal is currently in the National Congress as a draft bill drawn up with broad participation of workers, employers and government administrators. Although it is not an ideal bill and does not contain what each of the parties broadly proposed, its main merit is that it allows a certain degree of agreement.

The National Labour Forum has articulated a true system of labour relations, which goes beyond simple union reforms and mobilises many opposing interests. For that reason, approval may take years or even decades (because there will always be observations made by the parties). However, it is evident that the work already undertaken is an important step in the search to update labour legislation and ensure that it is more compatible with the new

demands of national development, in such a way as to secure a suitable environment for generating employment and income; and to modernise the institutions of labour regulation, especially justice at work and the Ministry of Labour and Employment, stimulating dialogue and tripartism to ensure social justice.

The conclusions of the National Labour Forum were sent to Congress, but were not seen as a priority, because there were divergences regarding the project, resistance by the business sector, etc. Another of its merits was that it showed the MTE's capacity to conduct a project democratically, listening to all parties and recognising trade union bodies.

3.7 The relationship between DIEESE and the Ministry of Labour in Brazil. Agreements and projects (2004/2007.)

The projects drawn up by the DIEESE, which have produced several inter-institutional agreements with the Ministry of Labour (2004-2007), cover the following:

"Perfecting the PED system and designing new indicators and surveys". Agreement MTE/SPPE/CODEFAT No. 098/2005 and First Additional Term (2005/2006). Validity: Agreement: 26/Dec/2005 to 6/Dec/2006 Additional: 26/Dec/2006 to 30/April/2007 (*)

Objective A: Provide permanent technical assistance for regional research work.

Objective B: Perfect the monthly disclosure of the PED System.

Objective C: Construct the policy of access and availability to PED indicators and microdata.

Objective D: Incorporate the Monthly Occupation and Unemployment Survey (PMOD) into the PED System.

Objective E: Institutional articulation and management of the PED System.

Objective F: Pilot research in special areas with PED methodology.

"Development of methodologies for the construction of diagnoses, methodologies for drawing up proposals of a social and economic nature and methodologies for social qualification". Agreement MTE/SPPE/ CODEFAT N° 163/2004 (2004/2005). Validity: 16/12/2004 to 31/12/2005 (*)

General objective: The project "Development of methodologies for the construction of diagnoses, methodologies for drawing up proposals of a social and economic nature and methodologies for social qualification" has as its principal axis of action the construction of instruments to subsidise the qualified intervention of social actors and/or groups in spaces and issues considered essential for a process of sustainable development. The general objective of this project is the construction of instruments for social dialogue and joint work, targeting social groups or actors that perform actions in areas and issues that demand this kind of qualification.

Subproject I: Development of a training programme for members of trade union councils of regional labour delegations.

Subproject II: Development of a methodology of diagnosis and drawing up of proposals on the labour market and professional qualification across the country and in production chains.

Subproject III: Professional qualification: a new space for negotiation.

Subproject IV: Statistics Yearbook subsidies for social dialogue.

Subproject V: Development of a training methodology for union leaders and production of studies on the competitiveness of production chains in Competitiveness Forums: a production chain in the plastic transformation industry.

“New trends in the socioeconomic, political and cultural dynamic in the reality of the north-east region”. Contract N° 001/2006 (Agreement MTE/SPPE/CODEFAT n 081/2005). Validity: 25/08/06 to 30/11/06. (*)

General objective: Preparation of four Case Studies to provide knowledge of new trends in the socioeconomic, political and cultural dynamic in the north-east region, stressing the changes in the world of work and in the demands and needs for professional qualification.

“Social qualification for action by individuals or social groups in collective bargaining and in the management of public policy”. Agreement MTE/SPPE/CODEFAT - 075/2005 and Primeiro Termo Aditivo (2005/2007). Validity: 22/12/2005 to 31/12/2007. (*)

General objective: Exercise of social dialogue, of participation in government councils and of collective bargaining.

Subproject I: Extension and diffusion of the training programme for members of union councils in regional labour delegations.

Subproject II: Professional qualification: publishing and production of the kit and of the pilot experience on negotiating professional qualification.

Subproject III: Yearbook of Social and Professional Qualification 2006.

Subproject IV: Workers Yearbook 2006 with historical series: regular information for social dialogue.

Subproject V: Consultancy in preparing and implementing sectoral qualification plans - PLANSEQs in the plastics production chain in the State of São Paulo and in the local production agreement on irrigated fruitgrowing in the lower and middle San Francisco.

Subproject VI: Construction of a proposal to institutionalise the continuous training of workers in questions concerning the world of work.

Subproject VII: Training of counsellors on the Public Employment System.

(*) The full text of products delivered is available on the page www.dieese.org.br.

3.8 Origins of the DIEESE/MTE relationship and current situation

The production of the DIEESE in the period 2004-2007 in projects entrusted to it by the MTE was more prolific in the later years, but it is important to note that the relationship had already been in existence for a long time and was constructed on the strong relation of both

institutions in the same subject area: employment (although DIEESE's point of view focuses strongly on trade union representation).

The relationship between DIEESE and MTE dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, but became deeper and stronger with the appointment of the first Labour Minister after the dictatorship, Almir Pazzaniotto, a great lawyer specialising in labour rights, currently Minister of the Superior Tribunal of Labour, and who was a lawyer for the chemical workers and the metal workers trade union, among others. The relationship was strengthened after one of the most important historical milestones of the DIEESE was reached, the implementation of the Training Programme for Union Leaders and Advisors (PCDA) (see: Milestones).

The functions of the DIEESE vary in the different joint projects, but they are principally geared to accompanying processes by means of the provision of data and relevant information, consultancy and training of workers in a bid to authorise them to take part in social dialogue on issues that interest them.

On the subject of professional qualification in the PlanSeQs, for example, the DIEESE does not participate directly in the professional qualification plans, but rather in a stage prior to them. Its actions consist in preparing diagnoses on the labour market and, in some cases, in consultancy, preparation and implementation of the PlanSeQs. In general, the plans are prepared in the localities (municipalities or States) and are then channelled to the government.

In general it can be said that both for the PlanSeQs and for the Territorial Plans (PlanTeQs) DIEESE's contribution stems principally from the two projects on which it works together with the MTE. One of them is a project for preparing a methodology by DIEESE to make diagnoses on the labour market of a determined sector.

The added value of this methodology, which has become a reference in the issue, is that it was devised to include the participation of the principal social actors of the sector to be analysed. There is real concern that the actors themselves should participate and offer their perspective in the construction of knowledge on the labour market for the sector in which a plan of government intervention will subsequently be built.

Four cases have so far been worked on under the PlanSeQs. In two of them (commercial sector in Porto Alegre and the plastics industry sector in São Paulo), the diagnosis construction project had continuity with the construction of PlanSeQs, which likewise were prepared in a participatory fashion between the representations of workers, entrepreneurs and also public administrators. DIEESE's work on articulating these actors is most significant since it also has an advisory function to the trade union movement on negotiating the Plan. The plans are subsequently channelled to the Federal Government, and their implementation is requested. The DIEESE only participated in assessing the plan for the plastics sector.

The other DIEESE project with the MTE which impacts on government intervention plans is the training project for members of the Municipal Commissions on Employment and Income. These commissions have existed since the 1990s, but the DIEESE was recently called upon to train its members when it became evident that its exact role, and where the required information could be found for it to carry out its work, were not clear.

The DIEESE designed a course which deals with the role of the commissions and tripartite spaces; training is given in seeking information and planning actions. Many of those commissions drew up PlanTeQs, and so, indirectly, the DIEESE has participated in them, subsidising as ever the actions of the trade union movement.

3.9 Endogenous factors that furthered the influence of knowledge and research in the policy process for professional qualification.

The DIEESE, a learning organisation.

One of the main strengths of the DIEESE, and a very important contribution to Brazilian society, is its capacity to promote and support the construction of social dialogue, providing technical and scientific knowledge. This can be seen in the great quantity of institutions and persons involved in the different projects it develops, and in the concrete results of its research that originate the “knowledge products” which it has managed to deliver to society, particularly, to the workers.

The history of the DIEESE officially began on 22 December 1955, when a group of 20 trade union leaders from São Paulo, who had already held a series of joint mobilisations under the Pact for Interunion Unity (PUI), decided to build a body specifically for workers not included in the trade union structure, for the purpose of producing data as the basis for negotiations with employers. At that time, the unions believed that the official inflation figures were being manipulated, and wanted a reliable index for the working class.

Even if the reasons that motivated the founding of the DIEESE are still valid today, the study object of the entity took on new angles, accompanying the social and economic changes which have occurred in Brazil in the last 50 years. At the outset, the principal objective of the institution was to produce an index that would allow price fluctuations to be assessed in order to contrast them with official data during the campaigns to readjust the data base. At present, its activity is totally diversified with the labour market, technological development, income distribution, category profiles, mobilisations and achievements for the workers, work process and training of union leaders, all forming part of today’s DIEESE. (DIEESE, 2007) (13)

Something remarkable in the DIEESE is a very strong sense of cohesion in the specific requirements of the trade unions in the struggle for workers claims. The first characteristic emerging from the research has to do with the organisation’s identity, which has always been linked with the trade union movement and its demands; and with a strong sense and unity of shared purpose. The trade unions are partners of DIEESE, and it was they who founded it and who keep it functioning and to whom the institution owes its existence.

Another important characteristic observed is the interunion nature of the institution (which has partners of different political tendencies, with different conceptions of the world and varying “party colours”) which has led to a specialisation of its work with diversity and divergence to develop processes whose outcome is collective knowledge production and/or participatory agreements.

Another important detail of DIEESE organisation is that it has double direction. On one hand is the Union Directorate and on the other the Technical Directorate. The former is in fact

the political directorate of the organisation and also its legal authority. It decides which projects will be carried out, and which offers will be accepted or rejected. This is a particularity of this body: it never carries out any work which, in principle, could be thought to act against the interests of the workers. No project is approved if it is not deemed relevant by the Union Directorate.

So, the DIEESE exists and sees its role as producing knowledge by and for the workers. As regards its culture and organisational atmosphere, the awareness and the pride at being at the service of the trade union movement are clear to see.

It is also interesting to observe the interaction and interdependence of the Union and Technical Directorates. The former manages and organises the strategic processes, while the latter is responsible for the operating processes. Although the Technical Directorate depends on the Union or Political Directorate, both can be said to see themselves as essential for the harmonious functioning of the organisation and they have managed to develop a system of effective incentives to make the technical team highly skilled and to keep it updated.

There are investments and stimuli for masters and PhD studies, because this is felt to be an investment in promoting the quality of the work done by the institution.

Thanks to this background and capacity to respond to manifest needs linked to the central subject of its work, it can be claimed, without a doubt, that the DIEESE has the characteristics of a **learning organisation** whose development is the product of triple-loop learning, on the basis of which the organisation promotes its full restructuring, as a consequence of the reconsideration of its identity and *raison d'être*.

In an age which is characterised by constant change, it should not be ignored that organisational learning is the main tool of knowledge management and that triple-loop learning is part of the process that allows organisations to “learn to learn” (the only thing that ensures a maximum degree of proactivity, since by triggering increased learning potential, it guarantees their continuous renewal and development and, therefore, their survival and growth. The organisation promotes its own continuous movement.

According to Peter Senge (1992) (14), a learning organisation is able to see the future in relation to the present, to institutionalise processes of reflection-in-action, which it plans and sees as an opportunity to learn. Such organisations learn from each other as they develop and thus achieve meta-learning: they learn to learn. A learning organisation acquires the ability to “transform itself” through an alteration in its way of doing and its collective results, and due to the interaction of the members that belong to it.

The DIEESE transformation process, the evolution and refinement of its form of learning can be observed in its gradual but constant growth represented by the following milestones:

1955:

- **After a period of union struggles (strike of the 300,000), the DIEESE is founded by 18 trade unions of different political and ideological orientations**, as an organisation to talk to Government and society on the cost of living in Brazil.

1964:

- **True to its cause, the DIEESE continues to work in secret** after it is closed for several months by the military dictatorship.

1970s:

- **The DIEESE decides to invest in and tackle the problem of education** with an approach on training teachers at the end of the dictatorship.
- **The DIEESE responds to a need linked to the objective for which it was set up but, due to an identified need, acts on a different level to that initially foreseen and gains visibility.** This is evident because, due to distrust over the official inflation figures in the country, the DIEESE prepares a dossier on manipulation of the inflation index and publishes its own figures. It thus gains visibility in society because it has exposed the official index. This led to a workers' mobilisation demanding recovery of wage levels. The manipulation of the 1973 and 1974 figures was acknowledged even by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It thus becomes a reference organisation for the cost of living index, the base of the campaign for wage increases. The figure of Lula emerges as a great trade union leader in San Bernardo along with other leaders such as Mengheli and Vincentinho. Lula refuted the data of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and became a reference in the matter.
- **The DIEESE takes on a management role within the trade union movement.** Both the trade union movement and the DIEESE survived the dictatorship with great difficulty, but had already begun to train union leaders (in secret) to fight, not only against the authoritarian situation of the country, but also against the transformation of capitalism and labour relations. These training efforts led to the creation of the DIEESE's Trade Union School, which operated from 1980 to the beginning of the 1990s.
- **The DIEESE begins to act as articulator of a still precarious social dialogue.** In this period it becomes prominent as an interlocutor between trade unions, because at the time unions were not banned from forming Union Organisations (CUT, the first trade union organisation in Brazil, dates from 1983).

1980s:

- **The DIEESE increases its geographical coverage and its spheres of action.** A moment of rapid expansion as a result of the expansion of the trade union movement. A time of democratic restructuring in the country, which facilitated the expansion of the DIEESE and the creation of regional offices of the institution. It becomes a national institution.
- **The DIEESE conducts research into the Life and Employment Register and the Family Budget Survey** and thus resumes calculating the Cost of Living Index.
- **The DIEESE focuses its role on the union movement in specific fields,** such as Formation of a Trade Union School, where the dialectic method and its application

in concrete cases, such as worker's pay and the Constitutional Convention, were studied.

- **The DIEESE acts as an articulator of the trade union movement.** Pre-Constitutional Convention: the DIEESE trains and subsidises the unionists in their demands for a Constitutional Convention.
- **The DIEESE assumes an active role in central discussions of national interests.** The Technical Directorate of the DIEESE in the Commission of Notable Figures called to discuss the new Constitution also participates.
- **The DIEESE contextualises and designs methodologies, adapting instruments for the reality in which it is to act.** In 1985, the Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED, *Pesquisa de Emprego e Desemprego*) is launched. A process of dispute and denunciation begins on how employment indices should be prepared in Brazil. The DIEESE creates an appropriate methodology for observing the Brazilian labour market, with the aim of revealing hidden unemployment in the country. Until then research on employment was carried out on the basis of a methodology applicable to European countries. This research was funded by the State of São Paulo and was also conducted by the SEADE, a foundation from the same State. As of the 1990s, it was funded by the MTE with resources from the Workers' Protection Fund. Currently, it is administered nationally with over 12 institutions involved in managing the PED system in seven regions.

1990s:

- **The DIEESE boosts its role as a guide for the trade union movement, extends its actions to authorising actors to construct social dialogue in issues inherent to the demand for workers rights.** The Fernando Collor de Melo government opens up the country to imports and there is great concern, both in the Government and among entrepreneurs, over how to face international competition. The (Government) Assessment Commission on Labour and Employment in Brazil is created, and gives rise to the Brazilian Programme of Quality and Productivity (PB PQ). Workers identify the need for training in order to discuss the issues of restructuring production.
- **The DIEESE trains its team internally** while producing kits (documents created for programme implementation, with basic material for the development of training courses), another consolidated product of the institution. Research was done with the trade union movement and 20 priority topics were identified for collective bargaining.

1994:

- **The DIEESE begins the Qualification Programme for Union Leaders and Advisors (PCDA),** which exists until 2002. The programme trained over 4000 workers to discuss the topic of restructuring production, new labour relations, etc., as a sort of high-level academic specialisation. The project was funded by the

Ministry of Science and Technology and the MTE, with which it began to intensify relations. This was prior to the Government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

- Creation of a network of leaders, several of whom subsequently became public administrators. This was the first time that the unions had worked together and they succeeded in making a much broader situation diagnosis, promoting reflection on the role of current public policy. It is important to mention that at first DIEESE technicians themselves took part in the programme along with union members because the issues discussed were new for society. This dynamic remains the same: the new challenges in the labour market for workers, for instance, and participation in defining public policy, become a challenge for DIEESE technical experts.

The DIEESE has always had to struggle with diversity, but has been able to make this one of its strengths, which is reflected in all its work methodology and in experiences such as that of the PCDA.

Recent years:

- **The DIEESE sets up the GAM** (Group for Methodological Accompaniment) and the **GENE** (Group for Studies in Negotiation), internal teams for methodological accompaniment and to adapt the institution to impending changes.
- **The DIEESE prepares trainers** in using the information kits produced by the institution.
- **The DIEESE supports the National Labour Forum** promoted by the MTE. The bill is currently in Congress, although it has not been debated. Even so, this is very important in terms of defining labour relations and a new system that could be perfected and implemented in the future.
- **The DIEESE receives general recognition nationally and internationally as articulator of social dialogue between parties representing diverse and often opposing interests.** Municipal and state commissions on Employment and Income are set up, with the participation of public administrators, entrepreneurs and workers. The DIEESE is called upon to train participants in these commissions. In other words, the body that represents the trade union movement is recognised and invited to train the entrepreneur and Government representatives. This is a very important achievement for the organisation.
- **The DIEESE succeeds in articulating the creation of the School of Labour Sciences**, a dream that had remained latent since the very foundation of the institution. It thus hopes to transmit to the world a different vision, based on the point of view of the working class and of the training of persons.
- **The DIEESE is today in a process of growing participation in government projects** as a consequence of the greater participation of the trade union movement or of former union leaders in public spaces.
 - **Relevant organisational characteristics of the DIEESE.**

The DIEESE is a not-for-profit entity of national scope (particularly important in a country the size of Brazil with its great material and cultural diversity), which has 17 regional offices and produces and systematises information on a daily basis.

All the institution's production is structured on the basis of three types of work units, found in various Brazilian states and in the Federal District of Brasilia. Its national administration is in the city of São Paulo, where the DIEESE articulates all its technical production. In this unit, those responsible for the technical coordination of the institution and most of the consultancy, research and education teams work. DIEESE's regional offices are units created to develop regionally the consultancy, research and education work and to attend to the affiliated local entities.

The DIEESE has a project to expand the number of regional offices to be able to provide consultancy and conduct other work for the trade union movement around the country. The subsections are DIEESE units located in trade union entities affiliated to the institution, at the request of its directorates, anywhere in the country. Their objective is to produce studies, investigations and analyses that will contribute to growth in the union activities of the bodies. DIEESE subsections are present in union entities of bank, metal or petrochemical workers, commercial employees, workers in telephone companies, education, oil workers, electricians and public officials, among others, in various units of the Federation. Any affiliated union entity can ask the DIEESE for the establishment of a subsection.

DIEESE direction is exercised by three bodies:

- National Union Directorate, responsible for political orientation, planning guidelines and the budget.
- Executive, also Union, Directorate which accompanies and assesses planning execution.
- Technical Directorate, comprising employees who execute the planning of the other directorates and coordinate the work of the various teams.

In 2007, the institution developed a series of activities related to their specific areas of activity. They included union relations that involve consultancy work and studies for the trade union movement, activities of union formation through the Support Network for Collective Bargaining (RAN) for union leaders and advisors, and the articulation of work in sectoral networks. The Research Area conducted permanent studies, such as the Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED), thematic or sectoral research, or research by category and trade union surveys, like *Meu Salario*. The object of the Studies and Development Area is to prepare and realise pioneering projects, gather information from primary and secondary sources of data and also subsidise the implementation of Labour Observatories³ projects.

The DIEESE is an institution which is profoundly committed to workers' demands. Research and the production of technical-scientific knowledge is an important instrument in this struggle.

³ For further information, see: www.dieese.org.br.

DIEESE's technical personnel permanently seek to place themselves at the frontier of knowledge, not in order to win a Nobel Prize or a prominent position in the Academy, as they themselves say, but because they need to have the best instruments for that great struggle within capitalist society over the division of the wealth produced. The DIEESE fights for the need to overcome the subordination of workers in society. "The day that Brazil is an absolutely fair country... which it will be one day, perhaps the agenda of an institution like the DIEESE will be poorer, but that's alright, because we'll accept it as just another stage in our development" they say.

In the DIEESE, the commitment to continuous improvement is evident, as it is to personnel development (reflected both in the training programmes and incentives already mentioned, and in that absolute conviction on the "need" to be well prepared, which they have internalised).

The DIEESE is trying to stamp a creative and innovative, and not merely accumulative or reproductive, mode on its actions. It hopes to add value for a fight that is deemed to be noble and necessary. There can be said to be congruence between the intention declared and the results obtained from their work (see "Milestones"). The DIEESE produces high-quality knowledge, and performs collective work with a negotiating and inclusive approach, which promotes social dialogue, and in which many different actors participate.

On one hand, the DIEESE has a very experienced team of persons linked to the institution for several decades, but also permanent contact with new persons and a high insertion of its techniques in different regions, since they work in the union entities. This gives them a great advantage in knowledge of different local realities. Its team is multi- and interdisciplinary and is enriched by interaction with other organisations working on the same topic (there is often knowledge exchange with the constant movement of workers to and from the public sector).

Something else that can be seen is that it has achieved a coherent construction of "critical routes" for different processes and projects, since it normally bases itself on a diagnosis of objective data. When implementing a new methodology, the DIEESE first conducts "pilot tests", which are rigorously assessed before the launch as an end product outside the institution, thus assuring greater effectiveness.

However, and although the evidence shows many more strengths than weaknesses, the latter exist and are basically reflected in two questions: financial management (because there are constraints in financial and physical resources) that implies certain instability; and change management (because the institution has grown a great deal, and this growth has not necessarily been assimilated internally to the same extent by all, nor with the same degree of acceptance). On this point, its strong culture, which is a strength, also becomes a weakness, since it is less flexible to change and needs a greater effort to achieve it.

3.10 Exogenous factors that furthered the influence of knowledge and research in the professional qualification process in Brazil.

In recent years there has been clear growth in the participation in social movements in Brazil and, in particular, in the trade union movement, which plays an active part in a broad

discussion agenda on public policy. This is a very important framework of action for this Case Study.

In the eighties and nineties there were several experiences of social participation, including bodies of a consultative and deliberative nature and even broader initiatives, with greater influence on the implementation of government actions. Both locally and nationally there are many cases of this type of participation that may involve decisions on specific investments to more complete regulation propositions.

Examples are the Forums for Industrial Competitiveness promoted by the Federal Government; the recent campaign for monitoring the minimum wage, which led to the creation of a Quadripartite Commission to propose a permanent policy on the matter; the experience of tripartite or multipartite commissions created to act in local production agreements and production chains, and many others.

The changes occurring today thanks to the globalisation process have shown that the Brazilian economy lacks the full capacity to absorb the growing labour force, because unemployment, precarious working conditions, fall in real income, income concentration, etc. still exist.

This means that the question of work is considered to be a high priority at different levels, and that both the workers and the Government and employers participate in the discussion on possible solutions in spaces created for the purpose and where the DIEESE fulfils various articulation functions. Opportunities for the DIEESE are related to the relevance of the subject of work for society. In Brazil, there are few institutions that produce specific, complete information with the sufficient level of detail; and the way to obtain information from the DIEESE is greatly valued at different levels (participatory construction, “from the bottom up”, promoting social dialogue).

On the other hand, the threats that hang over the institution are linked precisely with its direct dependence on the trade union movement, since if participation of the latter decreases for any reason, (including the rise in individualism within the capitalist system) or there are internal fractures, this would directly affect the institution. Also assumed as risks are certain political instability in Brazil, and its potential to increase, a rise in the number of limited-term projects (more than 50% of DIEESE’s current budget) and staff turnover (with all its effects) that stems from them.

3.11 Focus and goals of the joint work.

The DIEESE has the clear purpose of accompanying the Brazilian trade union movement, supporting, recommending and developing its proposals for workers and all society.

As part of its constitutional mandate, the MTE is conducting a series of efforts for a social pact on the questions of work and the trade unions through, for example, the National Labour Forum, which is a legitimate public space for discussion and channelling of union or labour reforms and the affirmation of social dialogue.

The joint work between the DIEESE and the MTE is very broad and varies in intensity according to union and government agendas. However, in the period of analysis (2004-2007), the following projects stand out:

- **The Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED)**, which succeeded in providing permanent technical assistance for the execution of regional surveys, perfecting the monthly disclosure of the PED System, constructing a policy of access and availability of indicators and microdata of the PED, incorporating the Monthly Occupation and Unemployment Survey (PMOD) into the PED System, institutional articulation and management of the PED System, and conducting pilot surveys in special areas with PED methodology.
- **Social and professional qualification.** Preparation of methodologies for the construction of diagnoses, drawing up proposals of a social and economic nature, and for social qualification, which have as their principal axis of action the construction of instruments that can subsidise the qualified intervention of social actors and/or groups in spaces and issues considered essential for a process of sustainable development.

The MTE supports, finances and entrusts projects to the DIEESE because it is an institution that produces scientific knowledge, works with methodological rigour, has a highly skilled technical team, and this is reflected in a gradual increase in projects entrusted and an extension of its sphere of action.

3.12 Impact of joint work in public policy in Brazil.

The impact of joint work between the DIEESE and the MTE mentioned in this document refers to experiences and progress achieved principally in the construction of social dialogue and in allowing actors to take part in it.

In the question of **professional qualification**, which has direct impact in employability, and therefore, in the quality of employment, the joint work of these two organisations targets the opening of spaces for discussion; analysis and reflection, and the involvement of a large number of social actors belonging to the sector of workers, employers and the State. That is an achievement in itself.

Besides, the experiences studied on collective bargaining on professional qualification were able to articulate themselves with the implementation mechanism of the National Agenda of Decent Work in Brazil.

However, the fundamental impact is indirect and, therefore, difficult to measure. The information produced by the DIEESE for the MTE is valuable for the Government as it draws up work-related policies. The DIEESE is one of the most reliable sources of information on several areas, in which the MTE itself has not developed its own means of production. No institution other than DIEESE is so representative (due to the large-scale union presence of its members) or thinks, discusses or works on the question of labour and pay, the quality of life of the workers and the distribution of income, and other topics.

An interesting experience linked with impacts is that related by Nelson Karam, coordinator of the Education Area of the DIEESE, on the participation of the DIEESE in the

question of foresight, in which a discussion was launched with the participation of the union organisations and several relevant topics were put forward.

This produced a distortion of the claim that “incomes were part of public spending and shouldn’t be as high as they are today” because that supposedly “compromised public finances.” With its research, the DIEESE showed that the truth was that social security was in surplus, that there were sufficient resources to pay retirement pensions without problems and that there was even a positive side, besides the question of citizens rights, which was the promotional effect on economic development.

The DIEESE was also very active in denouncing slave and child labour, having spent two years gathering data that was later integrated and consolidated in the ILO proposal on decent work.

Work was also done on the questions of gender and race, with the DIEESE being one of the first organisations to concern itself with these issues. The information produced led to it being included on the National Agenda.

A further impact of DIEESE’s work in public policy concerns the actions of the trade unions in spaces for public policy discussion. By advising the union movement, and preparing it for negotiations with entrepreneurs and public administrators, the information and knowledge administered by DIEESE subsidises workers representations justifies their claims, strengthens their actions and the point of view of the workers in preparing work-related policies.

However, this impact can only occur when trade unions are called upon to participate in those spaces, which has happened fairly frequently, especially in the last decade, due to a greater openness on the participation of the trade union movement by means of the construction of various tripartite spaces. Besides, it is also important to mention that much necessary information for defining certain public policy is produced only by the DIEESE.

Finally, it is also necessary to refer to the impact stemming from the training of public administrators. As already mentioned, the DIEESE acts fairly frequently in qualifying participants in tripartite spaces and has thus achieved respectability, credibility and recognition outside the trade union movement.

3.13 Knowledge management for impact on public policy.

Knowledge management concerns intangible assets that have to do with processes related in one way or another to capturing, structuring and transmitting knowledge, whose principal tool lies in organisational learning.

As a conclusion to this Case Study, from the perspective of a research institution that wants to act to make an impact on public policy, the “best practices” identified reveal the need to develop the ability to “learn to learn” or, in the language used by Swieringa & Wierdsma (1992) achieve a level of “meta-learning”, which involves questioning one’s own learning capacity (already acquired), to find new forms of continuing to learn.

So due to its complexity and dynamism, the purpose mentioned, impact on public policy, demands, as with DIEESE, much more than “adaptive” learning (understood as focusing efforts on achieving incremental improvements in activity, but within a framework

of established action), making it imperative to reach “generative” learning, which demands radical modification in the framework of global action (McGill, Slocum & Lei, 1992) with which the competence for managing change will acquire great value.

Moreover, although the DIEESE has unique particularities (origin, mandate, circumstances and history), the most important constant elements that stand out in its actions and that are fundamental in terms of “best practices” are:

- ⇒ **The capacity to adapt to change.**
- ⇒ **The principles or guidelines.**
- ⇒ **The will, above all else, to act to change reality.**

In the history and evolution of this organisation, which belongs to the Brazilian trade union movement but has achieved considerable visibility, renown and recognition from the technical point of view; up to a certain moment, DIEESE can be seen to make an impact in public policy as an indirect result and one that is thus difficult to measure.

However, with the inclusion of the topic on its working agenda (around four years ago), which demanded a series of internal adjustments in structure, knowledge, instruments and the fine-tuning of its competences in areas in which it had already achieved a great deal (social dialogue, participatory methodologies for information management, etc.), a clearer approach can be seen towards obtaining outcomes, with clear acceptance of the contingency to which it is subject, since it is a body whose future is linked with the union movement and in which its greater or lesser participation will always condition its own role.

On the other hand, if we consider the generic process of policy development, we can see within the so-called “policy cycle” (Young and Quinn, 2002) **(15)** the following steps:

- 1) Defining the problem.
- 2) Construction of alternatives.
- 3) Choice of solution.
- 4) Policy design.
- 5) Policy implementation.
- 6) Policy appraisal.

The DIEESE plays a very active support role in the two initial steps (defining the problem and construction of alternatives), using different resources and strategies to subsidise the trade union movement, adopting a position that is not neutral but, on the contrary, “pushes” these processes forward.

From the point of view of the government body and of public policy administrators, it is clear in the case study that one condition for success is openness in spaces that allow knowledge of the research institution to be integrated and thus achieve synergic action. This seems to respond to a more democratic, broader and more inclusive vision of government.

Finally, a last element to mention is that it would seem that in order to allow public policy to be built in a participatory form, it should represent a form of doing things that goes beyond links of belonging (bonds of affection, culture, values or characteristics already

given), to place itself in a broader sphere of participation, with the possibility of new and different associations where critical thinking can be exercised.

4. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

4.1 Sources consulted

Interviews conducted in DIEESE:

- ⇒ Clemento Ganz Lúcio, technical director of DIEESE.
- ⇒ Suzanna Sochaczweski, head of the School of the Sciences of Work.
- ⇒ Nelson de Churi Karma, coordinator of the Education Area of DIEESE.
- ⇒ Ana Claudia Moreira Cardoso, secretary of Training in DIEESE.
- ⇒ Paulo Roberto Arantes do Valle, coordinator of the Subproject “Construction of Diagnoses on the Labour and Consultancy Market in the PlanSeQs with the participation of social actors”.
- ⇒ Crystiane Peres, technical expert from the Projects Secretariat.
- ⇒ Sergio Eduardo Arbulo Mendonca, technical supervisor of the “Labour Observatories” since 2007.
- ⇒ Sirlei Marcia de Oliveira, technical supervisor of Projects.
- ⇒ Francisco José Couceiro de Oliveira, research coordinator of DIEESE since 2007.
- ⇒ José Silvestre Prado de Oliveira, coordinator of Union Relations of DIEESE.

At the Ministry of Labour and Employment:

- ⇒ Marcelo Aguiar Santo Sá, Diretor do Departamento de Qualificação

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Espacios para el compromiso: usando el conocimiento para mejorar las políticas públicas a favor de los pobres



SPACES FOR COMMITMENT: USING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOUR OF THE POOR

Case Study:

*External Assessment of the Government of Jalisco's Development
Programme of Community Centres by El Colegio de Jalisco*

Final report

Project by:

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Jalisco, Mexico, 30 November 2008.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study describes the institutional linkage between a government agency in a subnational sphere and a centre of research and local higher education. It is the case of the Secretariat of Human Development of the Government of Jalisco and El Colegio de Jalisco. The linkage arose when the latter assessed the Development Programme of Community Centres. It should be stressed that what is shown here is not simply the form in which the government programme was assessed. It is not a technical and professional assessment document but it tells a story of how the programme was formulated and implemented. This text highlights the institutional factors, both endogenous and exogenous, which surrounded the Programme, as well as the discourse and government practice on the basis of a detailed institutional and organisational explanation. The story told here is of a true experience, is based on a documentary and legal review to help understand the institutional development, and is also founded on a series of interviews with key actors.

Key words: community centres, linkage, endogenous and exogenous factors.

1. CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF JALISCO: REGIONAL IMBALANCE

As mentioned in other papers (Arias, 2008), the level of economic development of the state of Jalisco was one of the highest in Mexico: “in 1997, the state of Jalisco had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$22 billion dollars, which corresponded to 7% of national GDP. In 1999, it had a population of 6.4 million inhabitants and a GDP per capita of \$3548 dollars a year” (Ruíz, 2000, p. 5).

However, the development attained is not territorially homogeneous. Of the total number of municipal districts, “only four (Guadalajara, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá and Zapopan) are home to over 50% of the population and, consequently, the greatest economic and service activity offered by the state is located in these same municipal districts” (Arias, 2008, p. 19).

This strong concentration in the Guadalajara metropolitan area produced, on one hand, a need for services and growing social demands and, on the other, progressive deterioration and abandonment in other regions of the state (Arias, 2008, p. 20).

This has led to constant migration of the population from rural communities in the state to other areas, preferably the Guadalajara metropolitan district. As of 1995, the government diagnosis recognised that the number of inhabitants from rural communities barely reached one million: “spread over more than 8600 population centres, 6000 of which have fewer than 100 inhabitants. This dispersion prevents the demographic thresholds needed for an adequate provision of urban services” (Government of the State of Jalisco, 1995, p. 106).

In 2004, the rural areas showed practically no significant variations in their demographic situation. According to certain internal working documents of the State Government, to which the assessment team from El Colegio de Jalisco (El ColJal) had access, it can be claimed that “95% of the population in localities of high or very high marginalisation live in communities of fewer than 2500 inhabitants. In Jalisco, this sector of the population numbers around one million persons”.

By virtue of this situation, for the period 2001-2007, the Government of Jalisco posed the need to set “an agenda to overcome poverty in the state, differentiated by geographical areas and groups of persons, which will foster social participation and promote production projects in accordance with the socio-economic characteristics of each locality” (Government of the State of Jalisco, 2001, p. 84). The Development Programme of Community Centres was an important item on this agenda.

In this context, population dispersion in rural areas is a prime exogenous factor¹ to explain differentiated policy formulation on tackling poverty in the state of Jalisco, with a basic distinction between the rural and urban areas. In particular, to a large extent, this can be said to explain the emergence of the notion of community centres, according to the following comment by the former secretary for Human Development, Rafael Ríos Martínez:

¹ For this case study exogenous factors will be understood to be those that are external to the organisation and, as a consequence, beyond its reach.

“It was clear that work had to be done in two spheres, and two points were identified as critical: rural and urban poverty. Urban poverty had certain characteristics and a totally different situation, depending a great deal on the creation of formal employment, urban infrastructure, means of transport and other types of things in that regard. And rural poverty was often the result of the very isolation of the settlements: communities of up to fifty inhabitants, communities of less than ten dwellings which, thanks to their geographical location, made it very difficult for municipal services to reach them and allow them to live, so they had no medical attention, no education, no infrastructure... a series of deficiencies in the midst of their habitat.

“So it was a clear concern: what are we going to do with all those people? The first step was to make a series of proposals in order to attend to those needs regionally through an area of influence in the most important town in the target area. The second was to venture into those localities. What is curious about the matter is that its geographical or orographical conformation means that it has a great number of dwellings and inhabitants in totally inaccessible areas and ones that lack even the most basic services. The dispersion generated the idea of building community centres”.²

² Interview with Rafael Ríos Martínez, former secretary of Human Development of the State Government. Conducted by Roberto Arias de la Mora and Alberto Arellano Ríos on 11 October 2008. Zapopan, Jalisco.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANISATIONS

2.1. El Colegio de Jalisco

The ColJal is an academic institution which, since its foundation 26 years ago, has dedicated its efforts to carrying out higher level educational work, research and cultural diffusion. It was particularly active in improving understanding of the environment by studying the past and present of western Mexico.

Under such premises, through its Programme of Applied Studies in Local and Regional Government, El ColJal has been consolidating an educational project with the aim of contributing to the upgrading and training of professionals from a variety of disciplines in different subjects essential to ensure the good performance of the government and public administration.

As part of these efforts, it offers diploma courses that have already received almost a hundred pupils from different public areas. These programmes were driven by a specific objective: to make concrete improvements in the professional work of the students, quality in the functioning of the bodies in which they are active and the social impact of their activities.

These first experiences detected a need in Jalisco's academic sphere for a formal postgraduate programme that will allow professionals linked with public affairs to receive solid training, with better technical and analytical tools and with greater resources for the study, design, implementation and assessment of public policy.

So, since 2003, El ColJal has been offering a Masters Degree Programme in Public, Municipal and State Government and Administration, with the aim of promoting greater decentralisation in teaching and research in Mexico, by generating useful knowledge for regional and municipal development, to help strengthen a more balanced federal model.

Experience and institutional capacity have been enriched since November 2006 with the opening of the "Luis F. Aguilar Villanueva" Public Administration Department, which seeks to boost the linkage of the Masters Degree Programme in Public, Municipal and State Government and Administration, offering pupils and graduates a suitable space for academic reflection, plural debate and the dissemination of ideas on government, public administration and public policy.

It was precisely this capacity and institutional orientation that became the main endogenous factor³ in facilitating communication and the subsequent convergence of institutional interests crystallised in the assessment exercise that gave rise to the collaboration experience between El ColJal and the Secretariat of Human Development described in this case study.

³ For this case study endogenous factors will be understood to be those that are internal to the organisation and, as a consequence, are under its control.

2.2. The Secretariat of Human Development of the Government of the State of Jalisco

Unlike El ColJal, the Secretariat of Human Development (SDH) is a recently created government organisation. It was set up during the first years of the Francisco Javier Ramírez Acuña government (2001-2007), and was motivated by a reflection made by the new authorities, which is an endogenous factor, on the institutional characteristics of the government framework in the state. The following comment by Rafael Ríos Martínez explains the emergence of the SDH:

“... (The idea was born from) observing that in the government sphere the support programmes designed to defeat poverty lacked an office of their own, a specific area for studying, controlling and operating programmes. Traditionally, this work had been done in the State Government firstly through the Secretariat of Rural Development, which operated this type of programmes exclusively in the rural environment. Subsequently, it was through the COPLADE [Planning Committee for State Development], which I always insisted was inappropriate because the COPLADE was a totally different planning body, which had different aims. The need had even been conceived for a body within State Government that could be held responsible. These were the motives behind the initiative to create the Secretariat, which is what was presented to Congress for the corresponding legal procedure⁴”.

From the point of view of the former secretary of Human Development, various exogenous factors allowed the initial proposal giving birth to the initiative to create the SDH to prosper. First of all, there was perceived inadequacy in a secretariat for social development in the federal sphere that had been operating diverse social programmes under a scheme which involved little effective participation by the states of the Republic.

Secondly, the pioneering experience of the state of Guanajuato served as inspiration and several ideas were taken to produce the initiative for Jalisco, from where the experience of decentralising social policy had begun to spread. This initiative would later become a wave affecting the other states of the Republic.

Thirdly, another motivation lies in the vision of human development being fostered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The presence of these exogenous factors could be corroborated during the interview with Alfonso Hernández Valdez, former advisor to the Secretariat of Human Development of the State Government, for whom ideological-partisan differentiation was another important exogenous factor in the creation of the SDH in Jalisco:

“When we began to think of creating the Secretariat, part of my work was to investigate in other states how the Secretariats entrusted with social policy in general were formed.

“So, there was a very clear distinction: there were secretariats of social development, analogous or very similar to the federal Secretariat of Social

⁴ Interview with Rafael Ríos Martínez.

Development (SEDESOL), in many states with a PRI government; and the new social development secretariats that had been appearing, as in Guanajuato, were called Secretariats of Human Development. Here there was a distinction, I'm not sure whether partisan, but certainly with a partisan origin, but there was also concern as it had a more integral axis in social policy. As I interviewed certain persons, they commented that the origin of social policy was imbued with assistentialism and programmes to fight poverty, which isn't a bad thing, but it was what these agencies focused on and, I think, there was a valid concern that it should be made a little more integral. That's to say, not just social assistance, not just fighting poverty but adopting new models for human development, which at that time were already well established, as proposed by the United Nations Development Programme.

I identify three components: a question of differentiation by party; a valid concern in terms of incorporating the most integral perspective influenced by the UN into social policy; and, in the case of PAN governments, the term human development seemed, in some way, to be more in keeping with their political programme. Perhaps this third element is related to the first, but that's the reason, I believe⁵.

In this context, a noteworthy aspect is the strategy adopted to promote the creation of the SDH, which was based fundamentally on close collaboration between the authorities and a group of consultants led by Alfonso Hernández Valdez. This factor inherent to the creation process was, to a large extent, decisive in assuring its materialisation in a relatively short nine-month period between March and November 2001. As Hernández Valdez said:

"In 2001, the then undersecretary of Social Participation, who belonged to the General Government Secretariat, now an under-secretariat, Rafael Ríos [Martínez], invited me to participate in a project to create a new secretariat, which would tentatively be called, and was indeed called, Secretariat of Human Development. The invitation was to create and design this new secretariat from the organisational, administrative and normative point of view. I began work in 2001⁶."

In fact, Decree N° 19,432 creating the SDH was published in the Official Gazette "El Estado de Jalisco" on 29 December 2001.

In accordance with this decree, various laws were modified for the purpose of creating the SDH. Among the reformed laws is the Organic Law of the Executive Branch of the State of Jalisco, whose article 41 established that "The Human Development Secretariat is the office responsible for planning, designing, coordinating and executing the integral development policies of persons and groups to which they belong." Among its attributions we can highlight the following:

⁵ Interview with Alfonso Hernández Valdez, former advisor to the Secretariat of Human Development of the State Government. Conducted by Roberto Arias de la Mora on 26 September 2008. Tlaquepaque, Jalisco.

⁶ Idem.

1. To coordinate, assess and help towards the design and execution of the social development programmes of the State Government together with the various agencies of the State Executive.
2. To execute and directly assess the corresponding social development programmes.
3. To coordinate and supervise the federal government's social programmes that are developed and applied in the State of Jalisco, in its sphere of competence, in accordance with agreements signed in that regard.
4. To coordinate and supervise the public assistance institutions, as well as to provide technical advice to those who request it;
5. To promote the professional provision of social assistance services, as well as to promote scientific and technological research to develop and improve the provision of assistance services;
6. To monitor the performance of the social assistance and public welfare institutions of the State Government, as well as the institutions of private welfare, coordinated by the Jalisco Institute of Social Assistance, and the System for the Integral Development of the Family, to ensure that they comply with the purposes for which they were created.
7. To promote the strengthening of the social administration through policies and programmes of citizen participation;
8. To drive and direct civil society so that it can participate in the drawing up, execution and assessment of social development policies.
9. To promote and carry out studies and research, as well as performing training activities on issues related to human development.
10. To promote and coordinate educational support actions for social integration and human development.
11. To promote and coordinate actions to train those receiving social assistance to work in the State, and
12. To manage and coordinate actions to promote access to decent housing.

In addition, the basic institutional characteristics –endogenous factor- of the new agency were structured, according to Adolfo Hernández Valdez, on:

“...Three pillars that are still valid. One pillar was to be, and was, the General Directorate of Social Development, another was to be the General

Directorate of Social Participation and, the third, the General Directorate of Social Policy.

“The idea was that Social Policy should set public development policy, or the agency entrusted with the work of planning, assessment, public policy proposal, and that the other two directorates should be a little more executive.

“The General Directorate of Social Development would operate the social development programmes in the State, while Social Participation would work with the citizens and communities.

“So, we constructed the Secretariat around these three directorates: a technical part, an operations part and a participatory part. I think it was a model which eventually proved its utility, its effectiveness. Although at first it was a Secretariat with very few resources, that was not one of its problems but one of the challenges at the outset. Gradually, the Secretariat managed to intervene with very specific programmes, in very specific places. We also worked on the decree setting it up, on the organogram, on establishing the functions of each of the posts, on the specific objectives of the Secretariat, and on programme design⁷”.

A relatively compact working team preferably made up of young professionals with solid academic formation was brought together, largely facilitated by continuity in the collaboration started by the first head of the agency with a group of consultants, was a decisive endogenous factor that boosted the scope of the first work done by the SDH.

“One of the great functions of this new Secretariat, at least as envisaged by the team, is that it should have the capacity to elaborate a true social policy. A public policy of social development that is not focused simply on continuing programmes from the time of the Federation, not because we didn’t need to continue them but because we had to think up new forms so that social development in the entity would be much more integral.

“So, as one of the functions of the new General Directorate of Social Policy, it occurred to us to start thinking of an integral social policy. Hence the concept of “Intégrate”, which was used to define public policy on integral social development, which incorporates several elements in keeping with the UN human development model: to encourage capacities of individuals, based on the assumption that the human being must be guaranteed freedom of choice, and a government that participates in the development of his capacities⁸”.

This vision was broadly shared by the first head of SDH, Rafael Ríos Martínez:

“It was essential to come down to the sphere of the person and not work in the abstract sphere of society. We had to come down and ensure the development of the individuals, and the group of individuals would develop the social sphere. What did we need to be able to combat poverty? First we needed to espouse the

⁷ Idem.

⁸ Idem.

idea that development of capacities was essential for persons to be in a position to manage to survive alone and to get ahead. So discussions began on a human development programme in the state. A programme inspired by the area of health, especially the health of pregnant women, of their unborn children, of nursing babies, and other questions such as vaccination and nutrition.

“So it was, and is, the individual from before birth: the nursing baby, its nutritional development and its educational development. Then came the education process and we linked it with the process of infrastructure, improvements in housing, roads, water, electricity and finally the possibility of production projects so that they could get ahead by themselves.”⁹

It is on the basis of this chronological vision of the human being that attempts were made to organise the various government programmes in health and education and in fostering the production infrastructure, rural development and economic activity in general.

This vision was broadly shared by the work team, particularly in the technical area, and in practice it meant the creation of a very flexible working environment open to the opinions of the public officials. This could be corroborated by the opinion of the former director of Research and Public Policy, for whom “Rafa was very open, very flexible, very willing to hear ideas.”¹⁰

The shared vision of objectives, together with a style of open inclusive management by the first head of the SDH, entailed two endogenous factors that boosted the scope of the first institutional tasks of the SDH.

In the particular case of the Programme of Community Centres the diagnostic component was reinforced by the convergence of another very specific exogenous factor: the demand for external assessment. According to Hernández Valdez, in charge of the assessment exercise of programme resources in its first year:

“I don’t remember whether it was with the operating rules of the Programme, but there were ‘state incentives’ [exogenous factor], and a demand that the projects proposed should have an assessment component. In the team we always thought that the assessment component was vitally important [endogenous factor]. Especially in a project like community centres, because in fact what it did was bring the “Integrate” strategy down to ground to apply it in localities of high and very high marginalisation, generally far from the main municipal centres¹¹”.

This circumstance became, as we shall now see, an important window of opportunity for productive collaboration between El ColJal and the SDH for several years.

⁹ Interview with Rafael Ríos Martínez.

¹⁰ Interview with Patricia Carrillo Collard. Former director of Research and Public Policies of the Secretariat of Human Development of the Government of the State. Conducted by Roberto Arias de la Mora and Alberto Arellano Ríos on 13 October 2008 in Guadalajara, Jalisco.

¹¹ Interview with Alfonso Hernández Valdez.

3. THE COLLABORATION EXPERIENCE

3.1. How the Secretariat began

At the beginning of 2004, and through the Directorate of Research and Public Policy, the SDH made contact with academics in the Programme of Applied Studies of El ColJal, in order to invite them to participate in the design and execution of the assessment of the Development Programme of Community Centres (PDNC).

At the outset, the SDH's interest in stimulating this type of approach with the ColJal seemed to be motivated by an exogenous factor of a legal and programmatic nature, according to Patricia Carrillo Collard, who explained that El ColJal was contracted because one of the requirements of SEDESOL programmes was that it receive external assessment¹².

In accordance with the PDNC framework and the 2003 operating rules of the Programme of State Incentives (PIE) of the SEDESOL, it was established that evaluation of the programme results had to be made "by an academic research institution or a specialised agency (...) with recognition and experience in the matter, based on the reference terms of the Programme" (Secretariat of Social Development, 2003, p. 25).

It should not be forgotten that, although it was a programme operated by the Government of Jalisco, the PDNC had received through the PIE budgetary resources from the Federation amounting to 19,649,217 pesos.¹³ The allocation of these resources was as a result of the choice between 14 proposals that were finalists in an open competition called by the SEDESOL under the modality of support for innovation (Secretariat of Social Development, 2003). This condition was a very important factor, according to the former planning director of the SDH, Sarah Obregón Davis.

"The main thing is that it was a project supported by the federal government. It was a project that had competed and been awarded in some way; so that was a very strong factor, making its enforcement valid, even within the Government¹⁴".

As a result of the first conversations between SDH officials and academics from El ColJal, on 23 April 2004 the interest of the education and research centre in conducting the assessment of the PDNC was formally ratified in the SEDESOL. The methodological criteria used in the academic expert's investigation had already been established by the SHD and previously communicated¹⁵.

¹² *Interview with Patricia Carrillo Collard.*

The recourse of the direct invitation to El ColJal, to which she refers, was possible by virtue of its being a non-profit-making institution dedicated to research and higher education.

¹³ *Equivalent to USD 1,786,292.50 at an exchange rate of 11 pesos to the dollar.*

¹⁴ *Interview with Sarah Obregón Davis, former planning director of the Secretariat of Human Development of the State Government. Conducted by Roberto Arias de la Mora in Tlaquepaque, Jalisco, on 26 September 2008.*

¹⁵ *Communication addressed to the Secretariat of Social Development by the president of El ColJal, Dr. José María Muriá Rouret on 23 April 2004.*

The methodology comprised three stages: in the first the profile of each locality and the PNDC were assessed; in the second a description was made of the implementation process; and lastly, the impact was assessed. In each of the stages technical estimates of analysis or observation were made; the data collection instruments were designed or built; a results format was submitted; the sources of information were identified; and the minimum measuring indicators were built.

Chart N° 1: Methodological window on the work to assess the PDNC

	First stage: profile of localities and PDNC	Second stage: description of the implementation process	Third stage: impact assessment
Period for submitting results.	One month.	Three months.	Five months.
Assessment technique.	Process auditing.	Direct observation.	Survey of beneficiary population.
Data collection instruments.	Auditing script based on the general and specific guidelines of the Operating Rules of SEDESOL, in the description of the PDNC and other subscribed instruments.	Observation script based on the programming of works and actions, as well as on the physical and financial progress reports.	Written semi-structured questionnaire.
Format for presentation of results.	Schematic report of normative verification, both for PDNC processes in general, and for each work or action included in the auditing.	Statistical report tabulated and illustrated on progress in execution.	Written report tabulated and illustrated with responses of each reagent applied in the interview.
Sources of information.	Persons and instances involved in operating and executing the PDNC (SEDESOL Delegation, SDH, town councils).	Observation <i>in situ</i> and interviews with the beneficiary population (persons and households).	Representative sample of the beneficiary population from the works and actions of the PDNC in reach community.
Minimum indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verifying the integration and operation of instances (committees) stipulated in the Operating Rules and in the PDNC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numerical and percentage progress in executing each work/ action programmed and selected for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Knowledge and identification of the PDNC and of the works/actions that it includes in each community. Changes in the

	First stage: profile of localities and PDNC	Second stage: description of the implementation process	Third stage: impact assessment
	guidelines. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence and contents of the general documentation and operating instruments (electoral registers) stipulated in the Operating Rules and the guidelines of the PDNC. • Existence and contents of the progress reports and control of works/actions. 	measuring.	quality of life of the informant and/or his family, stemming from works and actions of the project. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active participation of informants in the different phases of the PDNC.

Source: Own data.

In accordance with these criteria, on 3 May 2004 the terms of the contract were formalised to allow the study and assessment of the PDNC of the SDH to be performed. The state government represented by the Administration Secretariat endorsed the contract with El ColJal, which stipulated that the phases established in the methodological window should be set in motion. From that moment on, El ColJal authorised two academics linked with the Programme of Applied Studies in Government and Public Municipal and State Administration as those responsible for the assessment¹⁶. The work of analysis provided for in the first stage of the assessment thus formally got underway.

The first stage consisted in identifying the profile of the localities where PDNC could be implemented. A total of 14 localities out of a total of 90 were considered.

The selection process for the places eligible to become community centres was made on the basis of a universe of 620 rural localities in 90 municipal districts in Jalisco. The communities had already been identified by two agencies of the Government of Jalisco: The Subcommittee of Development of Ethnic Peoples and Priority Regions (SUDERP) and the

¹⁶ In charge of the assessment was Min. Roberto Arias de la Mora, former assistant coordinator on the Masters Programme of Applied Studies in Government and Public Municipal and State Administration, and currently teacher and researcher at El Colegio de Jalisco and academic coordinator of the study programme.

To carry out the field work Javier Gutiérrez Rodríguez was hired. This consultant is a specialist in applied research for strategic projects and graduate from the Programme of Applied Studies in Government and Public Municipal and State Administration from El Colegio de Jalisco.

COPLADE. From that universe 90 localities of high and very high marginalisation were selected, one for each of the municipalities considered by the Government of Jalisco for attention.

On the other hand, the minimal technical criteria that were considered in selecting the 90 communities assisted by the PDNC, and that in turn became its universe of attention, were the following:

- a. *They should have high or very high degrees of marginalisation.* The starting point for the selection was to begin with the most relegated localities.
- b. *They should have a population of under 2500 inhabitants but, if possible, over 300.* This range reflected the consideration that “in order to feasibly qualify as a community centre, a minimum population base is required.”
- c. *It should be near a road that is passable year round.* This criterion was deemed fundamental since “the community centre must be of easy access for the neighbouring communities”.
- d. *In a radius of four kilometres of influence there should be the greatest number of marginalised localities possible.* The radius of influence was defined on the estimate that “four kilometres is a distance that can be travelled in under an hour and a half on foot, depending on the geographical conditions”.
- e. *If feasible, it should not be close to the main municipal centre, which was thought to have several of the factors considered essential to trigger micro-regional development.* Hence community centres outside the area of influence of the main municipal centre would be privileged.

However, in this first phase, the authorities insisted on restricting the verification only to the execution of works and actions funded with PIE resources, which implied limiting the assessment to only 10 of the 14 localities initially considered. Besides, the verification exercise in those communities did not contemplate works and actions wholly funded with additional resources of the Government of Jalisco. The reason given then to curb the scheduled academic labour was that they were works and actions funded exclusively with federal resources and that they were close to the deadline for sending the first progress reports on the external assessment to the SEDESOL.

These conditioning factors did not pass unnoticed for the El ColJal assessors: the prevailing spirit of reserve and caution among the personnel of the agency meant that no information was given on the Programme other than that funded with federal resources. In other words, the only incentive for the SDH to cooperate with the El ColJal assessment had seemed strictly exogenous at the outset.

The interest of the state agency focused on requesting further budgetary resources from the Federation for the following year. In particular, the SEDESOL had to authorise them, for which it was essential that the SDH report the results of the assessment made by El ColJal. In other words, if an external assessment was not done or the minimum requirements of rationality in its exercise were not complied with, the SEDESOL would deny further budgetary resources for 2005.

In short, and although exogenous, this type of incentive was sufficient for the officials involved in the Programme and El ColJal to collaborate jointly. It also contributed to correct certain constraints of a logistical nature in the assessment process¹⁷.

The results of this first stage were submitted at the end of May 2004. They included a brief description both of the PDNC and of the profile of the 10 localities subject to assessment (see **Chart 2**). Besides, assessments and progress reports were made on the works and actions carried out in the localities after making the visits and the field work.

Chart N° 2: Community centres considered in the first phase of the assessment

Community seat of the Community centre	Municipality to which it belongs
1. Nuevo Valle.	Atotonilco el Alto.
2. Santa Elena de la Cruz.	Ayotlán.
3. Juchitlán.	Cuquío.
4. Las Güeras.	Encarnation de Díaz.
5. La Troje.	Lagos de Moreno.
6. Guadalupe Victoria.	Ojuelos.
7. San Jacinto.	Poncitlán.
8. Juanacatlán.	Tapalpa.
9. La Milpilla.	Teocuitatlán de Corona.
10. Santa Elena.	Tolimán.

Source: Own data.

The results obtained were entered into the request for budgetary resources file and submitted to the SEDESOL in the first days of June. Perhaps because the request made by the SDH had already been approved, or perhaps because of the very nature of the assessment that focused on the implementation process, the fact is that during the second phase of the process the problems of access to information increased for the assessors, who met with certain resistance.

However, the most important aspect of this cooperation and institutional approach exercise was the innovative design of the PDNC. The programme had a clear intersectoral vision that was materialised in different “packages” of programmes and actions executed by diverse agencies and entities from both the state and federal sphere, and it involved around 39,300,000 pesos.

The words of the former director of Planning of the SDH, Sarah Obregón Davis should not be overlooked when she said that one of the objectives of the Programme was to concentrate the actions and the programmes of the different Government agencies of the State

¹⁷ Among other constraints, the lack of suitable vehicles to travel on the access roads to rural communities stands out.

of Jalisco and, even, of some programmes of the Federal government. Therefore, the selection of localities was the prime objective.

The agencies that participated in the programme were the Secretariat of Rural Development (SEDER), the Secretariat of Urban Development (SEDEUR), the Administrative Committee of the State Programme to Build Schools, decentralised public bodies of the health sector and decentralised public bodies of the State Commission of Water and Sanitation (see **Chart 3**).

Chart N°3: Agencies, budgetary resources and localities benefiting from the Programme of State Incentives (PIE)

Agency or collaborating entity	Date of signing the execution annex	Amounts from the PIE ¹⁸	%	Number of localities benefiting
1. Secretariat of Rural Development.	10 October 2003.	\$ 1,120,727	2.85	9
2. Secretariat of Urban Development.	10 October 2003.	\$ 5,934,735	15.1	10
3. Administrative Committee of the State Programme to Build Schools.	10 October 2003.	\$ 3,742,539	9.52	4
4. Decentralised Public Body Health Services Jalisco.	17 November 2003.	\$ 1,133,394	2.89	7
5. Decentralised Public Body State Commission of Water and Sanitation.	10 October 2003.	\$ 27,367,039	69.64	10
Total investment		\$ 39,298,434	100	

Although the organisational design was an element to highlight, it produced several challenges and certain reticence in the assessment team. There was bureaucratic obstinacy in the five agencies directly responsible for the executing the works just when it was hoped to assess the actions performed. To carry out the task of external assessment the provisions of

¹⁸ The total investment reflected here is the result of the sum of resources which, in equal proportions, the federal and state governments contributed for the operation of the Programme and which amounted to \$19,649,217. This figure emerges from communiqué D. S. 134.720. PDSH 0180/2003 sent to the head of the SDH by the Jalisco Delegation of Sedesol.

the annexes of execution signed by the SDH were followed to comply with the Coordination Agreement for the Implementation of the PIE¹⁹.

The bureaucratic practices of the five executive instances were varied: from full collaboration by officials of the decentralised public body of the State Commission of Water to resistance and lack of collaboration in submitting information from the SEDER.

Unlike the first phase of the assessment and despite the difficulties and resistance in obtaining information, in the second phase of description of the process of implementation of the programme the team of assessors managed to integrate a report that went beyond the limited vision to the detailed verification on the level of compliance with the rules of operation of the PIE. The report was submitted in July and incorporated a broader description of the environment in which the PDNC was implemented. It identified the formal and informal factors that facilitated or limited the setting in motion of the Programme.

Submission of the report was decisive, not only in easing the resistance shown so far, but in beginning to modify the perception of the SDH officials and achieve their greater willingness to participate. The supposed benefits of the assessment of the Programme provided, perhaps for the first time, a complete vision of the processes involved in the operation of the Programme under the responsibility of the SDH. The recommendations that emerged from the first report helped show the potential of this kind of exercise to improve the formulation and setting in motion of other social programmes.

The change of perception among the SDH officials was finally consolidated with the results obtained in the third and last stage: the impact assessment. This stage involved conducting a survey of the beneficiaries of the PDNC. To apply it, it was necessary for the assessment team to hire young university students, preferably students of Political and Government Studies of the University of Guadalajara with previous experience in conducting surveys. The students were trained and the survey applied. Finally, the results were submitted at the end of September, as established in the calendar stipulated in the contract.

3.2. Trust, a pillar of collaboration between agencies (2005)

Although the results of the external assessment of the PIE were submitted to the SEDESOL as per the agreed timetable, additional resources were not allocated for the continuation of the PDNC in 2005. The work and technical analysis were insufficient to continue or improve a programme which was apparently yielding good results.

The true factor that explains why a government programme is designed, implemented and continued, regardless of its technical viability, is of another kind. During a conversation between the assessment team and the head of the General Directorate of Social Policy of the SDH, Alberto Órnelas, it emerged that the reason why the initial mission of the PDNC had not been accomplished was political.

¹⁹ The agreement was signed by the Federal Executive, by means of the Sedesol, and the State Executive, with the attendance of the General Secretariat of Government (SGG), the Secretariat of Finance (SF), the SDH and the Coplade, on 8 October 2003. Its formalisation meant the PDNC could start.

According to the Órnelas, the SEDESOL formally argued that it had not authorised the budget extension for the programme in 2005 because it had decided to support other state initiatives which had been left without resources in 2004. However, another explanation blames the political situation: the decision not to authorise the extension of the budgetary support was apparently caused by the distancing between the federal and state governments at the surprising announcement by Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, the then energy secretary, of his candidacy for the Partido Acción Nacional to the Presidency of the Republic. Subsequently, Calderón Hinojosa became President of the Republic.

However, this version could not be corroborated at a later date²⁰ and, on the contrary, in the opinion of Rafael Ríos Martínez, the level of intergovernmental collaboration in matters of social policy did not change with this political episode.

What was public and visible was that the event had implications between the Government of Jalisco and the federal government, on one hand because the candidacy of Calderón Hinojosa did not enjoy the support of President Vicente Fox and, on the other, because it was the Governor of Jalisco, Francisco Javier Ramírez Acuña, who made that candidacy public on 29 May 2004. As was to be expected, the event caused the resignation of the then Energy Secretary and a public rebuke to the Governor of the State of Jalisco²¹. This reflects the weight of political questions in the Mexican civil service.

Nevertheless, and despite the context, the SDH decided to continue collaborating with El ColJal during 2005. The aim was to study the socio-economic profile of the 31 localities that received support from the PDNC in 2004. On this occasion, the study focused on the actions of the PDNC that received funding through the State Social Investment Fund (FISE).

This second external assessment posed as a central objective to serve as a base from which to determine variations in the socio-economic conditions of the target localities, through successive programmed measurements for the future. With this perspective, the El ColJal assessment team presented a working strategy supported in the instruments, techniques and sources of information detailed in **Chart 4**.

Chart N° 4: Methodological window for the base survey 2005

Basic criteria	Assessment of the community and homes profile of the target localities
Period in which to submit results.	-One month as of the date of signing of the agreement.
Contents.	- Measurement of the socio-economic conditions of the 31 target localities. - Measurement of the perception of the inhabitants of the localities regarding their living conditions, on the basis of a

²⁰ An attempt was made to contact Alberto Órnelas, former director general of Social Policy of the SDH in order to interview him. However, it was not possible.

²¹ The Governor's reply to President Fox was: "Only the people from Jalisco can scold me."

	sample that included homes in 12 localities.
Assessment technique.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Surveys of the inhabitants of the target localities. - In-depth interview with key agents. - Direct observation.
Data collection instruments.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Semi-structured written questionnaires. - Observation script. - In-depth interviews.
Format for presentation of results.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Descriptive document on the profile of the localities. - Written report tabulated and illustrated on the survey, with the responses to each reagent applied in the interviews.
Sources of information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Representative sample of the beneficiary population. - Key informants. - Direct observation in communities.

Source: Own data.

The general objectives of the applied survey were two: first, to establish the basic features of the socio-economic profile of the 31 target localities; second, to identify the fundamental features of the socio-economic profile of its inhabitants, as well as their principal requirements, demands and expectations in the area of human development. Besides the quantitative results from the survey, the PDNC was subjected to an analysis exercise in light of the results and observations obtained from the survey, in which both the researchers responsible for the study and the personnel in charge of the field work participated.

As a result of this session of work the programme's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) were analysed. There follows a description of the main results of the exercise, organised according to the same structure as the study: the relevant community profile and the socio-economic profile of homes.

Relevant community profile

Strengths:

Public services.

- A reasonable coverage of electricity, public lighting, street paving and telephone services was observed in the communities.

Education services.

- [Basic education needs were relatively well covered.

Health services.

- The basic needs of the population in matters of health were practically covered by the public sector, either through auxiliaries, health centres or medical dispensaries. Mobile health brigades did not visit only five localities.

Government programmes

- In general terms, the perception in the localities regarding the presence of government programmes and supports was good. This is a strength that the PDNC shares, although in no locality was this programme identified as such. In this respect, the clarity with which

the interviewees recognised the agencies and government spheres that channelled support to their communities is worthy of note.

Opportunities:

General aspects of the locality

-The presence of municipal authorities in practically all the communities, through inframunicipal figures, such as the delegate or subdelegate, should be exploited to involve them even more in PDNC development.

Public services

-The data confirmed that in these communities water was mainly supplied by means of natural sources, both surface and underground. The presence of other non-natural means, such as an installed hydraulic network, pipes, pumping, pools or dams was not very significant. If the PDNC seeks to have significant impact in the dispersion patterns of the rural population, incentivating their concentration in these localities, strong investment in hydraulic infrastructure is a relevant variable that should be taken into account to encourage people to move to the locality with drinking water and mains drainage services. This observation seemed to be confirmed with the fact that one of the most pressing needs in the localities studied is precisely the lack of drainage.

Economy and employment

-Although production activities related to the primary sector (agriculture and stockbreeding), predominate, other economic activities not related to farming have begun to appear, such as construction. By making use of this opportunity, progress could be made in the PDNC objectives that seek to increase the population occupied in sectors other than the primary, with the consequent improvement in income.

Weaknesses:

Public services

-Although the electricity, public lighting, street paving and public or private telephone services appear to have the greatest coverage, it should be stressed that in some of these areas (roads, public lighting, and telephone booths, for instance), the principal needs for services or community equipment were identified. Only in the case of drainage is there a clear correlation between the strong deficit in the service and the needs for services and the most commonly mentioned community equipment.

Education services

-A recommendation was made to assess the information at locality level, together with the education authorities. For example, it seemed important to know why classes were given on only three or four days a week in some localities.

Health services

-In the communities basic health services are offered. There are other needs that are particularly sensitive to the population that are not being covered, like for example,

assistance in childbirth. These needs are satisfied in health installations located in neighbouring, and presumably larger, communities.

Government programmes

-It was necessary to emphasise the greater perceived presence of federal instances, followed by state agencies and, to a lesser extent, by town councils. This indicates that it had not been possible to involve the municipal authorities in the programmes, and the people perceive that absence by the municipal authorities. This was a weakness of the government programmes in general, and of the PDNC in particular, especially if it is recognised that decentralisation was one of the strategic objectives of the PDNC.

Threats:

Public services.

-A latent threat for the general purposes of the PDNC had to do with solid waste management, since a high percentage of localities burn the solid waste they generate. On the other hand, practically the same percentage of localities is served by the council refuse collection, although it would be interesting to know the quality of the service provided.

Economy and employment.

-The average daily wage in all the 31 localities was \$112.26, insufficient to cover the population's basic needs. The average cost of transporting to the community products such as school utensils, personal hygiene, beef and milk, among others, ranged from \$10 to \$106.

-Despite the significant weight of production activities linked to farming in the economy of the localities, it is surprising to see the strong trend to monoculture (maize and beans), as well as the lack of adequate production infrastructure.

Socio-economic profile of homes

Strengths:

System of family subsistence

-In 2004, the homes received different forms of support from the Government²² almost in the same proportion as their principal source of income (salaries, daily or weekly wages, etc.), with which they complemented their consumption needs.

Opportunities:

Origin and condition of the homes

-In contrast to what could be supposed, the data showed a strong attachment of persons to their place of birth. In most homes, the members claimed to have been born in Jalisco and

²² The references to the "government" must be read as generic. Whenever citizens were interviewed they were unable to distinguish and specify between government orders: federal, state or municipal.

expressed their intention to remain there for at least the next year. The PDNC had to make use of the intentions of the people to remain in their locality and strengthen them.

System of family subsistence

-In almost half the homes there was an incipient trend to complement the main family income with commercial activities of farming products and real estate (houses and land). The trend may be a window of opportunity that the PDNC should take into account at a potential strategy to boost the socio-economic development of the localities involved.

-If such a strategy is carried out, it is recommended to bear in mind the consumption needs of the localities, which seem to focus on products of primary need: food and drink, articles of personal hygiene, cleaning articles for the home, medicines, clothes, blankets and footwear, as well as school articles and other items.

Economic activities

-Agricultural activity is predominantly seasonal: few homes practice it throughout the whole year. The vast majority does so between one and ten months a year, thus putting them in a position to dedicate the rest of the time to other economic activity to complement the family income.

-Economic activities not related to farming showed a greater stability throughout the year. Those who work in small-scale trade and traditional employment maintained that occupation throughout the year. This observation reveals that alternative economic activities offer greater stability in family income as an advantage.

Weaknesses:

System of family subsistence

-In 2004, few homes received Government support to carry out economic activities to complement their income.

Threats:

Origin and condition of the homes.

-It is highly recommendable to enquire as to the reasons why almost half the persons did not respond to the questions on the permanent residence of the head of the family in the home and his/her spouse. According to the opinions given by those responsible for the survey, the possibility that they may not have responded to the question because they failed to understand it is minimal and, rather, the lack of response may reveal a definite pattern in the family relations prevailing in those localities.

Patrimony

-Although in the majority of homes it was claimed that the dwelling belonged to them, it was noteworthy that almost half said that the dwelling was not legally regulated, or they did not know if it was. Legal acknowledgement of possession of the dwelling is a necessary condition to guarantee the family patrimony. Therefore, if no specific action is considered in the question of regulation, any effort to support the socio-economic development of the family groups may be seriously limited in its scope.

-This observation seems to be confirmed with the prevailing form of land ownership: almost half those surveyed revealed some form of ownership different to private ownership (common, communal or public), or were unable to respond regarding ownership of the land on which their dwelling stands.

-Only a few homes have land suitable for agricultural activities. So the vast majority of members of the household engaged in agricultural work as day labourers either on rented or borrowed land, or on common land or communal property. The fact that the majority of heads of family in the homes consulted claimed as principal occupation day labourer or peasant confirms the above.

Economic activities

-In families a strong non-entrepreneurial economic culture was observed: the vast majority of its members engage in agricultural activities and the few that work in other activities did so as labourers or employees. Only in a few cases did they claim to engage in trade and almost the same proportion claimed to have some type of establishment (workshop, shop, pharmacy, taco store, etc.). This limiting factor suggests that training and education should play a fundamental role in the success of any strategy undertaken in support of the family economy.

This SWOT analysis reveals that government action is very limited in its capacity to effectively articulate social policy. This constraint is explained by the presence of certain tensions present in relations between town councils and state authorities.

In the particular case of the PDNC, it is clear that even as of its design –endogenous factor–, according to Obregón Davis spoke of the possibility of working interinstitutionally within the agencies of the State Government, with the agencies of the Federal government and with the town councils, certain exogenous factors appeared that complicated the spirit of intergovernmental coordination.

According to Alberto Esquer Gutiérrez, former director general of Social Policy of the Secretariat of Human Development of the State Government, the electoral situation –the presidential battle between Calderón, Madrazo and López Obrador– somewhat distorted the Programme, especially as regards the focus on the localities. Esquer Gutiérrez explained that the localities were chosen according to three criteria. On one hand, marginalisation was taken into account according to the figures of the National Population Council (CONAPO) and the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI). Finally, the requests and needs presented by the municipal presidents were also considered²³.

In other words, the priorities for attention according to the institutional criteria of the PDNC did not necessarily correspond with the interests and priorities of the municipal authorities.

²³ Interview with Alberto Esquer Gutiérrez, former director general of Social Policy of the Secretariat of Human Development of the State Government. Conducted by Roberto Arias de la Mora on 3 November 2008, in Guadalajara, Jalisco.

This significantly reduced the potential scope of the actions foreseen by the PDNC. According to Esquer Gutiérrez, “it was a state programme in which the municipality did not contribute to certain actions; it only contributed labour provided by the beneficiaries themselves and, on certain occasions, the municipal presidents [participated] with transport of certain machinery, but most was provided by the Government of the State of Jalisco²⁴”.

3.3. 2006: change and continuity

Despite the interest shown by SDH officials to continue studying and assessing the socio-economic conditions of communities in Jalisco, changes occurred in the SDH at the end of 2005, motivated by the proximity of the elections scheduled for the end of July 2006.

It should be taken into account that the electoral process itself was a determining factor that had a strong impact on the results of the programme and affected the immediate reality of the localities concerned, according to the following statement by Alberto Esquer:

“(In view of the fact that) the electoral process brought complications because the ground is basically of cement, the water storage systems are tall earthenware jars, or cisterns and the question of food was solved with DIF supplies, school breakfasts, and health care and education, (we had to) reinforce the Programme with very specific, very accurate indicators from the INEGI and the CONAPO to focus on municipalities and the localities we were attending²⁵”.

This period was particularly difficult because the provision of resources interfered with the result of the Programme. To reduce the negative impact, a direct delivery was made from the Government of the state of Jalisco to the beneficiaries (avoiding doing it via the municipalities). Moreover, to determine the degree of marginalisation of the localities a joint survey was conducted with the Government of the State of Jalisco, the municipalities, the registers of beneficiaries and those with socio-economic studies. The invitation was open and publications were disseminated with the results observed as of the delivery of these resources and materials²⁶.

Once the elections were over, and contrary to expectations, the new PDNC officials re-established contact with El ColJal assessors. According to Alberto Esquer Gutiérrez, the fundamental motivation lay in the need to assess the impact of the Programme in the beneficiaries in the community centres. So, and given that the ColJal had already assessed the Programme twice, a third assessment was decided ²⁷.

After various conversations, a request was finally formalised to carry out a third study which, unlike that made in 2005, targeted the integration of a social evaluation component that would complement the PDNC’s execution report. The period of assessment included the years 2003 to 2006 and was integrated with a view to the process of submission-reception of the Government of Jalisco.

²⁴ Idem.

²⁵ Idem.

²⁶ Idem.

²⁷ Idem.

In this context, the Coljal formally presented the terms of the assessment of social perception of the PDNC, as detailed in the following chart:

Chart N° 5: Methodological window of the assessment of the social perception of the PDNC.

Period for submitting results	Three months
Contents.	Measuring the changes perceived by the target population in their living conditions.
Assessment technique.	Survey of beneficiary population.
Data collection instruments.	Semi-structured written questionnaire.
Presentation format of results.	Written report tabulated and illustrated with the responses of each reactive applied in the interview.
Sources of information.	Representative population sample benefiting from the work and actions of the Programme in each community.

Source: Own data.

The general objectives of the assessment were defined jointly between the SDH personnel and the Coljal assessment team at a working meeting on 27 July. The objectives agreed were the following:

1. To analyse the perception on the economic and social situation of the interviewees.
2. To analyse whether the works or actions carried out in the locality affected the perception that the beneficiaries have of the Government in general.
3. To measure the level of knowledge and identification of the PDNC in the core localities.
4. To measure the impact of changes in the quality of life of the informants and/or their family, stemming directly or indirectly from the works and actions of the PDNC.
5. To estimate the level of active social participation of the informants in the PDNC, as well as their future willingness to participate in government programmes.

On the basis of these objectives, a semi-structured questionnaire was designed with open response scaled option from which information on the target population was gathered. Meanwhile, to select the sample the systematic method was used, with random stratified selection proportional to the number of inhabitants in each community and without weighting. For this, data was taken on the total number of inhabitants by core locality in the Census conducted by INEGI in 2000. On the basis of these criteria, the sample was made up of the following localities:

Municipality	Locality or centre	Total population of localities of influence	Population of the centre	Total population	Number of interviews
Jilotlán de los Dolores	El Rodeo	901	106	1007	10
San Julián	El Puerto de los Amoleros	1021	118	1139	10
Pihuamo	Colomos	483	243	726	10
San Miguel el Alto	La Angostura	894	173	1067	10
Zapotitlán de Vadillo	Teteapan	1434	222	1656	10
Autlán de Navarro	Agua Hedionda	217	228	445	10
Chiquilistlán	Agua Hedionda	901	264	1165	10
Huejuquilla El Alto	La Soledad	163	271	434	10
Chimaltitán	San Juan Los Potreros	560	300	860	10
Unión de Tula	La Taberna	232	136	368	10
Cihuatlán	Colonia Pinal Villa	211	207	418	10
Guachinango	Llano Grande	344	245	589	10
Juchitlán	Las Juntas	301	79	380	10
Etzatlán	Puerta de Pericos	103	164	267	10
Ayutla	El Zapotillo	785	186	971	10
Tamazula de Gordiano	El Taray	755	459	1214	26
Cuatitlán de García Barragán	Ayotitlán	3864	543	4407	27
Zapotiltc	Ferrería de Providencia	278	378	656	26
Sayula	El Reparó	338	350	688	26
Ayotlán	Santa Elena de la Cruz	227	722	949	35
Acatlán de Juárez	San José de los Pozos	57	794	851	34
Acatic	Tierras	858	1174	2032	29

Municipality	Locality or centre	Total population of localities of influence	Population of the centre	Total population	Number of interviews
	Coloradas				
Poncitlán	San Jacinto	261	1396	1657	18
Tapalpa	Juanacatlán	1076	2243	3319	29

Source: Own data.

With this composition and sample size, the estimated margin of error in the values of the variables was +/-5% globally, with a confidence level of 95%. This means that one out of every 20 pieces of data thrown up by the study could be outside the established margin of error. On the basis of this survey, various observations were made as to the economic and social situation of the communities. According to Esquer Gutiérrez, the ColJal assessment revealed that “Community Centres” was generating the expected impact in the localities in which it was applied²⁸.

Beyond the results of the survey, from the perspective of the then Director General of Social Policy, its results did have a significant impact in the perception of the state authorities, and very favourable practical consequences for the continuity of the Programme. According to Alberto Esquer, assessments are fundamental to know what happens in the programmes applied by the governments:

“One of the most difficult tasks of governments is to create transversal public policy between [the] federal, state and municipal governments; and between the agencies of the state Executive. The Governor requested specifically to see the results produced by the Programme. So, we couldn’t know the results if it wasn’t under assessment scheme. (...) I think that, even now, governments in Mexico, in general, and the Jalisco government, in particular, have very little culture in matters of assessment and, from my point of view, any programme that is not assessed can’t be improved. (...) The results of the assessment were vitally important for taking decisions on the budget, public policy decisions and decisions on distribution of resources as State Government”²⁹.

According to Esquer, the El ColJal assessment allowed them to discover that, although the impact was good, the number of localities reached by the Programme was relatively low and that there was still a long road to travel. So, the following year more resources were finally allocated to the Programme.

²⁸ Idem.

²⁹ Ibid.

4. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE COLLABORATION EXPERIENCE

The previous section contained a description of the collaboration experience between the SDH, a government agency in the subnational sphere in Mexico, and El ColJal, a local institute dedicated to higher education and research. It focused on those factors that determined the conditions in which the applied research was incorporated into the process of formulating social policy in Jalisco and, specifically, during the assessment stage of a particular government programme that was designed to combat poverty in rural communities with very particular characteristics.

Nevertheless, with the aim of appraising the impact of the factors, both endogenous and exogenous, of each of the organisations involved in this case study it was deemed pertinent to make a brief recapitulation of these factors.

4.1. El Colegio de Jalisco

The institutional efforts deployed by El ColJal in support of the professionalisation of the public service in the state of Jalisco and its municipalities, opened an important window of opportunity to the gradual incorporation of professional and researchers oriented to applied studies in the sphere of government and municipal and state public administration.

Consolidated over recent years, this trend was the principal endogenous factor that fostered convergence of institutional interests between the ColJal and the SDH, reflected in the assessment exercise external to the Programme of Community Centres.

In this regard, an exogenous factor to El ColJal which was fundamental to begin the initial linkage with the SDH was the prevailing normative expressed by the Operating Rules of the PIE that establish as an essential requirement external assessment of the social programme that receive public financing through said federal programme. However, the impact of the results from the first external assessment conducted by ColJal academics should also be stressed, as an endogenous factor that was decisive in sustaining the link with the SDH, at least during the following two years.

4.2. The Secretariat of Human Development

Now, if SDH's initial interest to formally request ColJal's collaboration to assess the Programme of Community Centres was restricted to the exogenous factor related to the Operating Rules of the PIE, the case study also reveals a series of factors endogenous to the SDH that helped sustain collaboration with El ColJal for two years after the first assessment exercise.

Among these factors endogenous to the SDH, the following stand out:

First of all, it is worth stressing both the initial motivation and the strategy that it was decided to follow for the creation of the SDH at the outset, and the later formulation of the social policy named "Integrate", as two prime endogenous factors. The first emerged from the diagnosis made by the government actors in which the lack of a government agency specialised in attending population in conditions of poverty was identified. The second was made in the close collaboration that could be established between public officials and a group of consultants who were entrusted with the technical tasks that allowed both the

organisational design proposal of SDH and the formulation of social policy in Jalisco to be sustained.

Secondly, we found the institutional characteristics of the SDH and the later integration of a working team like other fundamental endogenous factors that contributed to give a clear orientation and solid support to the first institutional tasks undertaken by the SDH. The institutional characteristics, as stressed above, were structured on the basis of three areas with clearly defined functions: the area responsible for planning social policy, the area responsible for programming operations, and a third area designed to foster citizen participation and social linkage. As regards the working team, it lays particular emphasis on the fact that it was formed in the planning area, and was made up of a relatively compact group of young professionals with a solid professional profile, who also stood out for showing high motivation in taking on responsibilities and undertaking innovative actions.

Finally, it is necessary to stress the personal style of direction shown by SDH's first head, Rafael Ríos Martínez, as an endogenous factor that was strategic in ensuring that the institutional objectives were achieved. This factor is crucial in creating a work mystique oriented by a vision shared between the head of the agency and his work team.

Certain factors exogenous to the SDH that seem to have impacted significantly during the conformation stage of this government agency also deserve to be stressed. In this sphere, the context of population dispersion that prevails in the rural areas of Jalisco stands out, along with the previous experiences made by the Government of Jalisco to attend to the rural population in conditions of marginalisation, as two relevant exogenous factors that had significant impact and opened an important opportunity for the SDH's initiative of creation as a government agency coordinating government efforts in matters of social policy.

In addition, the experiences developed in other states of the Republic, particularly the state of Guanajuato, the ideas concerning human development being disseminated in the framework of the United Nations Development Programme and the party political differentiation finally made up a favourable situation for the creation of the SDH.

The case illustrates particularly, how the normative demand to carry out an external assessment of the Programme of Community Centres was joined by the positive impact of the first results of the external assessment in the perception of the SDH public officials. Both exogenous factors contributed significantly in the decision of the government agency to sustain an institutional link with the ColJal from which other relevant studies and assessments resulted to improve social policy in Jalisco.

It is also worth pointing out that the exogenous factors that favoured the development of successive assessments external to the Programme of Community Centres seem to have helped reduce the tensions that subsequently appeared between the town councils and the SDH itself, stemming from the operation of the Programme in the context of a difficult political situation marked by the electoral process.

Beyond the political-electoral situation, the results of the assessments contributed to reveal certain limiting conditions of the necessary linkage that had to be established between the town councils and the State Government to ensure the operation of the Programme of

Community Centres. Such constraints are an exogenous factor that the SDH had to overcome at the time in order to sustain the good progress of the Programme.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The case study on the external assessment experience of the Government of Jalisco's Development Programme of Community Centres made by El ColJal is very solid and direct evidence on how the use of research applied to public policy is a fundamental tool to facilitate and substantially improve the process of formulating public policy in the social sphere.

However, certain questions arose that bear witness to the fact that relations between academic research centres and government agencies in Latin America are mediated by networks and relations that are not necessarily supported by institutional mechanisms that encourage solid formal relations. When in truth the intention is that social policies should respond to minimal criteria of rationality, these networks of contacts between actors are relations of friendship or professional relations that go beyond the constraints arising out of the bureaucratisation of public administrations.

In this respect, the case is very rich and shows the multiple constraints and opportunities that usually arise in developing joint initiatives between research-oriented institutions and government agencies. The case particularly shows how the close link and collaboration sustained between authorities and policy analysts, beyond the nature described above, became the key factor for social policies to respond to minimal technical criteria that attenuate the strong political position they enjoy.

The linkage we have just described generally covers different stages of the public policy process. Although the social policy was designed in the subnational government agency, in this case the SDH, and also the Programme of Community Centres (implementation phase) took charge of ensuring its accomplishment, the impact monitoring and assessment phases were looked after by a research centre, in this case El ColJal.

Although the case could be presented as a successful experience of linkage between a government agency and a research centre, especially in the phase of professional and endogenous collaboration, it also revealed the main problems and constraints which Latin American public administrations generally face, notably:

- a) The great weight of party politics on the public policy formulation process.
- b) The link between a subnational agency and a research centre usually begins with external imperatives rather than endogenously.
- c) Government actors recognise in the discourse the importance, value and utility of external assessment, whose scope goes further than programming and operational questions and really helps measure social impact. Unfortunately the institutional mechanisms that force it on or encourage it are scarce.
- d) The above means that social policies and government programmes are unable to resist "changes of government". This is reflected in the fact that policies are not institutionalised and reinvented, their content does not change and the prior experience is not wasted, among many other problems.

Finally, the case presented offers different clues that help understand problems in Latin American public function. Particularly, it illustrates how in practice links with research

centres are established, operate and perform, especially in the subnational sphere, which differs substantially from the national sphere.

In this regard, the sociological reality shown in this case study offers multiple evidence on the conditions of institutional weakness that still persist in subnational spheres of government and which strongly limit the possibilities and potentialities that can be reached through a closer linkage between applied research and the public policy formulation process.

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7. PHOTOGRAPHIC GALLERY





Juanacatlán, Tapalpa, Jalisco.



SPACES FOR COMMITMENT: USING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOUR OF THE POOR

Case Study

*Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote: realising
social, economic and cultural rights by attacking political clientelism in
social programmes in Ecuador*

Final report

**Melania Carrión, author
Orazio Bellettini, co-author**

Quito, Ecuador, 04 December 2008.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyses the experience “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote”, a successful initiative of work between civil society - Fundación para el Avance de las Reformas y Oportunidades (Foundation for the Advancement of Reforms and Opportunities, or Grupo FARO)- and public administration to combat clientelism in social programmes in Ecuador. To this end, it explores the background, objectives, phases, strategies, outcomes and the general characteristics of the experience as it attempts to promote changes in public management; the type of knowledge and evidence that was used to impact public decision-making. It also analyses the exogenous and endogenous factors that made the experience successful. The first part of this paper includes a theoretical and empirical debate as regards clientelism, which is necessary to reveal its consequences and to articulate strategies in the face of the reduction in opportunities for emergence.

Key words: public policy centre, clientelism, social programmes, public administration and management; knowledge and evidence; exogenous factors; endogenous factors.

INTRODUCTION

Public policy in Ecuador is a minor discipline in the development of social sciences in general, and of political science in particular. It is not strange, therefore, that the policies implemented and executed by governments have been studied and analysed very little. Public policy tends not to be generally visible.¹ Social policies and social programmes are no exception, so very little is known of management models, the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes, the form in which the actors articulate the distribution processes of resources and, in general, the problems that restrict compliance with the objective of promoting the economic, social and cultural rights of the populations with the highest indices of exclusion and poverty.

During the 80s and 90s, most social programmes in Ecuador were institutionalised and, far from being temporary, became permanent State policy, a situation which supposes urgent action by civil society to make the processes transparent, contribute to the improvement of the management and monitoring systems. “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” is the first evidence-based experience to emerge in Ecuador from civil society – Grupo FARO – to unmask the phenomenon of political clientelism in social programmes and to include the need to combat it on the political agenda. It is an experience with a successful outcome thanks to the characteristics of the social, political and institutional moment of Ecuador at the time and which is a policy window, but also thanks the characteristics of the Public Policy Centre related with its sphere of action and prior work on social programmes.

This case study describes the experience of the Grupo FARO proposal to combat political clientelism in 3 food and nutrition programmes (AE, PAE, PANN 2000); 2 child care programmes (FODI, ORI); 1 conditioned transfer of resources programme (BDH); 1 mother-child health programme (Maternidad Gratuita [Free Maternity]); 1 social investment programme (FISE); and 2 housing programmes (SIV-Urbano; and SIV Rural).²

One danger for any supposedly rigorous research is to start with assumed givens. Consequently, the field phase sought to identify whether the proposal to combat clientelism in the 10 social programmes mentioned above was significant for the actors involved and whether it was opportune in the political and institutional moment. Due to the constraints inherent in any research of this nature, the concerns generated by this study, such as subnational/local forms and dynamics of clientelist practice in each of the social programmes, are not covered. However, some indications are given.

¹ The new Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, in force since 21 October this year, vindicates the scorned role given to public policy, which supposes opening the possibility of greater emphasis on the issue.

² Aliméntate Ecuador (AE); Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE); Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición (PANN 2000); Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil (FODI); Operación Rescate Infantil (ORI); Fondo de Inversión Social (FISE); Sistema de Incentivos a la Vivienda Urbano y Rural (SIV Urbano y SIV Rural)

The structure of this study assumes an initial theoretical-analytical framework in which there is discussion of the fundamentals that underpinned the experience, i.e., a response is sought to the question: why an initiative to combat clientelism in Ecuador's social programmes? Secondly, there is a description of the experience "Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote", stressing the type of knowledge and evidence used to influence public administration. The exogenous and endogenous factors that allowed the success of the initiative are then explored, and finally the principal conclusions are presented.

I- THEORETICAL-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The documentation and analysis of the experience “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote,” the focus of this study, forced us to ask the question: why an initiative to combat clientelism in Ecuador’s social programmes? If, as suggested in an earlier section, it used knowledge and evidence of experiences in other countries, we researchers needed to discuss the opportunity and significance of the initiative in a context such as Ecuador’s. Only thus was it possible to draw conclusions regarding the success or otherwise of the experience. It thus avoided taking as given certain theoretical-analytical categories. This discussion, the outcome of the findings and of the type of knowledge and evidence used in the design and execution of the proposal to combat clientelism, meant exploring the concept of clientelism, its visible forms in social programmes and certain aspects that move them.

POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM, A DIFFERENT VIEW

Political clientelism has become one of the most moving and flexible categories in political science. Despite the difficulty the category presents when establishing conceptual limits and, in particular, when attempting to make it operational³, in general there to be a consensus that clientelism should be seen as a system of personal, asymmetric relations involving the exchange of goods and services between a patron and a client, based on political loyalty or reciprocity. However, electoral clientelism is specifically expressed as the exchange of favours for votes for a certain political candidate or party (Auyero, 1996).

An acritical view of political clientelism in general, and of electoral clientelism in particular, could bring progress and lead us to assume that the discussion is resolved and that the margins and connotations of this category – which is loaded with a normative vision – are clear. A further analysis however leads us to ask: **why is clientelism such an attractive and customary practice for political players?** We do not aspire to cover the discussion in all its breadth, but elections are, no doubt, a starting point. They are the focus of democracy and we cannot overlook the fact that clientelism is linked to minimal liberal-style democracy⁴ which for over half a century has been presented as the normative horizon of societies. And the link is such that the basic requirement demanded of systems which pride themselves on being democratic, is for free and competitive elections.⁵ Political parties and players do not act outside electoral logic⁶, on the contrary, they constantly find reaffirmation in it, and

³ Miguel Trotta (2003) refers to the diffuse limits that appear when attempting to analyse clientelism. The author sees it as a social and political phenomenon and practice. We agree on the multidimensional nature of clientelism, but we consider it prudent to specify that in the history of regional politics it is no longer a “phenomenon” but is by far a customary and naturalised practice.

⁴ Pereyra (n/d) vindicates this relationship.

⁵ See Dalh Robert (1971)

⁶ We are not ignoring the existence of anti-establishment parties analysed by Sartori (1992a). However, we stress that electoral clientelism involves players and parties that fight in the electoral arena.

legitimately so. Although the parties carry out functions that make the political system operative, they also have goals or objectives, the greatest of them being: the power of the State primarily winning elections⁷. Now, this competition in regions such as Latin America, is characterised as being absolutely volatile, full of uncertainty and charged with personalism - Mainwaring & Torcal (2005), Jones (2005) and Roberts (2002)⁸.

So it is not hard to infer that in order to win elections parties need to use strategies. It is a question of good election results winning for the victor as much power and influence as possible. The strategies of the parties could be inwards or outwards: the former, of no importance for this study, mainly affect organisational structure and, the latter, fundamentally the electorate. Therefore, we plan to analyse political clientelism (more permanent) and electoral clientelism (at election time) as contact strategies with the electorate, which assumes that effectively combating clientelism must include an attack on the incentives that political parties have in order to compete electorally. This proposal towards a more realistic than normative view of clientelism in social programmes does not ignore that practices and incentives in public administration may lead to significant outcomes in restricting political and electoral clientelism in social services. On the contrary, the experience analysed in this study reveals how to public administration can be influenced.

It is doubtful whether clientelist strategies are as effective in mobilising votes in all scenarios.⁹ It will depend on the kind of strategy, the characteristics of the party system, the political culture of the citizens, the type of goods - material or symbolic - involved in the exchange as well as the institutional constraints or incentives the electoral system and public administration provide. Generally, however, and despite the various forms the clientelist link may acquire, in the opinion of Gruenberg (n/d) it is characterised as being: a) an asymmetric relationship in which the patrons, brokers and clients have unequal resources, prestige and power; b) a personalised relationship in which general or universal rules do not apply and are not valid; and, c) an informal and diffuse relationship.¹⁰

⁷ (Duverger 1957), (Farrell & Webb, 2002) and (Downs 1957)

⁸ Roberts (2002) says that volatility in Latin America provides fertile ground for the emergence of independent politicians or outsiders and populist and personalist figures.

⁹ Schedler (2004) shows the links that clientelist strategy can have and how ineffective it may be. However, no broad study has been made to allow clearer conclusions to be drawn in measuring the impact of clientelism in winning elections. Schedler highlights the impossibility of setting up monitoring systems to verify whether the "client" has in fact voted. See also Gay (1998).

¹⁰ Gruenberg (n/d) and Trotta (2003) stress that there are many variants of clientelism, but both authors agree on two ideal types: "dense clientelism", which assumes a *quid pro quo* activity under the logic of an explicit exchange; and "institutional clientelism" in which the exchange takes place explicitly by incorporating categories such as citizen participation and the recognition of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) as well as practices of coadministration and rhetorical use of "rights," by fracturing the free exercise of the vote and affecting citizens' autonomy.

CLIENTELISM, THE STONE IN THE SHOE OF SOCIAL PROGRAMMES

Clientelist strategies are not new in developing countries, such as those in Latin America, although after the implementation of the adjustment programmes in the mid-80s they took on new forms¹¹. Unlike classic clientelist strategies, modern ones are characterised by the appropriation and use of public resources for political ends, adopting the discourse of rights inclusion.

A social programme¹² is a set of human actions designed to solve a certain problem that determines objectives, expected outcomes, time to reach those outcomes, means of execution and resources to attain them (Serrano 2008). A social programme is ascribed to a particular form of conceiving and interpreting the social world and has as its *raison d'être* to assist in some way to mitigate the “evils” or deficiencies that prevent development and greater enjoyment of rights.

Carrillo and Gruenberg (2006) argue that corruption and political clientelism tend to reduce the effectiveness of social programmes and may even bring about their complete failure, which should come as no surprise since clientelism is by definition an exclusive and selective strategy. It includes only an internal circle of loyal followers, while it excludes those who are alien to the relationship because they do not know “suitable” middlemen or for refusing to participate in the exchange. But although clientelism may, in principle, be exclusive, it can also take on a mask of inclusion in practice or at the level of discourse, giving rise to what we could well call “inclusive or democratic clientelism”.

In social policy and in public administration in general, the patron or intermediary will define the type of clientelistic strategy in terms of the capacities and resources he may have at his disposal to give his clients (Schedler, 2004). So, increased social investment¹³ can frequently coincide with election periods when the party or clientelistic politician is in power¹⁴ (Carrillo & Gruenberg, 2006). Coombs (in Carrillo & Gruenberg, 2006) indicates that there are three principal effects of clientelism in social programmes: a) the politically weak groups or those opposed to the administrators of social programmes do not receive the same benefits as those that do accept to be part of the exchange¹⁵; b) clientelism makes programmes less effective in the commitment to reach their target population; and, c) clientelism is common among populist governments that exploit the emotions of their citizens with speeches full of promises for the future and the provision of goods. Returning to Coombs’

¹¹ See Gruenberg (n/d); Pereyra (n/d); Trotta (2003).

¹² Serrano (2008) says that there are two types of programmes: a) those of a promotional nature, which are associated to capacity development, and those of social protection based on conditioned monetary transfers.

¹³ We prefer to speak of social investment rather than the classic concept of “social spending”.

¹⁴ Maravall (2003) analyses the opportunities available to citizens to control politicians in power by an approval vote or punishment vote. It should come as no surprise that whoever is in power will try to remain there and consequently will do everything in his power to do so.

¹⁵ We should probably stop referring to the link as “exchange” since it could be enhanced with the vote in the case of electoral clientelism and with political support in the macro case of political clientelism.

analysis, we would suggest as a fourth and fundamental effect of clientelism in social programmes: **the denial of citizenship and the growing inflexibility of the political, economic, social and cultural rights of those involved in the clientelist relationship and of the potential beneficiaries of the programmes.**

In readings on the subject, clientelism is often associated with corruption. This calls for certain explanations. The first thing to say, and this stems from this investigation, is that certain clientelist strategies are not necessarily acts of corruption¹⁶, although the ethical-moral criticism or their disqualification remains. The second is that clientelist-style strategies are acts of corruption when they are conceived as such in the legislation, i.e., when they infringe explicit norms. But other combinations are also possible: citizens may view certain clientelist strategies poorly since they are acts of corruption, but others, seen as a crime or infraction may be legitimate in the eyes of the citizens. The difference between these two readings corresponds to the degree of empowerment of rights for the beneficiaries of the social programmes and of course, to the institutional curbs and incentives that may exist to control and avoid the use of this type of strategies. Paraphrasing Cristina de la Torre, clientelism needs to lose respectability as the usual weapon of all political classes; it is a question of recovering ethics in politics.

SOME CLIENTELIST STRATEGIES IN SOCIAL PROGRAMMES¹⁷

By definition and as mentioned above, political actors can use a variety of clientelist strategies in social programmes, which will vary in terms of the opening they provide, the programme's design and management model, the resources available to the programme and whether the clientelist politician is in opposition or in government. The evidence used in "Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote" and the findings of this study allow us to propose the following four spheres and their main forms of political manipulation in social programmes:¹⁸

- a) **In coverage.** Common forms of political manipulation are inclusion of beneficiaries who, despite not meeting the focalisation criteria, are incorporated into a social programme. They may also include those who meet the requirements but are excluded and are thus not beneficiaries, and, lastly, the promise – at times permanent – to include a beneficiary in a programme.
- b) **In the contractual.** Verified by discretionally deciding to hire promoters, administrators and in general the managers of social programmes, principally at a subnational level; by selecting and awarding contracts to providers of services, goods or products, e.g., in

¹⁶ Tendler mentions other practices that act against the effectiveness of social programmes: bribery and the search for profit. (Pereyra n/d)

¹⁷ See Annex No. 1

¹⁸ As mentioned above, certain practices of electoral manipulation in social programmes are not necessarily acts of corruption. Pereyra proposes analysing two manifestations of corruption in social programmes: the first addresses the criteria used to select beneficiaries of a social programme; a second type of corruption involves the contractual level in the provision of services. We mention this macro differentiation, but prefer to present this modest classification.

the acquisition of food for nutrition programmes, inputs in agricultural programmes, building materials for housing programmes, and others; and, in the discretionary choice of social or community organisations that distribute or provide services or resources.

- c) **Discursive level.** Political clientelism in social programmes is not restricted to material exchange, but also to symbolic and discursive exchange. This little analysed sphere has often been mistaken for demagoguery. However, as a result of the lack of citizen culture and the growing weight of the mass media, programmes are very susceptible to clientelist management under the umbrella of “assistentialism” in the discourse of political leaders. We suggest three principal discursive uses of social programmes: the promotion of the programmes as an act of aid and management by the leaders; promises of increased benefits in the social programmes, mainly at election times;¹⁹ and, blackmail or threat of loss of the social benefit if the political player does not win the elections.
- d) **Institutional level.** Another form of clientelist management of programmes is the use of programme resources, such as vehicles, personal or real property to mobilise support for political leaders (at campaign meetings, for instance); and, using resources destined to the diffusion of programmes to promote political candidacies. Most frequently, these practices are crimes of public administration, or electoral crimes or offences. However, the subtlety of politicians and weakness in control bodies can open scenarios for the habitual use of these strategies.

WHAT MAKES A SOCIAL PROGRAMME MORE VULNERABLE TO CLIENTELIST MANAGEMENT?

Structural adjustment measures, i.e., privatisations, market liberalisation and reduction in the size of the State, have diminished the resources available to politicians to generate electoral support, which has become what Trotta (2003) refers to as “metamorphosis of clientelism”. Contemporary patrons have fewer resources to distribute among their clients, and consequently clientelist strategies in social programmes adopt diverse manifestations boosted by neoliberal logic such as “decentralisation” and “focalisation” (Gruenberg, n/d).²⁰

Pereyra says that two aspects could explain current clientelism or manipulation of the vote in social programmes. The first concerns the political context in which clientelism develops, and the second the content of the social programmes implemented. Not very far

¹⁹ A distinction should be made between the meaning of a programmatic proposal and what is exclusively electoral campaign strategy.

²⁰ This dynamic has created new connections between central and local governments. We argue, however, that the extension of rights and the discourse of citizens’ participation in the current conceptualisations of democracy have included players other than local governments, degenerating into a sort of “citizens’ corporativism”. The case analysed in Ecuador shows, however, that the adjustment reforms in social programmes have not been reflected in decentralisation but have promoted a logic of semi-decentralisation in just a few cases, in which local governments were not viewed as strategic players but non-governmental (NGOs), community or neighbourhood organisations, which were not immune to clientelist seduction.

removed from this approach, we wish to propose that the reasons to explain the greater or lesser vulnerability of social programmes to clientelist management are related to the following aspects: a) socio-political characteristics of the arena of competition for political power; b) institutional incentives in that competition; c) institutional characteristics related to public management; and, d) the distinctive characteristics of social programmes, or the management model applied in each of them, which is basically the same thing.

a) Socio-political characteristics of the arena of competition for political power. By starting, as we have, on the assumption that social programmes, understood as measures to alleviate poverty and socio-economic inequality, are prone to political manipulation, we are assuming the causal relationship that exists between clientelism and precariousness. We recognise the methodological risk of assuming that persons who are in the greatest insecurity are more vulnerable to clientelism, however, we stress that in the specific case of social programmes there is an undeniable correlation. Other social characteristics have to do with what is known as the historical legacy of the communities in question, but also, and fundamentally, with the degree of empowerment of the beneficiaries and actors involved in the notion of “rights”, the antithesis of categories such as assistentialism and protectionism. As political characteristics of the arena of competition for political power we must heed: whether the political party or actor is in power and has privileged access to the resources of social programmes; and whether it is in opposition and manipulates the programmes discursively for later electoral gain. This political dimension is also related with the system of - national and/or subnational - parties, the level of fragmentation and ideological polarisation, electoral volatility and the institutionalisation of the party system²¹. As we said, politicians and parties see clientelism as an electoral strategy, which is why a social programme in a specific geographical area may be more sensitive to it, in that it has a base in the precarious nature of society and the level of competitiveness it may have with other political players.

b) Institutional incentives in electoral competition. Political parties and players will use social programmes as a space to acquire electoral support provided the design and institutional control mechanisms allow it. One incentive to clientelist management by political players lies in the electoral system itself. An electoral system based on a personal and preferential vote will foster clientelist networks also of a personalist nature, while an electoral system that promotes the vote for a party will foster party clientelist relations. But also those links will be boosted by an electoral design that fails to acknowledge as an electoral crime actions of vote manipulation, such as the giving of gifts by the governing party at election time; the use of the media to promote candidates with public funds; open participation in electoral processes by those who are coordinators of social programmes; the lack of effective control on electoral spending; in-existent control over the content of electoral campaigns and proposals; the lack of regulations on the opposition, among

²¹ (Jones 2005) offers a strong approach on the impact of the characteristics of the party system on public policy.

others. Further reference should be made to the validity of the compulsory vote as an institutional incentive for greater efficacy of clientelist strategies.²²

c) Institutional characteristics related to public administration. This sphere of analysis is related to the above, although it differs in that it specifically refers to public administration. It is related with aspects such as: the incorporation or otherwise of new information technologies in the management of public institutions; criteria for appointing and selecting personnel, civil servants and public officials; professionalisation and technical training for carrying out their functions; the lack of staff appraisal and training mechanisms; the incomplete incorporation of process management, monitoring and evaluation of outcomes; lack of procedures for the reception of intra- and extra-institutional complaints and grievances; the incentives public officials may have for transparent, ethical and responsible management (e.g., stability conditional on efficiency among the employees and public officials); the existence or otherwise of operations handbooks; the lack of transparency policies and access to public information at all levels; permeability towards oversight boards and citizens' participation; inefficient control of public spending processes; short-term policy criteria; and, in particular, an inactive and uncommitted participation by control bodies.

d) Distinctive characteristics of social programmes and the management model applied in each of them. Social programmes differ from each other for a variety of reasons: they may be universal or focalised in relation to their target group; centralised or decentralised in relation to their management model. There are also differences concerning the origin of the financing; the type of resource they distribute;²³ the distribution mechanisms and instances. They may have citizens, civil society organisations or local governments as strategic players; and they may or may not have monitoring processes. They also differ in whether they incorporate oversight groups or user committees; if they have transparency processes and access to information, and whether national and local programme administrators enjoy job security and are employed by a government instance or, whether they are of free dismissal and appointment. A programme with budgetary preallocations, which in the opinion of many authors is a disincentive to clientelism, may be more sensitive to it and may perpetuate it if there are no technical distribution and monitoring mechanisms. On the other hand, a programme with no preallocations and which is financed with international credits, contrary to general opinion, could be just as clientelist if the unregulated participation of local players is established in the management model. In general, it is more likely that a programme that has user committees or oversight groups is less susceptible to clientelism than one that lacks these participation mechanisms. Likewise, it is more probable that a programme that is administered by appointed employees at each change of government will be more vulnerable to political clientelism, as are the programmes that do not have transparency processes and access to information. We shall halt here and discuss the characteristics of focalisation and decentralisation in greater depth below, but we stress that

²² These arguments arise in response to own studies and to the legal and political literature. At no time have they been subjected to full and complete verification, which will be left to a later study.

²³ There are two main types of social programme: **social funds** and **transfers directed to specific groups** (Pereyra, n/d).

the vulnerability or otherwise to clientelist management of a programme is given, in general, by the different combinations that may emerge from these characteristics.

II. NEITHER GIFTS NOR BLACKMAIL IN EXCHANGE FOR YOUR VOTE. THE EXPERIENCE

The analysis described in brief above is the referential framework that promotes strategies to combat clientelism in social policy and social programmes.

Studies on political and electoral clientelism in Ecuador are scarce, however, all of them in some way identify clientelism as a customary practice between political players to mobilise support and generate political loyalties.

Grupo FARO, a public policy centre in Ecuador, promoted an initiative to combat clientelism in social programmes as a result of the multiple reports of corruption and clientelism in the administration of discredited president Lucio Gutiérrez. The initiative promoted and executed by Grupo FARO to prevent electoral clientelism in elections and post-election political clientelism in general, was Ecuador's first experience in combating clientelism.

In this section we intend to describe the background to the initiative, its objectives, phases, outcomes obtained and its constraints. A subsequent section summarises the endogenous and exogenous aspects that allowed knowledge to be placed at the service of poorer sectors in Ecuadorian society.

A) BACKGROUND

A suitable analysis of the events preceding the application of the initiative to combat political clientelism in social programmes by the Public Policy Centre should focus on the years 2000-2006. In the opinion of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 2008), a period characterised by four major elements: i) the socio-economic and political crisis at the end of the 90s, ii) the dollarisation of the economy; iii) the increase in oil prices; and, iv) political instability.

The first of the factors, the crisis at the end of the 90s, was among others the result of the enforcement of measures of structural adjustment and instability in the price of the dollar. It basically appeared with the crisis in the financial system that included the unpopular measure to freeze deposits by the government of Jamil Mahuad. In consequence, the period was accompanied by economic recession,²⁴ increased unemployment and under-employment,²⁵ cuts in wages and purchasing power, worsening poverty levels²⁶, social instability and growth in the migratory process²⁷.

²⁴ According to an IDB report, in 1999 GDP per capita fell over 7% and Ecuador faced the most serious economic contraction in 30 years. It was only in 2004 that the trend was reversed and income per capita returned to levels prior to the crisis.

²⁵ According to data from the System of Social Indicators (SIISE), under-employment rose from 42% in 1998 to approximately 57% in 1999 and 60% in 2000. According to the IDB, unemployment doubled from 8.5% in May 1998 to 16.9% in June 1999. (SIISE).

In the year 2000, against this backdrop and in an attempt to stabilise inflation, promote economic growth and reduce interest rates, the then president of the Republic, Jamil Mahuad Witt decreed the dollarisation of the economy, replacing the national currency – the sucre – with the United States dollar. Popular dissatisfaction at these and other macroeconomic measures of the Mahuad government, such as the elimination of subsidies, provoked a revolt by organised civil society players, NGOs, citizen movements, but fundamentally by the indigenous movement and a few rebellious military men, among whom was Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, who acquired a protagonism that would allow him then to stand for office and win the 2003 elections.

A constitutional exit to the institutional and democratic rupture was found by allowing the then vice-president Gustavo Noboa to assume the presidency. Noboa's macroeconomic policy followed the path set out by his predecessor²⁸ and, in general, from 2002 was characterised by a stable economy and relative economic growth. In 2003, outsider²⁹ Lucio Gutiérrez took over and his short period in office (January 2003 – April 2005) was to be marked by a fairly favourable external shock as a result of high oil prices³⁰. Moreover, inflation and interest rates fell significantly, the current account went into the black, the fiscal situation improved considerably in the non-financial public sector, fiscal results were generally positive and, the economy grew at rates not even seen in the previous two decades (IDB, 2008).

Despite Ecuador's growth and greater economic stability in 2005, the political crisis that had started with the fall of President Mahuad in January 2000³¹ was still the great obstacle to the full functioning of the State and political system. The weakness of the Gutiérrez government, which had little legislative support, worsened after the 2004 local elections in which the government party –Sociedad Patriótica (Patriotic Society)- scored badly after its attempts to reorganise the Electoral Supreme Tribunal, the Constitutional Tribunal and remove the Supreme Court. This allowed former president Abdalá Bucaram to return from exile in Panama and face criminal lawsuits.³²

²⁶ The percentage of persons living below the poverty line increased 32%, rising from 39.4% in 1995 to 52% in 1999.

²⁷ The number of Ecuadorians who emigrated for employment reasons rose threefold between 1998 and 2000, from approximately 34,000 to 121,000 (SIISE)

²⁸ Noboa implemented dollarisation, renegotiated the foreign debt after the moratorium on the Brady bonds decreed by Mahuad and signed the first stand-by agreement with the IMF since the 80s (IDB, 2008)

²⁹ Lucio Gutiérrez was unknown in national politics and he was first able to stand for election in 2003 thanks to his role in the uprising of 21 January 2000 which overthrew former president Jamil Mahuad

³⁰ Although Ecuador is the world's second largest producer of bananas and a significant exporter of flowers, the Ecuadorian economy is decided by oil revenue, which represented 27% of the government budget and 60% of exports in 2006. On the world market, between the minimum price of December 1998 and the peak in July 2006, the price of a barrel of Ecuadorian oil rose over 780%.

³¹ The political crisis became visible with the fall of populist leader and former president Abdalá Bucaram.

³² The criminal lawsuits against Bucaram and Noboa were declared null and void.

It should be stressed that despite the considerable rise in gross domestic product (GDP), the Gutiérrez government witnessed decreasing public investment compared to GDP. However, wages rose considerably, regardless of the Organic Law of Liability, Stabilisation and Fiscal Transparency (LOREYTF), which restricted public indebtedness and established technical criteria to maintain fiscal equilibrium.³³

In April 2005, after several denunciations of corruption and nepotism, the participation of the self-termed “outlaws” in the capital of the Republic was launched. They got Congress to declare Gutiérrez’s exit and to place power in the hands of his vice-president, Alfredo Palacios. At a time of unrest and political instability the use of resources and public institutions to promote acts of support for the President were visible. The best known cases among social programmes were Aliméntate Ecuador and Child Rescue Operation (Operation de Rescate Infantil, ORI). Coombs (in Carrillo & Gruenberg, 2006) mentions the case of the Minister of Social Welfare, Antonio Vargas, who was accused of manipulating funds of the social programmes without authorisation, and using them for political purposes. He also highlights the abuse made by the minister when he took a million dollars from two aid programmes for children in poverty to build football stadiums, and transferred 10 million dollars from the Nuestros Niños (now the Child Development Fund, FODI) to the Child Rescue Operation Programme (ORI). Thus, the new Government and state institutions replaced public officials in the main state portfolios, in an attempt to “cleanse” the public administration of the vestiges of Gutiérrez’s time in office.

The use of clientelist strategies in the Gutiérrez government occurred in a context of fiscal stability and macro-economic growth, but also one of a high perception of corruption in the Government. Political actors in general did not respond to the assumption that greater stability and economic growth are the same as greater democratic stability. As Schedler (2004) points out, if economic deterioration coincides with corruption and self-enrichment grows excessively, clientelist networks tend towards autism and their efficacy decreases. This argument appears to explain the inefficacy of the strategies of the Sociedad Patriótica party and Gutiérrez’s fall.³⁴

Lucio Gutiérrez’s fall from power opened a window of opportunity in a society that had just witnessed (and repudiated) practices so obviously based on the manipulation of social programmes in favour of a political party. Against this background, Grupo FARO identified opportunities for clientelism in certain social programmes and began to work

³³ According to a BID report, the annual percentage rise in primary expenditure, set at a maximum of 3.5%, reached 10% in 2004 and 14% in 2005. This led the government of Alfredo Palacios (Gutiérrez’s former running mate) to reform the LOREYTF under the argument that the law prioritised current spending to the detriment of social investment.

³⁴ It must be recognised that Gutiérrez applied his clientelist strategies mainly in rural areas and outlying provinces and it was basically middle class sectors from Quito that brought about his downfall. This would be corroborated by the Citizens’ Participation study (2007), which says: “The reasons for the downfall of Bucaram and Mahuad are very “popular” in terms of acceptance while in the case of Gutiérrez, the institutional disruption had never been a question that moved the masses (...) The errors committed by Gutiérrez ‘weren’t that serious’ and did not justify his fall. This is an opinion shared by groups from all the cities, except among Quito professionals.”

jointly with two of them: Aliméntate Ecuador and Maternidad Gratuita. This experience of work promoted the initiative we are analysing in this study and, in particular, sought to combat electoral clientelism in the programmes at the 2006 presidential elections and, in general, in political clientelism after the elections.

As Coombs³⁵ says, clientelism is not a new phenomenon in Ecuador, and in Gruenberg's analysis, was not it an exclusive practice of Gutiérrez, although in his government clientelist strategies may have degenerated into corruption and become blatant. In May 2005, one month after the fall of Gutiérrez, Grupo FARO launched an assessment process of nine social programmes: Human Development Bond (Bono de Desarrollo Humano, BDH); Nuestros Niños (now FODI); Child Rescue Operation (ORI); School Feeding Programme (Programa de Alimentation Escolar, PAE); Aliméntate Ecuador Programme (AE); Emergency Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Inversion Social de Emergencia, FISE); System of Urban-Marginal and Rural Housing Incentives (Sistema de Incentivos a la Vivienda Urbano-Marginal y Rural, SIV); Free Maternity Programme (Programa de Maternidad Gratuita, PMG); Food and Nutrition Programme (Programa de Alimentation y Nutrition, PANN 2000). By 2006, the joint budget for social programmes destined to Ecuador's poorest reached 351 million dollars of the national budget and 41% of the central government's budget (Grupo FARO, 2007: 3)³⁶.

In the initial diagnosis, Grupo FARO identified the following constraints in the social programmes:

- i) Access to information. Of the nine programmes evaluated, only three supplied budgetary information, despite the Organic Law on Access to Public Information (LOTAIP).
- ii) Citizens' participation. Grupo FARO discovered that although the programmes contemplated certain instances of social participation, it was in fact almost inexistent or was limited to certain stages of management and assessment.
- iii) Complaint mechanisms. It was found that only four programmes had mechanisms to receive and process claims. In these cases, there were problems of efficacy.
- iv) Alliances with external actors. Grupo FARO identified that some social programmes incorporated a variety of local and social actors in their management model but that these alliances failed to prevent clientelism.

In response, the public policy centre proposed "to place the issue of transparency and the prevention of political clientelism on the agenda of these programmes" and considered that the moment of greatest impact would be the 2006 presidential elections (Grupo FARO, 2007).

³⁵ Coombs reveals that in Ecuador it is common practice, like "recommendations" of beneficiaries in programmes, putting pressure on administrators to replace personnel with friends and political allies. This claim was corroborated by a great number of interviewees for this case study.

³⁶ See characteristics of the programmes in the summarised Matrix, Table 2 (Annex).

B) PHASES, OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The initiative to combat political clientelism in social programmes contemplated two main moments: a) signing of the Transparency Agreement; and b) monitoring of the Transparency Agreement.

1 Transparency Agreement

On 14 July 2006, after a *lobby* process with the directors of the social programmes made by the Grupo FARO, the coordinators of the nine social programmes³⁷, Grupo FARO, five civil society organisations [Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP); Participación Ciudadana (PC); Centro Ecuatoriano de Derecho Ambiental (CEDA); Centro de Planificación y Estudios Sociales (CEPLAES); Coalition Acceso and Youth Employment Summit (Yes-Ecuador)] and, as witnesses of honour, the General Comptroller of the State, the Minister of Social Welfare, the Minister of Economy and Finance, the Minister of Education and Culture, and Pablo Salazar, Technical Secretary of the Frente Social, signed what was called “**Commitment agreement for the transparency and protection of the public funds of social programmes during election campaigns**”.

The agreement established that, in representation of the signing civil society organisations, Grupo FARO pledged to draw up an “assessment document of the results of the agreement after the 2006 presidential elections”³⁸. Grupo FARO committed its professional, technical, non-partisan, honest, impartial and transparent work. Meanwhile, the social programmes undertook “not to allow any public official, or organisation working directly with the social programmes in the provision of services, to use public resources destined to the programme for political ends in the 2006 election campaign” with the following measures:

- Raise awareness and inform of the signing of the agreement to local public officials, and the organisations with which they work directly in the central and provincial offices of the social programmes, on the concept and social, political and economic consequences of clientelism and the obligation to denounce such cases.
- Reprogramme awarding of support and public events, without affecting the beneficiaries, or obstructing the operating processes of the programmes, to prevent and reduce opportunities for political manipulation.
- Make it obligatory to protect the pool of vehicles, except if the Supreme Electoral Tribunal decides otherwise, for their use during the electoral process from the day prior to the polls, in order to avoid possible electoral use.
- Strengthening citizen processes on oversight boards in each of the social programmes participating in the programme.
- Activation of complaint mechanisms: 1800 line; electronic mail, telephone number, etc.

³⁷ Under the Housing Incentives System (SIV), the coordinators of the urban-marginal SIV and the rural SIV signed the agreement.

³⁸ Document: “Acuerdo de compromiso para la transparencia y protección de fondos públicos de programas sociales en campaña electoral”, signed on 14 July 2006. (Institutional Archives of Grupo FARO).

- Mass diffusion campaign on the signing of this agreement and its form of operation through accessible and possible media for the programme.
- Submitting to civil society the results of the complaints mechanisms during the campaign, taking into account the right to privacy of the accusers.
- Denouncing possible political pressure to divert resources for clientelist purposes.
- Strengthen and improve transparency and access to information, in compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP).

Objectives of the Agreement

The referential context of the objectives of the Transparency Agreement was the New Public Management approach and its principal postulates, such as strengthening, improving and innovating management processes, accountability, human resources, transparency, and incorporating the actors involved in the public policy formulation process.

Objective 1: Raise awareness and inform public officials on clientelism in social programmes.

This objective sought to generate commitments with local public officials to encourage them “to become key players in the fight against this practice and its consequences”. To do so, “a basic letter”³⁹ on clientelism was drawn up to be sent by the social programmes to their local offices and agents.

Objective 2. Carry out a mass diffusion campaign on the signing of the agreement and the consequences of clientelism on the beneficiaries.

This aimed to inform beneficiaries that the programmes are free of charge and highlight that fact that they are not the property or work of any candidate but are State actions. To do so, a communications strategy was established based on: a) placing the issue on the agenda of the media; b) broadcasting of a radio slot; c) national diffusion of “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote”, d) training beneficiaries. The last two activities received the support of the social programmes.

Objective 3. Reform and improve transparency and access to information through compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP).

Using a methodology designed by Grupo FARO, it was planned to monitor compliance with Article 7 of the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP) which makes the diffusion of public information through a web portal compulsory.

2 Monitoring the Transparency Agreement


The monitoring of compliance with these three objectives used different social research tools: participatory observation, in-depth interviews and quantitative and qualitative analysis

³⁹ See Document 1 (ANNEX)

of the information. The greatest innovation in the monitoring of the Transparency Agreement was probably the creation of a *ranking* of commitment to the agreement by the participating programmes. As we shall see, a *ranking* is an incentive because it generates competition between institutions. However, in this case its poor diffusion as a mechanism to present the results of compliance with the agreement did not allow greater impact, although among some of the programmes certain competition was perceived⁴⁰. The results arrived at in the monitoring phase were the following:

Objective 1, raising awareness and informing. For compliance with this objective it was requested that the programmes distribute among their local offices and spaces of coverage the poster “*Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote*”, and a communication that informed of the signing of the Transparency Agreement. To measure compliance, the Grupo FARO team made telephone calls and visits to provincial offices of the social programmes. The first measuring exercise threw up the following results:

Graph N°3: Compliance with the objective to raise awareness and inform



Source: Grupo FARO, from the Monitoring Data Base, Grupo FARO (2006).


Graph 3 reveals that the programme with greatest compliance, with 96%, was Aliméntate Ecuador (AE) and with the least, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) with 53%. It should be remembered that Aliméntate Ecuador was the programme most affected by the denunciations of political clientelism and corruption during the Gutiérrez government. However, other programmes such as Alimentation Escolar (PAE) and the Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil, took their own initiatives. For example, the PAE prepared a poster

⁴⁰ All interviewees claimed not to know of the *ranking* of social programmes. However, all in some way stressed as an incentive the participation of other social programmes. They also spoke of the need for the programme coordinators to compare themselves with similar programmes. This occurred particularly in the food and nutrition programmes (PAE and AE), and in child care programmes (ORI and FODI).

illustrating the characteristics of the programme, which read: “¡Señor candidato: en mi platito no meta la manito” (Mr Candidate: get your hands off my bowl!)⁴¹. The ORI, meanwhile, took the following additional measures for the executive units: a) those persons working in institutions should resign from their positions prior to presenting their candidatures; and b) the drawing up of an Ethics Agreement for the executive organisations. The National Coordinator pointed out that instructions were even given for local teachers not to appear in photographs at events since they belong exclusively to the beneficiary population⁴². Activities such as these were initiatives taken by the social programmes themselves, although unfortunately the measuring methodology for the objective to raise awareness and inform about the Transparency Agreement did not include recognition of the additional initiatives. If they had been measured, the FODI and PAE programmes would probably have received a higher result. In general, average compliance with this objective was 78.11%.

In order to comply with the second objective on the diffusion campaign two principal strategies were executed: a) in the media with national radio slots, interviews on different national radio broadcasters⁴³ press conferences in which Grupo FARO and Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil informed about the content of the Transparency Agreement, giving the telephone numbers and mechanisms to present complaints and denunciations; and b) information and training workshops for national technical experts (ORI); directors (FODI); user committees in national forums (PMG), and local training exercises to publicise the fact that the programme is free of charge (BDH). The support of the Technical Secretariat of the Frente Social, directed by economist Pablo Salazar, who collaborated with the printing of 2000 copies of the campaign poster was important⁴⁴. The general results in measuring compliance with the diffusion campaign were:

Graph N°4: Compliance with the objective of publicising the Transparency Agreement



⁴¹ Interview with economist Justo Tobar, National Coordinator of the PAE.

⁴² Interview with economist Francisco Carrión, National Coordinator of the FODI Programme.

⁴³ Basically, the interviews and radio slots were broadcast on AM frequency, which has greater impact in rural sectors. Access to the FM frequency of greater coverage in urban sectors is very costly, so was not used.

⁴⁴ In all 8000 campaign posters were distributed to the programmes for subnational diffusion.


Programmes

Source: Grupo FARO, from the Monitoring Data Base, Grupo FARO (2007).

Graph 4 shows the level of compliance with the second objective of the Agreement. It can be seen that the Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición (PANN 2000, Food and Nutrition Programme) had the lowest qualification and that, on the contrary, the best qualifications (100%) were obtained by the programmes Aliméntate Ecuador (AE), Fondo de Inversión Social (FISE, Social Investment Fund), and the Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE, School Feeding Programme). In general average compliance was 88.11%.

Assessment of the third objective on compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP), was made in two measuring exercises⁴⁵: the first meant that a report could be produced to include recommendations and it was submitted to the programmes for consideration. The second, a month later, assessed progress in publicising the information through electronic portals. In its report on the experience, Grupo FARO highlights the efforts of some programmes such as ORI and AE to increase the quantity of information published on their respective portals, and recognises the impossibility of compliance by the Maternidad Gratuita programme, which at the time did not have its own web and publicised information on the programme on the Ministry of Public Health's page. The results of compliance of the third objective appear in **Graph 5**.

Graph N°5: Compliance with the LOTAIP



Source: Grupo FARO (2007).


Graph 5 reveals that five of the nine social programmes increased their level of compliance with the LOTAIP in the second measuring exercise (AE, FISE, ORI, FODI, PAE). Although the improvement of the web portals in compliance with the LOTAIP cannot be

⁴⁵ The first assessment was made during the week 20 to 25 August 2006, and the second in the week 20 to 24 November.

directly assigned to the intervention of Grupo FARO, it is worth mentioning that when interviewing the administrators of four of the five social programmes (AE, FODI, PAE and ORI) that reported an improvement after the first assessment, they related the changes and improvement in web portals to the intervention of Grupo FARO. The Coordinators of the FODI and Aliméntate Ecuador programmes indicated that the support of Grupo FARO was crucial for the improvement of the web pages, and they stressed that, besides oversight and counterpart, Grupo FARO became an advisor for this purpose.

Objective three was measured again in June 2007 to establish changes in compliance with the LOTAIP on the publication of information on the web portals. The results appear below:

Graph N°6: Comparative monitoring of the second and third measuring exercise of compliance with the LOTAIP



Source: Grupo FARO, 2007)⁴⁶.

Made six months later, the last measuring exercise shows that, in general, compliance with the LOTAIP rose in the programmes. This can be observed in the case of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH, Human Development Bond) and the Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición PANN 2000 (see **Graph 6**). However, in the second measuring exercise these programmes were in the process of being redesigned⁴⁷. So, in Aliméntate Ecuador (AE) there is a fall in the level of compliance, a situation that could result from the change in National Coordinator⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ The comparative results for ORI do not appear due to lack of access to the results of the third measuring exercise.

⁴⁷ See La Llave Ciudadana, 2007.

⁴⁸ The National Coordinator of Aliméntate Ecuador, engineer Richard Espinosa, was probably fundamental in carrying out the initiative, according to members of the Grupo FARO team. This was corroborated when during the interview with him empowerment and knowledge of the phases of the experience were clear.

3 Ranking of compliance with the Transparency Agreement

Grupo FARO drew up a ranking of compliance with the Agreement as an incentive to attain greater commitment from the social programmes participating. On this point, this case study based itself on the hypothesis that the ranking was a decisive incentive to participate in the Agreement and carry out the pledged activities. However, as mentioned above, the impact of the ranking as a tool of comparison between the programmes was less than expected. Nevertheless, in the interviews with the actors involved it could be established that the administrators of the social programmes knew that the level of compliance among all the programmes would be assessed and, of course, nobody, particularly in similar programmes, wished to be left out. However, on being consulted as to their knowledge of the ranking as such and the measuring methodology⁴⁹, none of the interviewees responded correctly, which leads to the conclusion that a perception of competition between programmes existed but there was no empowerment of the ranking as an assessment tool.

Chart N°1: Ranking of compliance with the Transparency Agreement

Programmes	Objective 1 Raise awareness and inform (in %)	Objective 2 Diffusion campaign (in %)	Objective 3 Compliance with the LOTAIP (in %)	Total %
AE	96	100	77	91
SIV	91	92	67	83
ORI	88	90	67	82
FISE	57	100	70	76
PAE	93	100	20	71
FODI	82	92	20	65
PMG	88	73	20	60
BDH	53	87	20	53
PANN	55	59	7	40

Source: Grupo FARO, (2007)

The results of the *ranking* of compliance show that the programme that received the best results was Aliméntate Ecuador (AE), followed by the Incentivo a la Vivienda (SIV, Housing Incentive) and Operación de Rescate Infantil (ORI, Child Rescue Operation) programmes;

⁴⁹ The interviewees often referred to the measuring exercise for the third objective: compliance with the LOTAIP. It seems that administrators perceived more strongly the monitoring of the improvement in the web portals. Consequently, there was a positive feedback effect which occurred from the socialisation of the results of the first measuring exercise.

and the programmes with the lowest percentages were the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) and the Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición (PANN).

It should be stressed that there is an important correlation: the best qualified programmes as to compliance with the agreement (AE, SIV, ORI, FISE) are those that had a strong history of corruption, clientelist management or manipulation. By exploring the motivations of the social programme administrators to participate in the initiative, the interviewees revealed, among other things, their interest in showing the changes the new administrations were enforcing to make programme management and use of public resources more transparent, and the need to recover the legitimacy lost in the corruption scandals. Lastly, the *ranking* shows that the programmes with the lowest qualifications in compliance had the least incentives to participate in the initiative. So, the Maternidad Gratuita programme had been working on transparency with the Grupo FARO and had the “user committees” as participation and social oversight mechanisms; the Human Development Bond, in fact felt no greater effects because it had not observed danger of clientelism in the programme. In that respect, the National Coordinator indicated that the characteristics of the programme are filters for clientelist management, since the focalisation tool (basis for the Selection of Beneficiaries - SELBEN-) does not allow politicians to manipulate or interfere in the selection of beneficiaries, although there are errors which need to be corrected.⁵⁰ The Programa de Nutrición y Alimentación (PANN) lends itself very little to political management, given the characteristics of its management model through the Health Units of the Provincial Directorates of the Ministry of Health, but fundamentally due to the type of resources it distributes (“mi papilla” and “mi bebida”)⁵¹. Its problems mostly lie in the programme’s ineffectiveness.

Two programmes, the Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil (FODI, Child Development Fund) and the Alimentación Escolar (PAE, School Feeding Programme), have an average result in the *ranking* of compliance due to the low values they obtained in measuring compliance with objective three, related to publicising the information on the web pages, and despite the commitment and high qualifications obtained in measuring the first two objectives. Remember that these two programmes had additional initiatives concerning the Agreement⁵².

C) ON THE KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE USED IN THE EXPERIENCE

Grupo FARO echoed the studies made after the “Corruption as an Impediment to Social Development” seminar, organised by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and

⁵⁰ The field work revealed that the Bono de Desarrollo Humano is more prone to discursive clientelist management. The political actors (local councils, mayors) usually offer inclusion to people from rural sectors, and although this may not be possible, ignorance as to how to access the programme among citizens gives rise to confusion. The population is not fully informed as to the focalisation mechanism and tool.

⁵¹ MI PAPILLA is a food rich in proteins, vitamins and minerals, to ensure good child development from six months of age. It is a powder to prepare a purée, for children from 6 months and 2 years. MI BEBIDA is a delicious feeding alternative for pregnant women and mothers who breastfeed.

⁵² The best rated Alimentación Escolar (AE) programme implemented a strong diffusion strategy among local actors (local councils) through awareness-raising and training workshops.

CIPPEC in 2005. Studies such as those by Victoria Pereyra, Christian Gruenberg, Gustavo Merino, Alejandro Urizar and Cristian Gruenberg, and Elizabeth Coombs revealed the limits of efficiency of the social programmes as a result of clientelist practices⁵³.

By 2006, Grupo FARO had managed to position itself as a leading and pioneering organisation in the promotion of transparency and accountability in public administration. In addition, it received public acknowledgement of its impartiality, as highlighted by interviewees, an aspect that afforded it legitimacy and allowed it to open spaces in the State as a counterbalance in order to facilitate improvement processes and innovation in institutional practices.

As we know, knowledge is accumulative and comes from a variety of sources. The experience “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” responds to the prior use of evidence and learning to influence in the public administration accumulated by Grupo FARO. In the case analysed, Grupo FARO used three sources of evidence: a) the studies and research mentioned which highlighted previous experiences of combating clientelism; b) its own research and assessments made by the public policy centre with nine of the social programmes to discover opportunities for clientelism after the denunciations of corruption made during the Lucio Gutiérrez government; and c) the experience of previous work with the public administration that Grupo FARO had accumulated. Besides, Grupo FARO had the support of experts who, no doubt, facilitated the incorporation of prior knowledge and learning in the Ecuadorian case.

The theoretical contributions and the empirical studies of clientelism in social programmes made in other countries revealed several characteristics that Grupo FARO found in the Ecuadorian case when assessing social programmes: the growing invisibility of the problem of clientelism in social programmes, constraints in access to information and diffusion; weak participation of citizen actors who were beneficiaries of the social programmes, and inexistence or inefficacy of complaint mechanisms in the programmes.

1) Growing invisibility of clientelism in social programmes

The desired link between democracy and development is not mechanical, nor is it the automatic result of having free and competitive elections. On the contrary, it responds to dialectic dynamics and a long construction process. While the field work to establish the characteristics of the experience documented here was going ahead, we deemed it necessary to approach the citizens and explore responses to questions like: what perception do Ecuadorians have of political clientelism⁵⁴? It was assumed that responses to this question would allow us to analyse the efficacy of the strategy to combat political clientelism designed and executed by Grupo FARO with the social programmes.

It is outside the purposes of this investigation to analyse in depth the perceptions of citizens regarding clientelism in social programmes, but we believe it appropriate to explore certain elements that arose from the work and that are supported by a paper by Martínez

⁵³ See studies by the authors mentioned in Carrillo & Gruenberg (n/d).

⁵⁴ Schedler (2004) sees the danger of taking for granted immoral economic by lower-class voters as a variable that explains the political effectiveness of clientelism in social programmes.

(1999) and the qualitative study of citizens' perceptions and attitudes on Ecuadorian democracy made by the Corporation Participation Ciudadana (2007). We shall conclude and propose that three main visions of clientelism exist among Ecuadorian citizens:

Utilitarian vision. Martínez (1999) finds that, for many urban inhabitants, the corruption of politicians is useful since they notice that only at campaign times are they interested in their situation. Therefore, the campaign is an opportunity to solve problems that would not have received attention either before or after the elections, such as access to water.

"Water is a political tool; the pipes are in place, the work is done (...), he who is promoting himself will give drinking water." (Martínez, 1999) Workshop report in Isla Trinitaria.

The following are opinions of Ecuadorians on clientelism quoted in the study by Participation Ciudadana (2007) mentioned above:

"It's a good business." "It is for many people." "They can get you a job." "I've never been on a campaign. My granny who got divorced never had a job, and we said nobody will let you work in their house, go and join a political party, but she said no, I'm not good enough. No gran, you're smart, you'll get something, and she joined a political party, and went off to meetings in Quito, got friendly with a lot of people and when that party won, I don't remember who, they made her a teacher and then she separated." "It's to make contacts and get a job." (Group of women from Cuenca).

In this utilitarian vision, clientelism is perceived as a good business to win favours, positions or gifts both among the poorest people and in the middle classes, where exchange goods are different and argue the case for work contracts, for instance.

"They don't give anything away now, they give you a position. When Lucio joined there was a girl of 19 working in customs and she didn't know a thing. She was earning 800 dollars and didn't know a thing. She studied journalism." (Group of professionals, Guayaquil).

So, among the persons of least resources and those that suffer greatest instability there is more vulnerability and the utilitarian clientelist relationship takes on the form of a palliative for survival, according to the Participation Ciudadana document (2007). "In the case of the poorest, it is a question of survival: they wear the T-shirt, the rice feeds them for a good while, the *fiesta* is the chance to 'have a good time' free", Participation Ciudadana (2007: 59).

"I voted for Marcelo Cabrera because I was earning 100 for all the campaign and he said to me take 50 so you can buy food until my campaign's over, and like me there were loads. It's the despair." "It's being in need, there are no jobs and no Money so a politician comes along and offers these things." (Group of men, Cuenca).

“Populism takes advantage of the poor people.” “They go off with chickens, rice, fish.” “The poor people do, especially the Ashuar people.” “In the most vulnerable parts.” (Group of adults, Macas).

However, this utilitarian reality does not assume total and complete efficacy in clientelist strategies, since as Schedler (2004) finds, citizens may accept the goods or resources given by the clientelist politician, but not give him their vote or respond with political loyalty. In fact, the “clients” may be well aware of the “patron’s” intention and may respond with logical revenge:

“Revenge (...) is a form of paying politicians back with a taste of their own medicine: they’re always taking advantage of the people, but the people can only take advantage of the politicians at election time, and make them spend money on presents and parties, taking back a little of the money they ‘steal.’ They use clientelism to return the trickery: the politicians fool the people with their offers which are all lies and the people fool the 4 politicians by receiving the presents but not voting for them.” (Participation ciudadana, 2007: 59).

“There is a community and about seven candidates came along. They prepare their own posters, but they’re crooks” (Group of youngsters, Macas).

“They trick us with money”. “They give us 5 dollars and they get the vote”. “I take the money but they don’t get my vote” (Group of women. San Lorenzo).

Assistentialist vision. It was mentioned above that political and institutional clientelism has as a breeding ground a fractured culture in citizenship and weak empowerment of the notion of “rights” in public management. In the perceptions of the beneficiaries, on seeing how favours or goods are awarded by political players who have access to public funds, the situation becomes more acute. It is common for beneficiaries to perceive that the resources of the social programmes or services they receive from the public administration are a “favour” or “help” given by political administrators. Claims like the following are frequently heard:

“The Mayor has brought work,” or “The politicians and political intriguers don’t support anything, they offer but don’t do a thing, they should. They should support us at least in self-help, but we haven’t seen a thing. The Environment Ministry gives no support either, they just come up to Lago Cuicocha, but do nothing for the communities.” Martínez (1999).

“They expect politicians to help them, they see the social programmes as help from the administrators, so that’s why we had to work to let them know that it’s not a favour we’re doing them but our duty, an obligation” (Programme Coordinator interviewed).

So, the performance of state bodies and the administration of the politicians are associated with the concept of “help”, there is no empowerment of rights. If goods or works are not delivered by local politicians it is seen as a denial of help.

Critical but naturalised vision. It is worrying that, in general, citizens clearly see clientelism as “*gifts from candidates at election campaign time.*”⁵⁵ That is to say that most of the Ecuadorian population identifies what is known as dense clientelism, but they do not notice other mechanisms of vote manipulation, even less so in social programmes. Dense clientelism is a practice that many find disagreeable although that does not imply that it is not used. On the contrary, as Andrade (2004) says, it has become “a constant and organising institution of political action”. This view implies a critical naturalisation of practices of dense clientelism, while the unidentified others are made to seem routine and acceptable as happens with acts of clientelism or vote manipulation in social programmes. This speaks of the existence of institutional clientelism that has made of its practices a social and political rule in the heart of the logic of the functioning of the programme and the actions of citizens. Thus, any initiative to combat clientelism defined previously as the need to conceptualise the category and raise awareness in actors involved as to its implications in social policies.

ii) On limits in the access to information and diffusion

The evidence revealed that lack of knowledge as to the benefits and management model of social programmes among the citizens and direct beneficiaries boosted weak citizen empowerment regarding their rights. For this reason, a first step in combating clientelism was to raise awareness among officials on the programmes regarding the need to inform citizens as to the benefits and mechanisms of distribution in the social programmes, presenting them as citizens’ rights and not as favours from politicians or incumbent authorities. In addition, although laws exist to promote and oblige the management of the programmes to make them more transparent and to publicise important information, there was no institutionalised practice of publicising and disseminating information on the programmes. At the signing of the Transparency Agreement, only three of the nine programmes provided information on their budgets. Previous experiences and methodologies to measure compliance with the provisions of the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Information gave the team technical support to promote compliance.

iii) Specific actions at election time

The study made by Gustavo Merino in the Social Development Programmes in México revealed as positive certain strategies used by the Ministry of Social Development to combat clientelism. In the diagnosis on social programmes in Ecuador, Grupo FARO identified the opportunity to include in the Transparency Agreement some of these initiatives, like the commitment of social programme coordinators to limit the use of vehicles, as well as the promotion and distribution of the benefits of the social programmes at election time.

⁵⁵ *Participación Ciudadana* (2007)

iv) Weak citizen participation in the management of social programmes

Previous evidence showed that social programmes are more susceptible to political manipulation when there is no participation by citizens and direct beneficiaries in the management of the programmes (Carrillo & Gruenberg, n/d). Grupo FARO previously worked with the Aliméntate Ecuador and the Maternidad Gratuita programmes, and confirmed that, by promoting the empowerment of local actors to oversee the processes of distribution of benefits from the programmes, clientelist management was restricted. This experience showed that it was not sufficient to incorporate local actors in some phase of programme management, but that it was vital to train citizens in their role and responsibility in the success and efficacy of the programme and ensuring their commitment to permanent monitoring.

v) Mechanisms to receive and process complaints

Grupo FARO identified a lack of mechanisms for the reception and processing of complaints in most social programmes and, in the cases in which a mechanism existed, in the web for example, they were ineffective. So, considering that the first step to combat clientelism was to disseminate the social programmes as regards to rights, it was vital to encourage in some cases the incorporation of tools for the reception of complaints and, in others, to perfect existing mechanisms. However, the final assessment of the experience reveals weak impact as regards promoting better and more effective complaints mechanisms, although it helped reveal the importance of establishing systems of reception of complaints by using knowledge on experiences implemented in other countries, like the case of the Programa Oportunidades in México (Merino, n/d).

D) USING EVIDENCE TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC DECISIONS

Chart 2 details the type of knowledge used by Grupo FARO in the experience “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote”. It mentions as exogenous sources those from theory and other case studies and, as endogenous sources, the knowledge acquired in the systematisation of the programme diagnoses and previous learning.

Chart N°2: Knowledge and evidence used in the experience

Topics	Knowledge/evidence	Source
Concept and effects of clientelism.	The concept of clientelism is diffuse and has to do with the context.	Exogenous and endogenous
	Clientelism reduces the efficacy of social programmes and is an attack on the poorest sectors.	
	In Ecuador there is a problem of growing invisibility of clientelism in social programmes.	
Transparency and access to information.	Access to public information is the most effective mechanism to promote transparency.	Endogenous and exogenous
	Access to information and transparency are “antidotes” for corruption and clientelism.	
	Compliance with legal provision on access to information promotes	

Topics	Knowledge/evidence	Source
	changes in the public administration culture.	
Diffusion of information on social programmes.	Diffusion of social programmes as rights discourages clientelism and promotes citizenship.	Exogenous
	Citizens informed of the benefits of the programmes, criteria and processes of selection of beneficiaries as well as distribution mechanisms are less susceptible to clientelist manipulation.	
	The diffusion strategies that use simple messages may be successful in the proposals to combat clientelism in social programmes.	
Clientelism at election time.	The Mexican experience (Merino n/d) showed successful outcomes by prohibiting the promotion of social programmes prior to the elections.	Exogenous
	The unrestricted use of vehicles of the social programmes at election time encourages clientelist practices.	
	Limiting the awarding of benefits of social programmes at election time discourages clientelism.	
Citizen participation.	The active participation of actors and beneficiaries promotes transparency and limits opportunities for clientelism.	Endogenous and exogenous
	Participation in the logic of “social treasury inspector’s office” helps detect, sanction and eradicates corruption.	
	Citizen participation is more effective when it includes the actors in all the phases of the programmes, making them responsible for their own development.	
	Participation strengthens citizenship and empowerment of rights.	
Complaint and denunciation mechanisms.	The inexistence and inefficacy of these mechanisms encourage clientelism and corruption.	Exogenous and endogenous
	Complaint and denunciation mechanisms are fundamental in controlling the concentration of power and discretionality.	
	These mechanisms favour the guarantee of citizens’ rights.	
	These mechanisms strengthen the notion of the benefits of social programmes as rights and not as favours.	

Grupo FARO thus incorporated into its experience of combating clientelism in social programmes knowledge and endogenous learning acquired previously in questions of access to public information and transparency, strengthening of citizen participation, and in virtue of the diagnosis of the nine social programmes and the systematisation of the work experience in Aliméntate Ecuador and Maternidad Gratuita, the inexistence or inefficacy of the complaint and denunciation mechanisms.

The knowledge, learning and evidence described above allowed Grupo FARO to present to civil society organizations, social programme administrators, the Technical Secretariat of the Frente Social and the Board of Ministers an innovative proposal to combat clientelism which, in essence, consisted of an Agreement signed between these stakeholders in a commitment to publicise the concept of clientelism and its repercussions, take specific

actions to limit the use of the programmes and their resources in electoral periods and boost compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Information (LOTAI).

In addition to the quantitative results obtained from the monitoring of the Agreement, we should ask what real impact the initiative had in its attempt to promote a new culture in public management. The answers are explorations obtained in interviews with social programme administrators, local actors, civil society organisations and members of the Grupo FARO working team.

i) Promote diffusion of social programmes as citizens rights

The manipulation of social programmes and their clientelist manifestations were seen to have taken hold in the citizens' lack of knowledge as regards their rights. "Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote" and "Mr Candidate: get your hands off my bowl" are campaign slogans that promoted the recognition that the social programmes were State organized and, as such, are not liable to be appropriated by politicians. Two years after implementing the initiative, it cannot be established to what extent the social programme administrators were previously empowered in focusing in rights in programme policy. However, on interviewing them, all agreed that it is necessary for citizens to understand that social programmes are expressions of their rights and not of the benevolence or help of a candidate⁵⁶. Despite the difficulty of measuring the real impact of the campaign, it must be pointed out that the diffusion mechanisms were focused on promoting the economic and social rights of the beneficiaries but also implicitly, on promoting the guarantee of political rights by revealing forms of coercion or manipulation of the vote. Although there is still much to do to change perceptions and practices that belong to a political culture with a clientelist trend and, even more so, on the rocky road towards full citizenship, the experience is, without doubt, a first and fundamental step.

"(...) That's why the poster read: 'Mr Candidato: get your hands off my bowl'. That was our initiative to reflect our commitment, in terms of the particularities of our programme and to join actions so that people would see the rights they have, that they're not a gift from anybody, but the exercise of responsible citizenship," interview with economist Justo Tobas, Coordinator of the Programme Alimentation Escolar.

ii) Reveal "political clientelism" as a problem in social programmes between civil society and public administration actors

Political and electoral clientelism is a constant practice in Ecuador: it has diverse manifestations and generates varied perceptions in citizens. It should be stressed that speaking of "political and electoral clientelism" in Ecuador is synonymous with "buying votes," in the style of what Trotta (2003) and Gruenberg (2006) recognise as "dense clientelism". In its most elaborate manifestations, citizens perceive as a clientelist act the

⁵⁶ We cannot assert that the focus on rights observed in the discourse of the coordinators and technical experts on the BDH, PAE, AE, PMG and FODI programmes is an effect of the initiative. It would seem that they link in to the discourse on "citizenship" promoted by the current Rafael Correa government.

offers of work made by political actors⁵⁷. For administrators, political clientelism is associated with corruption, and emerges when there is “discretionality” in the management of public assets and, in the case of the programmes, in the selection of beneficiaries and distribution of resources. Although it is not possible to reconstruct the level of perception that the administrators and civil society organisations have on the subject of clientelism prior to the signing of the Transparency Agreement, the Coordinators interviewed were asked if there was in the institution any policy or activity to combat clientelism in the programmes. The majority of administrators (ORI, PAE, AE, PMG, SIV and FODI) indicated that no specific policies were geared to combating clientelism in the programmes prior to the signing of the Agreement. However, in the cases of ORI, PAE, AE and FODI⁵⁸ they indicated that processes had begun to make public management transparent and avoid corruption.

Likewise, investigations were made to see if some study or report existed to establish critical bottlenecks in programme administration that would show in which moments of the distribution of benefits clientelist management could occur. In all cases the response was negative, but what had been done in some programmes was to diagnose what was not working well and where there was corruption in the use of public funds. Although it is true that most clientelist acts are acts of corruption, these questions reaffirmed that the question of political clientelism as such and the need to fight it were not part of the public administration agenda in general, nor of the social programmes in particular. This was corroborated when, on questioning the administrators on whether there had ever been a meeting between the coordinators of the programmes called by the then Ministry of Social welfare to coordinate or establish strategies related to combating clientelism, all agreed that, although there was a need to make public management transparent, the question of combating clientelism had not been discussed.

Something similar occurs among civil society representatives. One of those interviewed⁵⁹ claimed that a general perception existed that politicians use clientelist strategies. However, there was no debate on clientelism in social programmes, and no information on the subject. The civil society organisations involved felt motivated to sign the Agreement as a result of the information they received from Grupo FARO, which revealed the scale of the problem, its manifestations and effects.

In general, for the first time in the experiences of civil society participation, the problem was being addressed and tackled through specific activities. On questioning the administrators about whether there had previously been any proposal to work on the topic, all agreed that there had been initiatives of social oversight boards, but none had addressed the issue of political clientelism.

It should be mentioned that the impact in visibility of the issue seems, in general, to have been greater among the upper spheres of public administration and in the civil society

⁵⁷ See study by Participación Ciudadana (2007).

⁵⁸ The FODI Programme is relatively new, and began to function as such in 2005.

⁵⁹ Interview with Dr. Ruth Hidalgo, director of Corporación Participación Ciudadana, an organisation which specialises in follow-up and oversight of election processes. Her paper stresses transparency and control of electoral spending.

organisations participating in the Agreement (all based in the capital of the Republic)⁶⁰. Although Ecuadorian politics is forged in the two most important provinces of Ecuador, Quito and Guayaquil, it needs to be taken to subnational and local territorial levels in which the manifestations of clientelism are not only part of public policy discourse or of a matter of agenda, but daily naturalised practices, that in the logic of complex social, political and economic relations remain outside the knowledge and in-depth analysis of the “centre” administrators.

iii) Include on the agenda of social programmes the question of political clientelism and the need to combat it through specific strategies

The initiative meant, in fact, the - temporary at least - incorporation of the question and the need to combat it on the agenda of the social programmes through compliance with the specific activities outlined by Grupo FARO. This includes sending communications to all provincial coordinations and spheres of local administration informing of the Agreement and some manifestations of political clientelism that should be censured, combated and denounced. The letters thus publicised specific measures such as:

- The need to raise awareness among allied organisations to the programmes on the concept of clientelism and its social, political and economic consequences⁶¹.
- Reprogramming the giving of support and public events when they coincide with election periods and lend themselves to manipulation or confusion.
- Making it obligatory to safeguard vehicles belonging to institutions.
- Strengthening citizen oversight processes.
- Activating denunciation mechanisms such as a 1800 telephone line, electronic mail, telephone numbers and others.
- Launch of a dissemination campaign on the signing of the agreement.
- Providing civil society with the results of campaign mechanisms.
- Encouraging denunciations of political pressures.

These specific activities were promoted by the national coordinators of the programmes through an informative letter⁶² that publicised the signing of the Agreement, the concept and manifestations of political clientelism, and invited local Coordinators to denounce any attempt at political manipulation and at forestalling public assets to guarantee compliance with the objectives of the programme. It contained a warning on the effects of clientelism in efforts to overcome poverty and stimulate inclusion. The letter may be seen below.

Diffusion of the Agreement

⁶⁰ Except for the Aliméntate Ecuador programme, which promoted awareness-raising workshops for local actors such as Local councils. The impact of the radio slots cannot be strictly, which means that a link in the real impact assessment among the end users of the social programmes.

⁶¹ Document 1 (Annexes) contains the content of the official letters sent by the national programme coordinators to raise awareness among local actors.

⁶² See Document 1 in the Annex.

I hereby inform you that on 14 July 2006 directors of ten social programmes signed an agreement on the transparent use of public resources during the election campaign. This event, with participation by the Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil FODI, Operation de Rescate Infantil ORI, Aliméntate Ecuador, PAE, PAN 2000, Programme de Protection Social, SIV Urbano, SIV Rural, FISE, and the Ley de Maternidad Gratuita, has brought to the attention of the public a phenomenon known as clientelism.

(...)

Therefore, the directors and officials of the ten most important social programmes in Ecuador, which handle over 300 million dollars and serve more than 3 million beneficiaries, have expressed their desire to combat clientelism in the 2006 election campaign. The general proposal is to reject any political pressure to make inappropriate use of public funds, and to stay on the path of new technical reforms (...) (See Annex 3, Document 1).

Concept of clientelism

(...)

Clientelism is the use of public resources for political ends. It can be seen in various forms. Some examples are the use of public vehicles to support the election campaign of a candidate, the giving of benefits of a social programme to a candidate's political allies, the awarding of a public contract to a private company that financed an election campaign, the use of technical or field personnel from projects for political campaigning, the use of families benefiting from the projects in a political campaign arguing that if they do not work on the campaign the project will close, or the use of any public resource to favour a candidate's election campaign.

Effects of political clientelism on social programmes

Clientelism renders social programmes to relieve poverty ineffective. In many cases, clientelist networks do not benefit the poorest but the politically strong. This means that by paying their taxes all Ecuadorians are having to pay for ineffective programmes. Even worse, politically weak groups do not have the same rights as the rest. The exclusion of these groups from public services, such as health and education, increases wealth disparity.

When clientelism is accepted as "normal", the political, economic and social development of the country is harmed enormously. Clientelism is a dominant practice in populist democracies in which candidates take advantage of the emotions of citizens offering speeches with immediate promises and goods, but not with long-term effective public policy. The candidates that hand out more food, T-shirts, caps, notebooks, etc., are elected, not those with most capacity to lead the country's development plans. (...) (See Annex 3/Document 1).

Incorporating public officials, employees and local actors

(...)

However, in the social programmes developed by the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (in the sectors of housing, sanitation and drinking water, and territorial zoning), it is essential to have the support of all officials from the institution and of the executive organisations at the local level to combat this phenomenon. The signing of this agreement does not restrict the freedom of all Ecuadorians to elect or be elected, what it does is guard against the use of public resources and that they should not be used under any concept to favour any candidate.

We hereby request that the executive organisations, technical and field personnel, management committees, parents, oversight boards and other personnel inform the central office if they experience any political pressure in the execution of projects. Only together can we ensure that the benefits of the MIDUVI's social programmes remain social and not political.

(...) (Ibidem).

Together with these concrete activities are the initiatives taken by five programmes. The Programa Alimentate Ecuador (AE) and the Programa de Maternidad Gratuita, which had initiated a process of joint work with Grupo FARO before the signing of the Transparency Agreement, promoted workshops for local actors. In the case of AE, the work of diffusion focused on the presidents of the local councils and so the support of the Grupo FARO team was requested. The Maternidad Gratuita programme publicised the issue in its workshops for "user committees". Meanwhile, the FODI adopted additional measures to prevent providers of services/successful bidders for resources from using the programmes. They were requested to resign from their positions if presenting candidatures, and it was stipulated that if the reports and publications of the activities performed by the successful organisations bidding for resources were to carry images of a certain person or organisation, then those photographs should be of actual beneficiaries. As a result of the poster "Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote", the Programa de Alimentación Escolar decided to design and print a poster with the characteristics of the Programme⁶³. According to its former Technical Coordinator, the Operation de Rescate Infantil (ORI) programme ran several workshops, not necessarily to publicise the agreement, but to inform of the need for transparent programmes and raise awareness among the population as to its role in combating political clientelism⁶⁴.

iv) Promoting the culture of transparency and accountability

In connection with Transparency Agreement, the Grupo FARO held several working meetings with the coordinators of the social programmes, technical experts and those

⁶³ It was initially agreed to print 2000 copies. The Programme Coordinator indicated that after the experience more posters were printed for distribution.

⁶⁴ Interviewee engineer Diego Granja pointed out that during the Gutiérrez administration the ORI had become a den of total iniquity, and approximately 90% of the child care centres sponsored and funded by ORI were not operating as such and had been opened in places where there was no real need or beneficiaries. ORI had become a space of corruption to favour government party followers.

responsible for following up the initiative in each programme. These working meetings focused on the need to make public management as a tool to combat corruption and political clientelism transparent. On asking interviewees about the objectives and achievements of the initiative, all to some extent emphasised transparency as an objective. In addition, among some interviewees, Grupo FARO was placed as a civil society organisation that promotes transparency in the management of public funds⁶⁵.

The discursive structure of interviewees revealed that the experience and work of Grupo FARO had managed to position the initiative as a bid to combat political clientelism based on transparency in accountability and on the strengthening of civil society organisations incorporated in programme administration.

v) Encouraging compliance with the LOTAIP

The third objective of the experience sought to promote compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP) as regards publicising information on web portals. The role of Grupo FARO went beyond that of a civil society oversight organisation to take on the role of advisor, allowing administrative stakeholders to incorporate suggestions as regards the type, quantity and quality of the information to be publicised on the web and how to make it accessible to users:

“(...) At that time, if I remember rightly, the LOTAIP was already in force, so we had our web page, but had to perfect it. These initiatives force you to be prepared for an accountability process, from wherever it may come. I would like these oversight boards not to be sponsored either by Grupo FARO or by any other NGO, but to be the fruit of the maturity of the social organisation, for Ecuadorian society to organise itself alone without the need for any NGO. I see that as a process that we need to build (...) Grupo FARO suggested that we change some things about the information that was publicised on the web and we accept them. If it’s to improve, then that’s fine.” Interview with the Coordinator of the Alimentation Escolar Programme, economist Justo Tobar.

“(...) They gave us great support in improving the web page and complying with the provisions of LOTAIP”. (Interview with economist Francisco Carrión, FODI Coordinator)

To a greater or lesser extent, all interviewees recognised the role of Grupo FARO in promoting the LOTAIP and in the improvement of the web pages.

⁶⁵ Economist Pablo Salazar, former technical secretary of the Frente Social; engineer Richard Espinosa, former coordinator of Aliméntate Ecuador; economist David Alomía, National Coordinator of the Programa de Protección Social BDH; Iván Cañizares, Executive Unit for the Law on Free Motherhood (PMG).

vi) Raising awareness among key local actors on the specific manifestations and effects of political clientelism in social programmes

This outcome was achieved in two different ways with diverse effects: a) awareness-raising work and direct training of presidents of the local councils; b) indirectly in radio slots, campaign poster and actions of diffusion of local administrators. Measuring the impact of the awareness-raising and diffusion campaign in local actors is a titanic task. However, access was much better in the case of local councils, key actors in the Aliméntate Ecuador programme, through workshops run by Grupo FARO. The workshops, however, did not reach all the provinces due to budgetary reasons. The results of the radio slots cannot be measured either, although it is assumed they primarily reached rural sectors, since the slots were broadcast on amplitude modulation (AM) frequency, which is of greater access in rural areas than in urban ones. The Grupo FARO working team for this initiative, coordinated by Maribel Almeida, has the perception that, in general, awareness was raised primarily among the members of the local councils as key citizen actors in the Aliméntate Ecuador programme, and the users committees of the Maternidad Gratuita programme.

vii) Strengthening recognition of citizens participation

The diffusion and training activities performed by Grupo FARO for local and technical actors in the programmes was based on the need to strengthen participation of community organisations and actors benefiting or participating in the execution of the programmes at some time. Although the initiative's scarce resources did not allow it to reach all the actors in the value chain of the social programmes in its attempt to strengthen local capacities in activating processes of accountability, the strengthening of citizens participation in the management, monitoring and assessment of social programmes had greater impact among administrators⁶⁶.

E) THE STRATEGIES USED BY THE PUBLIC POLICY CENTRE AND THEIR EFFICACY

Interviews with the Grupo FARO team, civil society organisations and administrators of the social programmes, as well as the documented information compiled, allow the following strategies to be identified:

- Capitalisation of prior relations with public administration.
- Direct *lobbying with Programme Coordinators*.
- Generating incentives for competition (ranking of compliance).
- Establishing strategic alliances.
- Legitimising the initiative by involving civil society actors.
- Involving the principal ministries.
- Mass diffusion of the agreement.

Grupo FARO took advantage of a “policy window” that opened with a new Government, which was more interested in incorporating technical administrators in the

⁶⁶ Interviews with coordinators of the social programmes.

programmes than the Gutiérrez government. In this scenario, in 2006, with support from the Fondo de la Alianza por la Transparencia (PTF) a process of joint work began with Aliméntate Ecuador (AE) to monitor the transparent use of programme funds while promoting the strengthening of citizens' participation. This and other previous work experiences with Operation Rescate Infantil (ORI) and Maternidad Gratuita (PMG) were used in order to bring other programmes into the initiative to combat political clientelism. In addition, Grupo FARO had managed to position itself as a specialised public policy centre in issues of transparency.

But the prior work experience was insufficient. The Coordinator for the initiative, Maribel Almeida, undertook direct lobbying process with each one of the Coordinators of the social programmes to secure the interest and political will. The *lobby* strategy was strengthened as more programmes joined: nobody wanted to be left out of signing the agreement. The lobbying strategy was also designed to win the support of the "Board of Ministers" of the Frente Social. The initiative therefore had great support.

With three of the most important social programmes committed, the others had greater incentive to become involved. After the denunciations of corruption in some programmes, it was necessary for the administrators to participate in the Agreement and, thus, send the message that they were acting with transparency. As mentioned, the ranking as a tool did not motivate incorporation and compliance because in general the informants claimed to have no knowledge of the existence of a *ranking*. However, knowing that the programmes would be assessed in some way did promote a certain logic of competition between them, especially between similar programmes.

Another Grupo FARO strategy to place the initiative on the public agenda was to establish key alliances. One of them, more personal than institutional, was forged with economist Pablo Salazar, former technical secretary of the Frente Social, who used his good relations with certain ministers to promote the initiative and take it to the Board of Ministers⁶⁷. The presidents of the local councils, such as local actors, were also key in the diffusion of the Agreement.

Special mention should be made of the strategy of alliance with other actors from civil society which, although they signed the Agreement, did not participate actively in diffusion and monitoring, principally because, from the outset, they had made no commitments with them. However, given its history, its institutional endorsement meant, no doubt, an incentive to achieve greater commitment with the administrators on presenting the proposal as of social interest. Signing a bilateral agreement is not the same as signing one between nine social programmes, seven civil society organisations, and having as witnesses of honour the State Comptroller, three ministers and the Secretary of the Frente Social, economist Pablo Salazar.

Once the issue had been placed on the public agenda, the communicational strategy was central in carrying out two of the three objectives proposed: raising awareness and publicising the campaign to combat clientelism. Lastly, and to monitor the whole process, the

⁶⁷ Interview with Pablo Salazar.

Programme Coordination got the programmes to designate persons responsible for following up the initiative, facilitating the work of Grupo FARO and compliance with the Agreement.

F) THE CONSTRAINTS AND THE LESSONS LEARNT

In principle, the experience of combating clientelism in social programmes can be qualified as successful. However, certain constraints and lessons that may be of use in attempting other similar experiences should be taken into account. The constraints of the experience are apparent in three fundamental areas: i) institutional impact; ii) impact on local actors; iii) media impact; and iv) socialisation of outcomes with the actors involved.

i) **Institutional impact.** The initiative made an impact during its execution and was placed on the agenda of the social programmes. However, it was not institutionalised in all of them. This limitation is recognised in the report contained in the document *La Llave* (2007):

“It is not possible to claim that the signing of the Agreement has produced structural changes within the social programmes. However, it is certain that the fundamental objective has been obtained: to place the subject on the political agenda (...).”

This analysis involves considering the initial purpose of Grupo FARO to be to place the phenomenon of political clientelism in social programmes and the need to combat it on the public agenda. This aim was met during the execution of the initiative, however, on consulting the programme administrators which measures had subsequently been adopted to combat political clientelism, only the Coordinator of the Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil (FODI) and that of the Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE) mentioned continuous measures and policies to avoid clientelist management of the programmes. Consequently, the main constraint of the proposal was seen to be that “combating political and electoral clientelism” could not be institutionalised, and generating permanent policy in the programmes. It is worth highlighting the two programmes in which concern was voiced over the issue (FODI and PAE). Their current coordinators were subcoordinators at the time in which the initiative was carried out⁶⁸, which implies that the greatest stability and success of an initiative, as well as its greatest likelihood of being institutionalised, is closely related to the greater stability of the administrators when they have committed to the initiative.

ii) **Impact on local actors.** Political and electoral clientelism emerges fundamentally on a subnational scale and the original beneficiaries are in the provinces and, primarily, in rural and urban-marginal sectors. The initiative to combat clientelism relied on the national coordinations of the programmes publicising the Agreement so that it would reach the beneficiaries. In fact, the national coordinations decided that it should go ahead; but although the campaign to combat clientelism was publicized in the printed media and on the radio, it

⁶⁸ Something similar but less emphatic was observed in the Programa de Maternidad Gratuita (PMG), in which technical staff had done very little. The technical expert responsible was able to tell us that at the workshops for “the users committees” the subject of clientelism and the need to combat it is included.

was seen to have little impact on beneficiaries. A strong constraint of the experience concerns the lack of a detailed study that reveals in which phases or moments of the administration and value chain of social programmes is there participation by local, social or community actors, and how these relate and articulate with the programmes. With a study of this magnitude, it would be simpler to identify the key actors in each of the social programmes and define strategies to reach them.

“(...) I think it worked more here because this is where the offices of the programmes are. I know that Maribel travelled to some provinces to publicise the campaign... my mum works in the Health Directorate of Bolívar and is the person in charge of Maternidad Gratuita and she never heard of this campaign, and never got the posters. I came to work in FARO and knew, we even had the T-shirts (...) but my mum said “they should have done more diffusion”.... And everyone was supposed to get the official letter... I suppose that they did in some cases... then they said we got the poster, but we don’t know where they put it... she said ‘It must be in the health centres, to inform the users’” (Interview with member of the Grupo FARO Technical Team).

The testimony above reveals that the Grupo FARO initiative did not reach all beneficiaries and actors involved in all the social programmes, due to a lack of planning rather than due to lack of compliance with the Agreement by the administrations and officials of the social programmes.

iii) **Media impact.** We shall begin by saying that what is not in the headlines of the mass media, like television and the printed press is not on the public agenda. Despite the media coverage given to the signing of the Transparency Agreement, the initiative was unable to place the need to combat clientelism in social programmes on the public agenda. Given its importance and real impact, media coverage of the initiative could have been greater.

iv) **Socialisation of the results with actors involved.** Although the experience was monitored, systematised and assessed, the interviews with certain coordinators of the social programmes and representatives of civil society organisations that signed the Transparency Agreement revealed the need for the progress and, in particular, the results of the experience, to be disseminated among the main actors participating. Various interviewees claimed not to know the final results and the position of their programme in the ranking of compliance.

G) CHARACTERISING THE EXPERIENCE “NEITHER GIFTS NOR BLACKMAIL IN EXCHANGE FOR YOUR VOTE”

The Grupo FARO initiative with the social programmes in Ecuador can be characterised as an experience: i) which tended a **bridge between theory and practice**; ii) an innovative **evidence-based** initiative; iii) of **visibilisation, awareness-raising, prevention and fight against** clientelism in social programmes; iv) an experience that encourages changes in public administration and civil society. It should be recognised that the initiative was opportune and relevant.

Grupo FARO is a civil society organisation that, unlike others characterised by “activist” labour, works on the investigation, design, analysis and assessment of public policy. The experience “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” is characterised principally for using previous studies on clientelism in social programmes and the “New Public Management” approach as a referential framework⁶⁹. The initiative to combat social clientelism in programmes incorporated central aspects of the debate on the subject into its design, execution and monitoring. It worked on the diffuse aspects of the issue, the need to empower local actors in exercising citizenship and social participation, as well as the need to show the negative effects of clientelist practice in social policy and among the poor.

We say that it is an experience that tended a bridge between theory and practice since the strength of the centre for public policy in research went beyond that of a concrete experience. “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” is an example of how knowledge may be applied and impregnate with specific, clear and concrete proposals the new relations between civil society and the State. The postulates of the “New Public Management” model materialised in specific and concrete proposals like the methodology of monitoring compliance with the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP), as well as in the advice given on setting up mechanisms to receive complaints and, in general, in all the activities geared to transparency and efficiency in the provision of the services of the social programmes.

We say it was an innovative initiative because for the first time a civil society organisation in Ecuador addressed the need to combat clientelism in social programmes. Also for the first time an organisation was able to commit the principal social programmes to particular action. In addition, the strength of the initiative was possible, among other aspects, because it managed to commit and involve important civil society organisations and the Government⁷⁰. Most of the interviewees, even in civil society, characterised the proposal as an innovative initiative, “something that needed doing, but that nobody dared do”. At the same time, the initiative was evidence-based, not only because it took initiatives carried out in other countries as antecedents, but principally, due to the results obtained by the public policy centre itself in diagnosing and assessing social programmes.

The design of the initiative and its execution explicitly posed the objective of placing the problem of clientelism and the need to combat it on the public agenda. On assessing the results of each of the phases, it was observed that the initiative had revealed the phenomenon in social programmes and local actors. The awareness raised and, through specific measures,

⁶⁹ Also known as *New Public Management*, it promotes changes in public administration as a central component of the so-called second-generation reforms promoted by international banks (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and International Monetary Fund). We propose to take a critical view of the visions promoted by this model, due to the impossibility of passing the logic of private administration into the public sphere, which by definition does not respond to market criteria but to social welfare.

⁷⁰ Thanks to the Technical Secretariat of the Frente Social, the initiative was taken to the Council of Ministers, who gave their support.

a sort of fight against clientelism could also be seen in the results. It is worth stressing that, in accordance with the verdict of three of the interviewees, in the programmes that were not known to be clientelist, the initiatives had a preventive and informative effect.

Lastly, something that characterises the experience outlined here is that it sought to generate changes in public administration and in civil society. In administration, it planned to promote transparency in administration and financial management, compliance with the LOTAIP, the setting up of complaint and denunciation mechanisms and the incorporation and strengthening of the local actors.

As will be explained below, in the analysis of endogenous and exogenous factors, the initiative appeared at a time when programme administrators showed openness to moves to make their administration more transparent, and it was apposite since it addressed a latent “phenomenon” which had become invisible.

III ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN THE SUCCESS AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE EXPERIENCE

As in any successful experience, in this case study it is possible to identify and explore many internal and external factors that influenced the initiative to a greater or lesser extent. Although some elements of analysis have already been discussed, we shall attempt to present certain brief explanations.

ENDOGENOUS FACTORS

Objective driven technical work. As strengths of Grupo FARO, it has been established that this public policy centre has incorporated objective-driven administrative practices in its management model. Projects are executed technically seeking the convergence of quantitative and qualitative tools in the follow-up, monitoring and assessment of results. This characteristic was achieved by means of continuous learning. The Grupo FARO technical team clearly defines the objectives and establishes expected results, then identifies the key players and the strategies to influence and reach the objectives.

Research and evidence-based innovation. As one of the interviewees indicated, of the total of the public policy centre's tasks, the research and analysis of public policy is the most important aspect, and may represent, according to the perceptions of the women interviewed, over 60% of the work. The research seeks convergence between the theoretical aspects and the empirical evidence and attempts both to "ground" the theoretical aspects in reality, and to propose theory on the basis of reality. The strong research component and knowledge generation allows Grupo FARO to innovate in public policy on the basis of other successful experiences, which is why the documentation on good practices is so important. Any Grupo FARO initiative entails a previous planning stage which includes an analysis of successful experiences or similar cases that endow the project in question with inputs. One of the interviewees said:

"(...) I interviewed my colleague who gave us the information and I've seen the information from Grupo FARO on the web page, as well as the meetings we had. I see it as an NGO that promotes oversight. I must admit that she abides by the guidelines of the programme, a space to take observation and knowledge of successful experiences. This was what led us to join" (Interview with a Coordinator of a social programme).

Thus, it is recognised that Grupo FARO's work based on evidence and successful experiences encouraged the actors in public administration to join the initiative.

Positioning as a public policy centre. Despite being a civil society organisation, Grupo FARO stands at a certain distance from other similar organisations because of its weak political protagonism⁷¹. However, it has managed to position itself as a reference of what a

⁷¹ Many civil society organisations are "activist" organisations.

public policy centre is and should be. One of the interviewees analysed the low media impact of Grupo FARO as both positive and negative, arguing that Grupo FARO is recognised as a *think tank* but not as an activist organisation that seeks protagonism⁷². All the coordinators and technical experts interviewed mentioned this characteristic of Grupo FARO to some extent.

Financing. Established as another potentiality of Grupo FARO that, as regards incorporating the initiative on the public agenda, could help towards securing economic resources to execute the initial proposal. One of the interviewees indicated that when a civil society organisation approaches the social programme to propose oversight activities or participation in an initiative requesting resources for it, there are no chance since possibilities many organisations have done deals with the oversight boards.

Multidisciplinary staff. The Grupo FARO team is made up of a multidisciplinary group of professionals, technical experts, academics and researchers, which no doubt allows the incorporation of very varied knowledge.

The constraints of the experience of combating clientelism are not directly related to endogenous characteristics of the public policy centre, except as regards the media impact of the initiative. In general, as emerges from the interviews with members of the FARO team, there is no strong policy or resources provided for strategies of media lobbying, a situation that has great impact when it is an initiative to place a subject on the public agenda⁷³.

EXOGENOUS FACTORS

Although this study outlined several factors that had an influence in making better use of knowledge and evidence, thus ensuring the success of the initiative, and certain constraints were identified, a summary of what we call exogenous factors will be presented in this section.

Political and institutional context as a “policy window”

“Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” appeared at a time of political crisis, of institutional disruption and in a scenario characterised by the lack of legitimacy of social programmes among the citizens as a result of the denunciations of corruption and clientelism that shook the Lucio Gutiérrez government and led to his overthrow.

There was, in consequence, a need to make the administration of the social programmes transparent and to recover the lost legitimacy. In addition, the new Government made an important –but incomplete– renewal of the directors or coordinators of social programmes. So, for example, the new coordinators and technical experts on the Alimentate Ecuador (AE) and Operation Rescate Infantil (ORI) programmes, who had been the focus of the

⁷² One interviewee mentioned that he ascribed to the Grupo FARO proposal after learning of its history and confirming that it is not like other civil society organisations, which only seek personal reward or institutional protagonism.

⁷³ Grupo FARO is currently in a strategic planning process and is defining its “Theory of Change.” Its new vision incorporates the need to strengthen its levels of media impact, maintaining its impartiality and forestalling the legitimacy it has earned as a public policy centre.

denunciations of clientelist management and corruption, showed particular interest in purging the programmes and even redesigning certain phases of the administration to limit the bottlenecks that encouraged discretionality and manipulation for political ends:

“(...) there was a lot of work and technical confidence in the team and I think that helped. It was an instrument that fit very well with the dynamic of a Government that was trying to make a mark (...) It was making a very specific effort to root out the questions of clientelism in social programmes, it worked on assessing the impact of the programmes. At that time I think that Galo Chiriboga was already Energy Minister, but I was involved in the period of transition in the Government (...) but there was also the commitment of the President. I teach public policy at FLACSO and I know about it, so it was an interesting situation, and a good initiative, which hadn’t existed before, but I’m not sure it can be repeated at this political moment, for example, with the sort of profile it has, with the leadership, the form, but also with a Government that is in a process of legitimisation, without the strong [weight of] public opinion. With citizens who have not fully identified the problem it is tremendously difficult without a sector that is empowered with the problems that it involves”. (Interview with the former Technical Secretary of Frente Social).

As the interviewee says, there was political and institutional openness to execute the proposal. Although combating clientelism in social programmes includes a strong dose of technical capacities that must be part of the design and administration of the model of distribution of benefits, the possibility of a real, sustained and effective change of practices in public administration assumes an essential need to join political wills from the highest spheres of government. Without straying from this case, we cannot fail to notice that the current political context characterised by a plebiscite practice and logic, of constant popular reaffirmation and permanent elections, limits the possibility of repeating or advancing in another phase of the experience⁷⁴.

Technical profile of the administrators of the social programmes

The analysis of the experience meant identifying whether there were common specific characteristics in the new team of social programme coordinators. It could be confirmed that the programme administrators who showed the greatest commitment to the Transparency Agreement and compliance with it responded, albeit to an appointment of a political nature, to a prior consideration of their quality as technical experts and professionals trained to respond to the challenges of programme coordination. So, it was observed that the profile of the Technical Secretary of Frente Social was an important boost to ensuring that the Board of Ministers approved the proposal. Likewise, on interviewing the programme coordinators as

⁷⁴ Unlike his predecessor Alfredo Palacios, the current president, Rafael Correa, has a long-term “political project”, which implies that he is using a diversity of “popular” strategies to maintain the support of the citizens. This has meant higher social investment, a rise in bond prices and, in general, benefits awarded by the social programmes, which are well publicized by the Government. It is easy to imagine that an experience like “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” would not be well received in the current political context.

to preceding administrations, in particular, those of the Gutiérrez government, they lacked the incorporation of technical criteria in the management of the social programmes.

“(...) evidently we had just come from a government, there was a common characteristic among those who worked with Palacio, which was general rejection of clientelist practices, there was a lot of questioning on the subject, and many technical people around in the programmes who were not looking for a clientelist work logic...” (Interview with the former Secretary of Frente Social)

In general, it can be concluded that the greatest level of compliance with the agreement was found in the social programmes that were directed by professionals with a technical profile and in those in which there was greatest risk or perception of opportunities for clientelist manipulation. One of the programmes that obtained the lowest results in the final assessment was the Bono de Desarrollo Humano and the Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición. On interviewing the coordinator and an official of these programmes, both agreed that, although they joined the initiative, the opportunities for clientelist manipulation in the programme are almost inexistent due to the characteristics of the programmes in question. In the first case, there is a data base for selecting beneficiaries that annuls any discretionality the political actors may have; and, in the second, the type of benefit given (“*mi papilla y mi bebida*”) prevents clientelist manipulation from existing, since they are not benefits that can be extended to all the population since the beneficiaries are the children in their early years.

Prior relations and work experience with social programmes

Another exogenous factor, but one with a high endogenous content, are the prior relations that Grupo FARO had fostered with the Aliméntate Ecuador and the Maternidad Gratuita programmes. These prior experiences had shown that, when designing strategies to combat clientelism in social programmes, an essential starting point is to inform users and direct beneficiaries as to programmes concerning their rights. At the same time, public officials and actors from civil society had been trained on the concept and consequences of clientelism in social programmes. Lastly, the work experiences with these programmes concerning compliance with la LOTAIP revealed the need to extend the initiative to other social programmes, relying on the prior learning and legitimacy from the work done.

Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP)

Lastly, as an exogenous factor “Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote” used the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP) as its principal tool. Although the law had been in force for several years, the social programmes revealed a considerable lack of compliance with the provisions on publicising information on the web page. Grupo FARO was able to place its proposal in a legal framework that recognised the right of citizens to be informed and the obligation of the public administration to facilitate access to information and include complaints and denunciation mechanisms.

IV CONCLUSIONS

The study of clientelism as an electoral strategy of political parties and actors assumes an understanding of its multidimensionality and adaptability to diverse socio-political and institutional contexts and realities. The case study discussed is part of the debate on political clientelism in general and the debate that arises in social programmes, in particular; which is why it is necessary to discuss certain hypotheses. Below are the conclusions on the debate on political clientelism in social programmes, social spending and programmes in Ecuador and the experience of combating clientelism in Grupo FARO's social programmes.

In Ecuador, clientelism is seen as a criticised but naturalised practice and converted into a constant institution organising political life. "Dense" clientelism is clearly identified but no perception of clientelism in social programmes is observed, which is why we dare to say that, in general, there is a growing invisibility of clientelism in social programmes.

"Neither gifts nor blackmail in exchange for your vote" was the first experience of combating clientelism in social programmes in Ecuador. This, along with a series of strategies like lobbying the programme coordinators, capitalising on previous work on issues of transparency, and incorporating strategic local and civil society actors, meant the initiative could be placed on the administration agenda of the social programmes.

The experience of combating clientelism analysed appears at a time of macroeconomic stability and, in particular, of disruption of institutional suffering under the previous government. In most cases, the actors joined the initiative seeking to incorporate important changes in the programmes and, in others, seeking to show that the new administration was transparent. In both cases there was a need to legitimise the administration of the social programmes. This was confirmed on verifying that in measuring the results of the Transparency Agreement the programmes that best responded and complied were precisely those that had been denounced for corruption in the previous government. So, Grupo FARO found a policy window to incorporate the initiative into the public agenda.

The Grupo FARO initiative was successful in managing to reveal clientelism as a problem that affects the efficacy of the social programmes and harms the poorest sectors in the country. It was also able to promote changes in public administration in relation to transparency in the administration and strengthen channels of citizens' participation. The constraints, though, were the impossibility of sustaining the initiative and, although it had managed to place the subject on the public administration agenda, it did not become an issue of the public agenda, fundamentally due to a weak media strategy.

It was not possible to reach all the local actors in the same way. The best results were obtained with the local councils, strategic actors in the Aliméntate Ecuador programme. The asymmetries in the responses of the programmes are in general for two reasons: a) technical characteristics of the administrators; and b) a perception of risk of clientelism by the actors.

The success of the Grupo FARO initiative in social programmes in Ecuador was as a response to multiple endogenous and exogenous factors, and was characterised as being a *bridge between theory and practice*; it is innovative, but *evidence-based*; an experience of

visibilisation, awareness-raising, preventing and combating clientelism in social programmes, and an experience that brought change in public administration and civil society.

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ANNEXES

Chart N°1: SPHERES AND MANIFESTATIONS OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN SOCIAL PROGRAMMES

Level	Actions
a. Beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusion of unqualified beneficiaries. - Inclusion of qualified but excluded beneficiaries, based on anti-technical and discretionary criteria. - Promise of inclusion in the programme.
b. Contractual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discretionary contracting of employees, promoters, administrators or coordinators at subnational level. - Discretionary contracting of suppliers of resources. - Discretionary choice of social or community organisations that distribute or provide service and, discretionary allocation of resources.
c. Discursive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of social programmes as help and achievement of political players. - Promises of increased benefits in social programmes, principally at election time. - Threat/blackmail involving "loss of social benefit."
d. Institutional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of vehicles and assets for political rallies or meetings. - Use of resources for promotion in the media and in public spaces of a political figure.

Source: Own data.

Chart N°2: SOCIAL PROGRAMMES THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE EXPERIENCE OF COMBATING CLIENTELISM

Programme	Creation	Type of programme	Objectives	Mechanism of operation
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH)	Precedents in the Solidarity or Poverty Bond created in 1998 (Jamil Mahuad's government) to compensate for effects of economic crisis.	SubsidFocused subsidy and a programme of conditioned monetary transfer.	Ensure a minimal level of consumption for familias below the poverty line (quintiles 1 & 2).	Monthly money transfer (currently 30 dollars) to mothers, the elderly and the disabled. (Instrument for selecting beneficiaries base - SELBEN)
Programa de Alimentación y Nutrición (PANN 200)	Precedents in the Programme of Mother-Child Assistance and Care (PACMI) administered by the Ministry of Health 1998-2000. After 2000 known as PANN 2000.	Focalised into sectors, but universal in coverage to all the beneficiaries that meet the requirements.	Contribute to improving the nutritional status of pregnant women, gestating mothers and children under the age of three through the living of food complements.	Unit under the Ministry of Health with the participation of the World Food Programme in acquisitions. The complements "mi papilla" y "mi bebida" are sent to the Operating Units of the Ministry of Health.

<p>Aliméntate Ecuador (AE)</p>	<p>Emerged at the beginning of the nineties as projects for community dining rooms and work groups; in 2002 it was called Programme for Community Development (PRADEC), and in 2004 it changed its name to Aliméntate Ecuador and refocused its attention to children aged 2 to 5.</p>	<p>Focused.</p>	<p>Improve the health and nutritional status of children; reduce the prevalence of anaemia in boys and girls; improve the psychomotor and cognitive development of boys and girls.</p>	<p>Currently functions as Technical and Administrative Unit of the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (previously Social Welfare). Food is purchased with the intermediation of the PMA and is distributed with the support of the local councils. Oil, rice, lentils, tuna are given to adults, the elderly and the disabled; and fortified food to children.</p>
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Source: Own data.

ANNEX 3

Document 1

MODEL OF OFFICIAL LETTER SENT BY NATIONAL COORDINATORS TO SUBNATIONAL COORDINATORS

República del Ecuador

Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda

Oficio circular No. SV-06 00098 - 2006

Quito, DM.

Señores

DIRECTORES PROVINCIALES MIDUVI

Presente

De mi consideración:

Por medio del presente me permito poner a su conocimiento que el 14 de Julio del 2006, directores de diez programas sociales firmaron un convenio para el uso transparente de recursos públicos durante la campaña electoral. Este evento, en el cual participaron el Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil FODI, Operación de Rescate Infantil ORI, Aliméntate Ecuador, PAE, PAN 2000, Programa de Protección Social, SIV Urbano, SIV Rural, FISE, y la Ley de Maternidad Gratuita, atrajo atención pública a un fenómeno denominado clientelismo.

El clientelismo es el uso de recursos públicos con fines políticos, se puede manifestar en varias formas. Algunos ejemplos son la prestación de vehículos públicos para apoyar la campaña electoral de un candidato, la entrega de beneficios de un programa social a aliados políticos de un candidato, la asignación de un contrato público a una empresa privada que financió una campaña electoral, el uso del personal técnico ó de campo de los proyectos para proselitismo político, la utilización de las familias beneficiarias de los proyectos en campaña política argumentando que de no trabajar en la campaña el proyecto se cerrará o utilizando cualquier recurso público para favorecer la campaña electoral de cualquier candidato.

El clientelismo torna inefectivos a los programas sociales en términos de aliviar la pobreza. Las redes clientelares en muchos casos, no benefician a los más pobres, sino a los políticamente más fuertes. Esto quiere decir que todos los ecuatorianos (as), mediante impuestos, tienen que pagar por programas poco efectivos. Aún peor, grupos políticamente débiles no tienen los mismos derechos que los demás. La exclusión de estos grupos de los servicios públicos, como salud y educación, aumenta la disparidad de la riqueza.

Cuando el clientelismo es aceptado como algo "normal", el desarrollo político, económico y social del país se perjudica enormemente. El clientelismo es una práctica dominante de democracias populistas donde los candidatos capitalizan las emociones de los ciudadanos usando discursos con promesas y bienes inmediatos más no con políticas públicas de largo plazo y efectivas. Se eligen los candidatos que reparten más alimentos, camisetas, gorras, cuadernos, etc., y no a los que tienen más capacidad para liderar planes de desarrollo del país.

Source: Archive of the Grupo FARO.

Annex 4

Chart N°4: Matrix of informants interviewed

No	Name	Institution
1	Richard Espinosa (engineer)	Former Coordinator of the Aliméntate Ecuador programme (AE).
2	Dr. Ruth Hidalgo	Director of Participation Ciudadana (PC). Former Coordinator of Coalition Acceso.
3	Dr. Ramiro Larrea	Former director of CEPLAES.
4	Ing. Luis Antonio Camino	Former provincial director of MIDUVI-Tungurahua.
5	Hernán Torres (engineer)	Provincial director of MIDUVI - Bolívar.
6	Justo Tóbar (economist)	Coordinator of the Programa de Alimentation Escolar (PAE)
7	Pablo Salazar (economist)	Former technical secretary of Frente Social.
8	Iván Cañizares	Programme de Maternidad Gratuita (PMG).
9	David Alomía (economist)	Coordinator del Programme de Protection Social responsable de varios programmes entre ellos Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH).
10	Diego Granja (engineer)	Operation de Rescate Infantil.
11	Dr. Francisco Carrión	Coordinator of Fondo de Desarrollo Infantil.
12	Dr. Mariana Guerrero	Provincial Health Directorate of Loja.
13	Maribel Almeida	Coordinator of the experience analysed (Grupo FARO).
14	Mireya Villacís	FARO Team
15	Luis Chaguango	President of the parish council - Bolívar.